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Abstract  
This thesis is concerned with understanding how smart technologies are conceived, 
created and implemented, and explores the ways these processes are shaped by 
historical, geo-political, economic and technical contexts. At its core the thesis is 
concerned with understanding how technical citizenship and democracy can be 
preserved within the design process against a backdrop of increasing neoliberalism and 
technocracy. This is investigated by means of a comparative study of smart public 
bikeshare schemes in Dublin, Ireland and Hamilton, Canada. These schemes are 
configured and systemized using a variety of technical and ideological rationales and 
express the imaginaries of place in significantly different ways. Utilising a conceptual 
framework derived from Andrew Feenberg’s critical theory of technology, the thesis 
unpacks and problematizes the innovation process in order to understand how the 
outcomes of these schemes support the way of life of one or another influential social 
group. The philosophical orientation of the study is critical constructivism which 
combines a form of constructivism with more systematic and socially critical views of 
technology. The axis of comparison between the schemes is democratization and the 
manner in which the rationalizations and embedded cultural assumptions 
characterizing particular places operate to support or resist more egalitarian forms of 
participation. Methodologically, Feenberg’s critical framework is supported both by 
theory-driven thematic coding and critical hermeneutics which is an interpretative 
process that compliments the theoretical framework and positions issues of power and 
ideology within a wider, macro-level context. Data sources supporting the research 
comprise interviews, a variety of documentary sources and the architectures and 
technical specifications of both smart bikeshare systems. The findings from the 
research illustrate that despite the pervasiveness of a neoliberal orthodoxy 
conditioning technology production, citizen-centric design is still possible within a 
climate of consensus building and cooperation. As such, the thesis adds to the body of 
knowledge on philosophy of technology, critical urbanism, smart city development, 
democratic engagement and collaborative infrastructuring. In addition, the conceptual 
framework, developed in response to the empirical cases, represents an elaboration of 
Feenberg’s work and so the thesis also makes an important contribution to the analytic 
and methodological potential of critical theory of technology. 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
Introduction 
Through the use of data-driven systems and networked infrastructures, smart cities and 
the policy initiatives supporting them, are positioned as enabling cities achieve greater 
efficiency and control, sustainability, innovation and economic performance. In 
addition, and given technology’s capacity for transformation, technology led 
approaches to urban development also offer the potential of social innovation through 
improved citizen engagement and integrative forms of governmental practices and 
processes (Townsend 2013; Kitchin 2014). 
Seen in this light, smart cities promise not only instrumental and financial 
rewards through improved service management, competitive advantage and net job 
creation, but also the empowering of citizens by enabling the co-production of 
infrastructure, public services and strategic development. In this formulation, the city 
is framed as a platform which empowers participatory and cooperative processes. 
Connecting data, people and knowledge, the city is envisioned as a dynamic and 
productive hub for the construction of the city by its citizens. Implicit in this narrative 
is the assumption that smart technologies are inherently value-free and benign, and 
used for progressive and egalitarian ends. 
While information and communications technologies may offer the potential to 
foster greater democratization, it has been argued that urban regimes have placed 
comparatively little emphasis on engaging with design and implementation strategies 
which might support meaningful citizen participation. Rather, urban administration is 
more generally characterized by prioritising instrumental features such as information 
dissemination and service delivery which emphasise efficiency and cost saving 
(Freeman & Quirke, 2013; Wiig, 2015; Kitchin et al., 2017). Furthermore, critical 
scholarship has also noted that the design of smart technologies operates in hegemonic 
ways by translating the interests of powerful capitalist and bureaucratic actors into 
specifications which create modes of citizenship characterized by passivity, obedience 
and consumerism (Feenberg, 2010; Hacklay, 2013; Hannig, 2016; Cardullo & Kitchin, 
2017).  
As such, smart technologies are being increasingly implicated in processes of 
splintered urbanism (Graham & Marvin, 2002) with the implementation of networked, 
digital infrastructures being characterized by socio-economic and spatial bias. From 
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this perspective, narratives proposing ‘technological neutrality’ can be seen as a 
strategic attempt by vested interests to depoliticize design and position it beyond the 
scope of political action (Hacklay, 2013). Therefore, considerations of democracy and 
citizen participation have been largely rhetorical and mobilized to add legitimacy to 
technical praxis concerned with supporting private interests and entrepreneurial modes 
of governance (Cardullo & Kitchin, 2017; Perng, 2017). Such action has tended to 
produce technologies which are functional in nature, but which are resistant to social 
influence and the interests, concerns and needs of people and communities (Holland, 
2008; Feenberg, 2010; 2017). It is the position of this thesis that, despite the 
pervasiveness of structural and ideological constraints conditioning technology 
production, citizen-centric design may still prevail when supported by rationalizations 
and reflexive practices concerned with the reintegration of functionality with 
progressive social values. This thesis explores such potential through an investigation 
of one smart technology – public smart bikeshare.  
Contemporary or ‘smart’ bikeshare is a form of mobility in which bikes are 
made available from a network of strategically positioned stations distributed 
throughout the urban environment. Modern designs, which are generally supported by 
sophisticated information and communication technologies, deliver automation, ease 
of use, improved management and operations processes and reduced cost. As a result, 
smart bikeshare has spread exponentially in recent years and, as of 2015, there were 
more than 900 public schemes operating globally (DeMaio & Meddin, 2015). In 
addition to its potential in delivering cities instrumental value by reducing congestion 
and C02 emissions, improving health and extending the reach of public transportation 
for example, smart bikeshare is also being positioned by city administrations as 
integral to making cities smarter, more sustainable and more connected (Cuddy et al., 
2014; Rani & Vyas, 2017). Furthermore, and against a backdrop of increasingly 
critical commentary on the ideological nature of the smart city concept, smart 
bikeshare is being promoted by urban regimes as a means of delivering greater equity 
to disadvantaged communities by mitigating social, economic and transport 
disadvantage (Buck, 2012; Clark & Curl, 2015; Hannig, 2016) 
Despite this however, a number of scholars have begun to question the 
motivations at the heart of the smart bikeshare industry (Fishman et al., 2013; Duarte 
& Firmino, 2017). In a manner reflective of broader smart city concerns, smart 
bikeshare is emerging as a technology appropriated by elite interests leading to its 
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implication in social polarization and gentrification. This is evident in patterns of 
implementation bias characterized by economic and spatial disparity and in 
configurations which operate to preferentially exclude already marginalized groups 
(Hannig, 2016; Duarte & Firmino, 2017). The design of smart bikeshare systems 
therefore, has become intimately linked with issues of neoliberalism, democracy and 
social justice. As such, smart bikeshare represents an important socio-technical 
innovation through which these issues may be explored 
The philosophical orientation of this research is critical constructivism which 
understands design as a contested terrain where competing value systems seek 
expression through the configuration of technical devices.  This positions the work 
within a tradition which deeply implicates the form and content of technology with the 
worlds and identities it creates. This contrasts with other positions common within the 
philosophy of technology, which, in the interest of clarifying key terms and concepts 
for the unfamiliar reader, require some exposition.  
1.1 Positioning the research with the Philosophy of Technology Tradition: 
Feenberg (1999) has identified four main schools of thought which have characterized 
scholarship within the tradition of philosophy of technology; instrumentalism, 
determinism, substantivism and critical theory (see Table 1). These positions differ 
with respect to the role of human actors and the neutrality of technical means. 
Table 1.1: Technology and Society: Main Schools of Thought 
   
Technology is: Autonomous Humanly Controlled 
Neutral Determinism (e.g. 
Traditional Marxism) 
Instrumentalism 
(Liberal Faith in 
Progress) 
Value-Laden Substantivism (means and 
ends linked in systems – 
Ellul, Heidegger) 
Critical Theory (Choice 
of alternative means-ends 
systems). 
 
 
Source: (Feenberg, 1999: 9) 
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Technological determinism is predicated on the assumption that technology and 
its development follow its own autonomous functional logic, which is independent of 
social contexts. From this perspective technology is seen as social only through the 
purpose it serves (MacKenzie & Wajcman, 1996). Therefore, it is perceived to be 
analogous to science and mathematics by its intrinsic independence to the social world. 
According to technological determinism, technical progress follows an inexorable path 
from lower to higher forms of sophistication with each stage of its development 
following a single trajectory of necessary and dependant steps. As such, technology is 
framed as a decontextualized and self-generating entity with its own immutable 
imperatives to which society must adapt and conform. Implicit in this view is the 
notion that all attempts to develop democratic controls of technology, and its 
associated impacts, are inherently futile (Bijker, 1995).  
Instrumentalism sees technology as a universal resource which humans can 
appropriate for the betterment of society. It overlaps with determinism in that it also 
views technology as not encapsulating values per se but differs in that it allows for the 
influence of human control in its developmental trajectory. Implicit in this position is 
faith in progress through technological development (Feenberg, 2010). This view is 
dominant within institutional settings where digital technologies are accepted as 
delivering quality of life improvements for society in general (Hacklay, 2013) 
Substantivist or essentialist views of technology propose that design is not 
neutral but incorporates the interests and agendas of powerful actors and is therefore 
value-laden and ideological. Best exemplified by work of Martin Heidegger (1977) 
and Jacque Ellul (1964), substantivism sees technology in largely dystopian terms. 
 
“According to substantivism, modernity is an epistemological event that 
discloses the hidden secret of the essence of technology. And what is hidden? 
Rationality itself, the pure drive for efficiency, for increasing control and 
calculability…Substantivist critique has affinities with determinism. For both, 
technological advance has an automatic and unilinear character. What makes 
substantivism so very gloomy is the additional assumption that technology is 
inherently biased toward domination. (Feenberg, 1999: 3) 
Again, this position inevitably precludes democratic control of technology given its 
one and immutable ‘essence’.  
On the other hand, Feenberg’s critical approach to technology acknowledges 
the tendency in modern societies towards efficiency and control but retains the 
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possibility that design may also incorporate socially specific values and so develop in 
ways which can incorporate multiple epistemologies. It emerges broadly from 
critiques by Herbert Marcuse (1964), Michel Foucault (1980) and from scholars in the 
constructivist tradition such as sociologist Bruno Latour (1987) who problematized the 
primacy of scientific rationality and argued that design was a social construction 
amenable to human intervention. As such, society has the capacity to choose alternate 
means-ends systems. Feenberg has synthesized insights from both essentialist 
philosophy and social constructivism to produce his own unique theoretical framework 
for interpreting the technology production process. The position stands at the 
intersection of two historic traditions then, neither one of which by themselves, can 
address the primary issue of political possibility. As will be discussed in Chapter 2 for 
example, common criticisms of constructivist theories of technology highlight their 
focus on contingency, fluidity and moral neutrality which ignores structure and thereby 
depoliticizes technical activity production no less than those perspectives from the 
essentialist tradition. 
Feenberg’s response to this dilemma - instrumentalization theory - provides the 
analytic and normative tools supporting the research and proposes that design must be 
considered at two analytically distinct levels which he terms primary and secondary 
instrumentalization. These instrumentalizations broadly correlate with substantivist 
and constructivist notions of technology. Primary instrumentalization is concerned 
with our functional relation to reality. 
 
“At the first level, we seek and find affordances that can be mobilized in devices 
and systems by decontextualizing the objects of experience and reducing them 
to their useful properties. This involves a process of de-worlding in which 
objects are torn out of their original contexts and exposed to analysis and 
manipulation while subjects are positioned for distanced control.”  (Feenberg, 
2005: 2)  
In the secondary instrumentalization technologies are integrated with existing 
devices and systems and with ethical and normative principles. While primary 
instrumentalization simplifies a device, this secondary phase offers the potential to 
imbue technology with qualities and characteristics which can cause a ‘disclosing’ or 
a ‘revealing’ of a world. 
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“Disclosing involves a complementary process of realization which qualifies 
the original functionalization by orienting it toward a new world involving 
those same objects and subjects.” (Feenberg, 2005: 3) 
Within the context of this research, instrumentalization theory acts as a 
powerful framework for analysing the dialectical process by which smart bikeshare 
systems are produced, as multiple actors and interests compete for dominance. Where 
primary instrumentalization (functionalization) holds sway in the design process, 
systems tend to be simplified, separated from their social contexts and operate largely 
in support of goal-oriented action or to preserve the autonomy of powerful interests. 
Conversely, where secondary instrumentalization is informed by ethical and aesthetic 
considerations, there exists the potential to recontextualize and adapt these systems for 
greater social value. While analysis at the primary level is informed by substantivist 
critiques of technology, analysis at the secondary level is inspired by the potential of 
technology revealed through empirical studies in the constructivist tradition. Chapter 
2 provides an elaboration of instrumentalization theory, justifies it use within the 
context of this research, and reflects upon its relationship to other theoretical positions 
within science, technology and society studies. In particular it contrasts Feenberg’s 
critical perspective with poststructural approaches such as assemblage theory, social 
construction of technology (SCOT) and actor network theory (ANT) which, while 
useful methodologically and as a counterpoint to essentialism, fail to adequately 
address the key issue of power as an influence configuring the production of 
technology. 
1.2 Research Question and Contribution to Research 
While scholarship on smart bikeshare has begun to map its relationship with inequality 
and exclusion, much of the research to-date has tended to view systems as technically 
homogenous and adopted an instrumental perspective which quantitatively assesses 
smart bikeshare in different geographic locations using statistical and other 
quantitative methods to understand its impact on categories such as modal share, 
safety, the environment and so on (DeMaio, 2009; Midgley, 2009; Shaheen et al., 
2013). Thus far, there have been no detailed empirical studies which either critically 
evaluate design as a form of urban technopolitics or explore the potential of smart 
bikeshare systems to enrol citizens in collaborative practices such as participatory 
design, knowledge sharing, and devolved forms of decision-making.  
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This project addresses this gap by investigating the instrumentalizations 
underpinning smart bikeshare and, by extension, interrogates the dominant narratives 
of progress within which the smart city has become corralled. It proceeds through a 
comparative study of two schemes – Dublinbikes (Dublin, Ireland) and SobiHamilton 
(Hamilton, Canada). These schemes are paradigmatic from a critical perspective in 
that their respective designs, and the processes by which they were realized, articulate 
fundamentally different notions of ‘success’ and the common good. While 
Dublinbikes is symptomatic of the technocracy and instrumentalism broadly 
characterizing the sector (and smart technology production more generally), 
SobiHamilton’s design, which is adaptive, inclusive and open, demonstrates that these 
processes need not be ubiquitous. As such, the cases represent a productive way of 
examining the interplay between primary and secondary instrumentalizations and the 
effects that the values and cultural assumptions sedimented in both sites of production 
have on decision-making, strategic planning and urban development.  
The research question which this thesis answers is: 
 
How may the design and implementation of smart bikeshare systems preserve notions 
of equality, democratization and citizenship? 
In answering this question, the project makes the following original 
contributions to research. Through hermeneutically tracing the attributes and 
functional properties of smart bikeshare systems back to the instrumentalizations 
acting upon them, it demonstrates that the architectural and ideological content of 
systems is not technically determined but is a product of the socio-cultural milieu 
within which the design and implementation process occurs. As part of this process, it 
empirically reveals how an orthodoxy of neoliberalism and bureaucracy operates in a 
real world setting to corporatize one instantiation of this technology, while also 
illustrating the potential of reflexive design to reconfigure smart bikeshare as a 
platform for innovation, dialogue, participatory modes of governance and systemic 
social change. In this sense it leverages, and operationalizes, both essentialist and 
constructivist perspectives in demonstrating the pervasive role of structure in 
patterning design while also articulating a view of agency as capable of conditioning 
these processes. The research also maps the interdependencies between these 
processes and the smart city narratives operating in both locations. As such, and in 
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addition to providing academics and practitioners with a set of integrative principles 
to guide the design of smart bikeshare schemes, it adds to the body of knowledge on 
critical urbanism, smart city development, democratic engagement, collaborative 
infrastructuring and technical citizenship. The thesis also makes an important 
theoretical contribution to the critical canon by demonstrating the utility of Feenberg’s 
framework in a new, and still emerging, empirical setting. Through the research 
process, this framework was adapted to address limitations in its formulation by 
incorporating the conceptual means to more effectively map technology’s response 
over time to the influence of environmental factors such as socio-political change, 
experiential learning and technical innovation. Modifying the model to embrace this 
aspect of technology emphasises the ongoing and emergent nature of design and 
enhances the framework’s capacity to be usefully applied across multiple settings. 
1.3 Thesis Structure 
The argument and empirical research are set out in seven chapters. Chapter 2 provides 
a critical examination of the smart city construct, which in large part reflects the 
background cultural values and assumptions shaping smart technology production. 
The chapter problematizes the rhetoric which positions the smart city as inherently 
depoliticized and benign by mapping its implication in processes of entrepreneurial 
governance, control and social polarization. Through this lens, the design of 
technology emerges as operating hegemonically to perpetuate the interests of powerful 
stakeholders and, in the process, produce urban citizenship characterized by 
compliance and consumerism. The chapter also engages with conceptual positions 
which propose that technology may resist such processes to produce systems which 
retain diversity and incorporate a multitude of goals and aspirations. As previously 
noted, these notions of contestation and reflexive design are central to the work of 
philosopher of technology Andrew Feenberg. Accordingly, the chapter provides a 
discussion of his work, contrasts it with other conceptual positions within the 
sociology of technology tradition, and justifies its use in this project. A discussion of 
the recontextualization strategies which may be employed to support 
instrumentalization theory’s emancipatory agenda is also provided.  
Chapter 3 reviews the history and technical evolution of bikeshare, maps its 
potential instrumental, cultural and environmental value to cities and explores the ways 
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in which the configuration of contemporary schemes has become increasingly aligned 
with the underlying logics of the smart city. Through bias inscribed at the level of 
design and implementation, smart bikeshare systems are shown to operate primarily in 
the support of sectoral interests. The chapter also explores previous scholarship which 
focuses on strategies and practices which might reorient smart bikeshare both as an 
equitable mode of transport and as a political platform. The chapter also describes how 
democratic interventions might be used tactically to build networks of influence across 
multiple domains and in the process effect systemic social transformation. The chapter 
concludes with an examination of the potential of creative design both to mitigate 
many structural, economic and procedural barriers to equity and to foster knowledge 
sharing and decision-making practices which might (re)position riders as co-creators 
of the schemes they appropriate.  
Chapter 4 provides a discussion of the methodological choices made in support 
of the research. The chapter is structured using a conceptual framework developed by 
Sanders et al. (2007) which describes the successive layers the research must pass 
through as a coherent methodology is formulated. Accordingly, the chapter begins 
with a discussion of the ontological and epistemological assumptions inherent in 
critical theory and describes the implications of these assumptions for the 
methodologies being used. The chapter continues with a discussion of the reasoning 
used to interpret the project’s research findings, construct explanations and draw 
conclusions. In this instance, Feenberg’s instrumentalization theory was used 
primarily abductively, however the process retained both deductive and inductive 
elements. The reasons for this hybrid approach are explained and justified in the 
chapter, as is the choice of case study as an appropriate strategy through which to 
develop the research. The chapter also provides a discussion of the factors influencing 
the choice of research sites and the tools used to collect and analyse data. This focuses 
on critical hermeneutics’ use as an interpretative tool to compliment and extend 
thematic coding as a means of understanding both the macro and micro level forces 
shaping design. 
Chapter 5 presents the findings from the projects’ first case study – 
Dublinbikes. It provides a detailed chronological account of the schemes’ development 
and maps the relationship between its configuration and the contexts from which it 
emerged. Two factors proved especially influential in this regard; firstly, the increasing 
neoliberalism which had come to define governance at both urban and national scales, 
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and secondly, Dublin’s historic failure to adequately manage the spread of 
unauthorized outdoor advertising infrastructure. Together these contexts would 
produce the alliances and strategies shaping the systems’ trajectory. Contrary to the 
rhetoric positioning DublinBike’s as promoting citizenship and social equity, the 
scheme emerges as a technology used primarily to protect the structure and authority 
of Dublin City Council. This is manifest in patterns of service distribution which is 
linked back to the nature of the public private partnership used to implement the 
scheme and the managerialist and autocratic modes of governance which operated to 
exclude public and political representation from the democratic process. The chapter 
also provides an exploration of the commonalities and interdependencies between 
Dublinbikes and a series of other smart initiatives unfolding within the city. This 
reveals the systemic failure of local governance to support participatory and consensus 
building processes. As such, the scheme emerges as symptomatic of a broader culture 
of institutional inertia. 
The findings from the projects’ second case study – SobiHamilton - are 
presented in Chapter 6. It adopts a structurally similar approach to Chapter 5, 
beginning with an account of the challenges created by the city’s geo-political 
configuration and continuing with a detailed empirical account of the way the project 
was guided through its various developmental phases. It pays particular attention to 
the dependencies and interconnections between the systems’ configuration and the 
rationales and beliefs operating in the broader decision-making environment. The 
findings reveal SobiHamilton to be reflective of a new and inclusive politics emerging 
within the city. The scheme embodies notions of democracy and technical citizenry, 
with institutional and lay epistemologies combining to create a technology with a 
diverse set of interests and goals. In practice, design emerges as a distributed function 
involving universities, civic organisations, bureaucrats, technologists, environmental 
groups, community advocates and citizens. In contrast to DublinBike’s technocratic 
and functionalist orientation, which acts to preserve the status quo, SobiHamilton’s 
configuration explicitly addresses the structural and cultural barriers to equity 
currently characterizing the industry and actively fosters increased dialogue between 
decision makers and citizens. This positions the scheme as a platform for enabling new 
forms of innovation and engagement which have already begun to influence 
technology production across other areas of the city. 
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Chapter 7 interprets the findings from both case studies through Feenberg’s 
critical lens. It mobilizes the analytic and ethical tools provided by instrumentalization 
theory to develop and enrich the empirical accounts from the preceding chapters and 
position them within a broader conceptual and explanatory framework. Given the 
nature of the findings, the analysis critiques the modes of power through which bias 
has shaped the technical horizon in Dublin and examines the rationalizations and 
practices by which Hamilton has managed to preserve enlightened notions of 
democracy. Accordingly, the chapter begins with a separate analysis of each case 
which explores the relationships between processes of instrumentalization and 
technology production. Here, the culture of corporate and institutional governance in 
Dublin emerges as strategic and autocratic; with consequential effects on the system 
and the forms citizenship it produced. SobiHamilton, by comparison, reflects a more 
vocational and collaborative ethos with the technology designed to integrate with the 
city’s technical, social and cultural environments. The chapter continues with a 
second-level analysis which compares and contrasts the cases and explores not only 
the proximate or local factors formative to their respective schemes but also the 
provincial, national and supra national contexts which coalesced to produce 
fundamentally different conceptualizations of success.  
Finally, Chapter 8 leverages the findings from the study to develop a set of 
design principles which, despite the variability and contingency of place, may be 
reasonably applied to encourage more equitable system production across multiple 
settings. The chapter also proposes a series of strategic policy initiatives, which, based 
on the empirical findings, are likely to provide the governmental, technical cultural 
contexts to support such efforts. These include enhanced co-ordination between state 
actors, greater integration of smart bikeshare with public transportation, the provision 
of multi-player ecosystems and the creation and sharing of fine-grained data. The 
chapter also provides a reflection on the implications of the research for theory which 
emphasises the importance of critical perspectives for an understanding of the 
structural forces constraining democracy. It also calls for closer scrutiny of positions 
within the science technology and society tradition which avoid engaging with issues 
of power and which, inadvertently or otherwise, act to promote technology as neutral. 
The chapter concludes with a series of recommendations for future research conceived 
to compliment the findings from this project and address some of the limitations 
inherent in its design. 
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Chapter 2 - Theoretical Perspectives 
Introduction 
Smart technologies have been typically positioned by their advocates as inherently 
transformative and progressive, with the potential to create cities which are coherent, 
agile and responsive (Hollands, 2008; Greenfield, 2013; IBM, 2017).  In this positive 
framing, digital, networked technologies (transportation systems, smart grids, sensor 
networks, urban surveillance systems, mobile/locative media and so on) produce data 
which support the integration, management and control of urban infrastructure and 
services (Kitchin, 2016). Implicit in this framing is the assumption that technology is 
depoliticized and neutral; operating in a largely benign way to promote efficiency and 
productivity and reduce uncertainty in the management of places (Hacklay, 2015).  
Increasingly however, this narrative is being challenged in the critical literature 
(Holland, 2008; Wiig, 2015; Coletta et al., 2017) which emphasises the hidden or black 
boxed ideologies embedded within the design and management strategies producing 
technological infrastructure. These practices have a hegemonic effect by “being a 
representation of specific abstractions and thinking about the way cities and societies 
function” (Hacklay, 2015: 2). Essentially, technology can be mobilized to preserve and 
perpetuate the philosophies, aspirations and ways-of-life of dominant actors 
(Feenberg, 1999; Dusek, 2006). In particular, attention has been focused on the 
technocratic, functionalist orientation of smart technologies, which, it is claimed, tends 
to support both neoliberal and autocratic forms of governance and perpetuates citizens 
as compliant and passive consumers of products and services (Kitchin 2014; Datta 
2015; Sadowski & Pasquale 2015; Luque-Ayala & Marvin 2016; Kitchin et al., 2017). 
This prioritization of corporate and state interests (and values) leads to the exclusion 
of more pluralist epistemologies, which reflect the experience, knowledge claims and 
identities of society more generally (Bijker, 2013). 
In response to these criticisms, proponents of the smart city have sought to 
emphasize that technology innovation is being motivated - at least in part - by the 
desire to promote social equity and more participatory forms of governance. IBM’s 
product portfolio for example is being increasingly positioned as enabling new forms 
of crowdsourcing, engagement and citizenry (Abbas, 2016) and at a European level 
the ‘European Innovation Partnership for Smart Cities and Communities’ (EIPCSS) 
states that an essential element of the successful smart city is the “co-creation, co-
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design and co-production of solutions by citizens” (Smart cities.eu, 2017). Similar 
narratives are appearing at a city level. Smart Dublin, the organisation for the 
management and development of the city’s smart initiatives, is now marketing its 
activities under the banner “Open, Engaged, and Connected” which valorises 
collaborative frameworks, open innovation and transparent governance (DCC, n.d.). 
The promise, therefore, is that technology can be used as a channel to improve access 
to, and engagement with, decision makers and more generally that the smart city 
paradigm brings with it a normative shift that sees the city produced through more 
collaborative forms of negotiation and planning. 
Despite this rhetoric of new horizons, criticisms of the logics and ambitions of 
the smart city have persisted.  Sceptics have argued that this current iteration of the 
city is merely a phase in the evolution of entrepreneurial urbanism (Coletta et al., 2017; 
Wiig, 2015) which tends to coalesce around strategies for economic development, 
territorial competitiveness and attracting both capital and expertise to cities (Shelton 
et al., 2014; Coletta et al., 2017). As such, the technologies it produces remain deeply 
implicated in promoting and maintaining neoliberal forms and practices (Hacklay, 
2013; Gabrys, 2014; Shelton et al., 2014; Wiig, 2015).  
This chapter explores these issues in order to separate the rhetoric of smart 
technologies from the reality of their current formulations. A theoretical framework is 
then developed which provides a means through which the politics of technology and 
its implication for citizenry might be explored and problematized. 
2.1 The Politics of the Smart City Imaginary 
Though lacking a precise definition, the term ‘smart city’ has come to mean something 
inherently positive. Its proponents claim that networked, data driven technologies, can 
operate both instrumentally and normatively to reconfigure the nature of urban life and 
deliver technical, social and political improvements. Amongst the primary benefits 
claimed by such proponents is that smart technologies can deliver: a smart economy, 
through innovation and competitiveness; smart governance by supporting transparent 
and evidenced-based decision making; smart mobility, through integrated intelligent 
transport systems; and smart environments, by providing environmentally sustainable 
ways of producing and conserving energy; and significantly, smart citizens by 
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fostering a citizen-centric model of development which prioritizes social justice, 
participation and democracy (Hollands, 2008; Townsend, 2013; Kitchin, 2016).  
Implicit in this imaginary is the assumption that cities are universal, ahistorical 
and aspatial (Kitchin, 2016) with the technology serving them framed as value-free; a 
neutral servant, with largely benign and benevolent impacts (Feenberg, 2010).  It is an 
assumption that stems from a liberal faith in ‘progress’ and assumes that technology 
only acquires a valuative dimension or a social meaning through the ways in which it 
is applied (Hacklay, 2013). Increasingly however, this position is being challenged by 
critical scholars who have questioned the role which contemporary technologies play 
in specific social and political contexts (Holland, 2008; Shelton et al., 2014; Wiig, 
2015; Cardullo & Kitchin, 2017). They have demonstrated that the assemblage of 
actors, ideologies and technologies associated with real-world smart city 
implementations operate in ideologically partisan ways. The emerging consensus 
suggests that the production, design and use of various technologies is not only the 
product of social variables (Bijker et al., 1987) but is actively implicated in the 
perpetuation of the power geometries which they serve (Feenberg, 1999; Dusek, 2006; 
Shelton, et al., 2014; Kitchin et al., 2015).  
Hacklay (2013) for example notes that claims to neutrality essentially act as a 
mechanism to depoliticize technology given that the instrumental or technocratic 
rationality underpinning its production commands near universal assent.  As a 
consequence, so called normative rationality - which incorporates beliefs, values and 
meanings - becomes marginalized with consequential outcomes for democracy 
(Feenberg, 2017; Perng, 2017). If political or normative issues can be reduced to a set 
of technical-scientific problems, then a solutionist mentality can prevail as there would 
remain little need for political discourse (Feenberg, 2011; Perng, 2017). Technologists 
are positioned as already knowing the optimal way to do things in their domain hence 
citizen input is redundant. The position also leverages the deterministic notion that 
innovation leads inevitably and incrementally to more sophisticated (and positive) 
technical outcomes, which again operates to obviate the need for engagement and 
contestation (Bijker, 2013). Therefore, those who persist in challenging solutions 
developed by technocratic regimes can more conveniently be framed as irrational and 
ignored. Accordingly, there is a growing concern that smart technologies produced by 
assemblages of corporate and state actors act hegemonically to conserve and 
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perpetuate historically constituted hierarchies of knowledge and power (Hollands, 
2008; Kitchin et al., 2017). 
While the literature notes that the particular forms of power and control 
invested in, and performed by, smart city technologies are the product of situated and 
context-dependant variables, there remains nonetheless a pattern of enacting and 
reproducing neoliberal forms of governance which disguises growing social 
polarization (Graham & Marvin, 2001; Hollands, 2008). Such polarization belies the 
emphasis on human capital and participatory democracy found in much of the 
promotional literature and reflects the less than altruistic motivations energising the 
smart city concept (Peck & Tickell, 2002; Greenfield, 2013; Wiig, 2015). 
2.2 Neoliberalism, Governance and Technology 
Kitchin et al. (2017) note that, while the genesis of the ‘smart city’ can be traced to the 
drive by technology corporations in the late 2000s to cultivate new business 
opportunities, the concept is only the most recent phase of a process that has been 
developing steadily for decades. Cocchia (2015) identifies previous iterations as 
including the knowledge city (Ergazakis et al., 2004), digital city, (Couclelis, 2004), 
intelligent city (Komninos, 2006), wired city (Hollands, 2008) and ubiquitous city 
(Anthopoulos & Fitsilis, 2010). Despite the absence of a universal definition and the 
often unplanned and emergent character of the smart city (Dourish, 2016; Coletta & 
Kitchin, 2017), the themes that unify the phenomenon are the promotion of a ‘utopian 
urbanism’ by tech companies, property developers, governments and other sectoral 
interests (Datta, 2015) and the increased tendency towards the marketization and 
privatization of key urban infrastructure and services (Holland, 2008). Watson (2015) 
also notes that the constantly shifting labels and marketing associated with the city is 
part of an entrepreneurial model which makes apprehension and critique more 
difficult. Furthermore, it leads to a blurring of the distinction between the city and the 
private sector which enables the legitimization of neoliberal and algorithmic forms of 
governance (Cardullo & Kitchin, 2017). The result is the diminution of participatory 
decision making and technical citizenship. 
Recent research on the nature of such citizenship reveals that innovation is 
frequently characterized by paternalism, stewardship and the promotion of passive 
consumption, with technology production and design bearing the hallmark of top down 
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autocracy (Holland, 2008; Clark & Shelton, 2016). Cardullo and Kitchin (2017) note 
that citizen participation within the smart city paradigm typically ranges from non-
existent to tokenistic with individuals essentially positioned as ‘users’ reduced to 
experiencing algorithmically-mediated services. While algorithms are typically 
positioned as value free instruments of efficiency, Kitchin and Dodge, (2011) and 
Hacklay (2013) note that embedded within their operation are certain ideologies and 
rationales about how society should be managed. In practice, algorithms operate in 
tandem with institutions, administration, laws and social norms to exercise a form of 
disciplinary power designed to instil particular habits, dispositions, expectations and 
self-disciplining (Kitchin et al., 2017). Therefore, distributed and automated software-
mediated technologies act to modify behaviour in accordance with neoliberal or 
bureaucratic ideologies. Feenberg (1999), leveraging Weber’s concepts of 
rationalization (1964), proposes that it is ‘operational autonomy’ and self-perpetuation 
which dictates the style of technological design as powerful actors strive to maintain 
functional and ideological control of their domains through technocratic means.  
Researchers from the Programmable City project at Maynooth University, who 
undertook extensive research on ‘Smart Dublin’, cite numerous instances where these 
forms of technocracy are evident. Based on their analysis of traffic management 
systems, for example, they note that behind the veil of social and political neutrality 
these technologies, and the data they generate, are often implicated in networks of 
surveillance, policing and other forms of security and governmentalities (Kitchin et 
al., 2017). Drawing on the work of Monahan (2007), they also argue that such systems 
perpetuate forms of neoliberal development by emphasizing;  
 
“…‘pipes’ over places, maximizing the flow of privately owned vehicles 
through those pipes’ and privileging the support for certain mobilities over 
others (private over public transportation, driving over walking or bicycling. ” 
(Kitchin et al., 2017: 16) 
Similar themes emerged in their analysis of city dashboards. These systems are 
generally proffered as offering factual, comprehensive and accurate representations of 
various aspects of urban life. They essentially claim to translate the contingency and 
complexity of cities into rational and decontextualized forms of knowledge (Mattern, 
2014).  
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“As such, they provide a powerful realist epistemology for monitoring and 
understanding cities, underpinned by an instrumental rationality in which 
‘hard facts’ trump other kinds of knowledge and provide the basis for 
formulating solutions to urban issues... and they expand the capacity to govern 
by extending forms of power/knowledge.” (Kitchin et al., 2017: 7) 
 
Smart meters, intelligent transport systems and smart lighting, amongst others, were 
also shown to operate to instrumental and technocratic rationales which act to conserve 
institutional hierarchies and encourage particular (self) regulatory outcomes (Kitchin 
et al., 2017). Even with projects designed to promote collaboration and devolved forms 
of decision making such as citizen sensing and environmental monitoring, citizens are 
often little more than data producers with no agency to act upon this data subsequently. 
Again, this form of participation is instrumental rather than substantive (Hacklay, 
2013). Gabrys (2014) also notes that diverting citizens into modes of environmentality 
can have the effect of leaving neoliberal power unexamined. In the process, the logic 
of efficiency and economic optimization shapes development whereas previously it 
may have been understood through social or noneconomic modalities. 
Similarly, attempts intended to connect citizens to decision makers through ICT 
have tended to be both restrictive and utilitarian. Government agencies can be resistant 
to cultural and operational change and the extent to which they can scale their 
organisations, skills and expertise to accommodate engagement can be limited. Also, 
bureaucracies develop proficiencies at routine tasks which can cause technical 
specialization and path-dependency. This rarely lends itself to the kinds of flexibility 
required to engage constructively with the public (Perng, 2017). Consequently, 
engagement initiatives generally favour information dissemination and are supported 
by sterile, highly bound technical systems (Freeman & Quirke, 2013). Furthermore, 
they have tended to limit the notion of ‘technical citizenship’ to providing feedback on 
proposals developed by elites in the absence of consultation or democratic oversight 
(Dutil et al., 2008; Perng, 2017). In this way organisational identity is preserved. This 
also mirrors much activity in the private sector. In the case of hackathons for instance 
- where citizens with the appropriate technical expertise are invited to participate in 
collaborative design initiatives – events are typically owned and run by corporate 
sponsors who encourage innovation towards the creation of marketable products. In 
this way hackathons can be said to perpetuate business-led development and neoliberal 
urban governance (Perng et al., 2017).                                                                  
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Another aspect of the smart city is the repositioning of the public as consumers, 
with citizens restricted to selecting between products and services from a marketplace 
of providers. These products and services range from free-to-use private apps to core 
utilities increasingly delivered by private corporations or public private partnerships 
(Cardullo & Kitchin, 2017). The rhetoric promoting (and legitimizing) this shift from 
depoliticized to neoliberal forms of governance exploits arguments which focus on the 
perceived inability of traditional public sector administrations to competently deliver 
and/or manage technology based services, thereby promoting the need for various 
forms of privatization (Graham & Marvin 2001; Greenfield 2013; Kitchin 2014; 
Vanolo, 2014). Therefore, problems often associated with public administrations such 
as a lack of economic resources, poor internal integration, a deficit of knowledge and 
skills, cultural inertia and so on, become the basis not for systematic organisational 
reform leading to improved standards of governance but for increased co-operation 
with the private sector. Consequently, regimes comprising a variety of technocrats, 
bureaucrats, policy experts and vested interests tend to coalesce around self-serving 
epistemologies which understand the smart city, and its people, as best served by 
hybrid or ‘beyond the state’ configurations (Swyngedouw, 2005). Such configurations 
frequently operate from positions of monopoly and are unlikely to prioritize normative 
or ethical changes which might compromise their own autonomy (Feenberg, 2010). 
As such, democratic interventions become additionally challenging (Agyeman & 
McLaren, 2015; Perng, 2017). Collaborations between state and corporate entities can 
also result in infrastructure being assembled piecemeal, with systems poorly integrated 
with legacy technologies, the built environment and urban governance (Shelton et al, 
2014). Such infrastructure may also be resisted by city departments which have limited 
scope to incorporate new business and information handling practices into business-
as-usual activities (Kitchin et al., 2016; Perng, 2017). This tends to produce urban 
infrastructure which is managed with limited input from either city governance or 
citizens. Cardullo and Kitchin (2017) note also that chief executives of local authorities 
may have the capacity to action such projects without obtaining sanction from elected 
representatives and so democratic oversight is entirely absent. Furthermore, the 
democratization of large-scale projects in particular can be complicated by funding 
requirements (Cope, 2017). The planning of such projects is typically complex and 
challenging and so is often conducted in the absence of citizens as adequate resources 
are rarely made available to accommodate their participation. Once funding has been 
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secured then projects must meet contractually pre-defined deliverables and milestones 
thereby further reducing the potential influence of citizen advocacy.  
Consumerism in a smart city context is also a catalyst for social stratification 
and inequalities through bias in the distribution of infrastructure and services. For 
example, those who can afford it are invited to buy into a smart lifestyle by living in 
smart buildings and districts (Cardullo & Kitchin, 2017). These spaces are supported 
by technologies and systems designed to enhance convenience, security, mobility, 
service efficiency and so on. Through this process of ‘neo-liberal urbanism’ (Peck & 
Tickell, 2002) the smart city is increasingly marketed to educated, mobile 
professionals with social and political capital. As a result, the implementation and 
distribution of urban infrastructure is often modulated by patterns of socio-economic 
prejudice (Graham & Marvin, 2001; Feenberg, 2010; Mattern, 2016) which runs 
contrary to the rhetoric of smart communities embodying sustainability, diversity and 
inclusion (Holland, 2008; Shelton et al., 2014). In the case of Dublin for example, 
Heaphy and Pétercsák (2016) have reported that a special development zone 
comprising a mix of high-end offices blocks and residential apartments (and home to 
head offices of Facebook, Google and LinkedIn) has been designated a ‘smart district’ 
and will benefit from the associated investment in infrastructure, services and 
innovation.  
 
“…the area is to become a testbed for new smart technologies and act as a 
means to attract additional inward investment (especially from urban Internet 
of Things companies). Much of the space created is privately owned and 
managed rather than being public space, with such developments operating for 
the benefit of their owners and counter to that of an urban common.”  (Cardullo 
& Kitchin, 2017: 11) 
This kind of differential investment in infrastructure, which caters to powerful places 
and people, leads inevitably to unequal economic growth and a ‘splintered urbanism’ 
characterized by an abandonment of the ideals of justice and equity (Graham & 
Marvin, 2001). 
All in all, the design, implementation and use of technology within the smart 
city paradigm is typically orchestrated to maintain the ideologies, ambitions and ways-
of-life of powerful bureaucratic and corporate actors. Democracy, contrary to its 
portrayal in the marketing literature, is framed within a concept of neoliberal 
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citizenship which simultaneously emphasises the privatization of services and 
infrastructures and the framing of people as passive subjects and consumers. 
 
“…it [citizenship] is most often framed within an instrumental rather than 
normative or political frame. In other words, citizens are encouraged to help 
provide solutions to practical issues – such as producing an app, or feeding 
back on a development plan, or to perform certain roles/responsibilities – but 
not to challenge or replace the fundamental political rationalities shaping an 
issue or plan.” (Cardullo & Kitchin, 2017: 18) 
Despite this quite pessimistic analysis however, there remains optimism in the 
literature that interventions are possible which might reorient such decontextualized 
notions of democratization towards one which embraces pluralism, participation, 
equitable access to resources and so on (Feenberg, 1999; 2017). Cities are historically, 
politically, economically and culturally contingent places and as such the technologies 
they produce can embody this diversity. Despite the technological trends 
characterising the smart city, the potential still exists for technology to resist processes 
of right-wing colonization and incorporate the interests and goals of a broader range 
of political and normative perspectives (Dusek, 2006; Shelton et al., 2014). As political 
and discursive agency within society shifts, then so also does the possibility of 
translating this momentum into technical changes which meet socially relevant goals.  
This tension between conservation of hierarchy on the one hand and more 
democratic forms of technological transformations on the other is fundamental to the 
work of critical theorist Andrew Feenberg. His ‘critical theory of technology’ (1999; 
2010) challenges the primacy of technocracy while also theorizing on the nature of 
technology production and the means by which it might retain alternate interests and 
values. A discussion of his work, which forms the philosophical and theoretical 
framework supporting this research, will comprise the remainder of this chapter. 
2.3 Mapping Critical Theory of Technology: 
Feenberg’s theoretical position is essentially a synthesis of insights and critiques on 
modernity developed by theorists such as Weber (1964), the Frankfurt School (Adorno 
& Horkheimer, 1972) and Lukács (1971), and principles which emerged subsequently 
from sociological studies of technology (e.g. Bijker et al., 1987; Latour, 1987; Bijker, 
1997) which emphasized the contingent and relational nature of technological 
development. While these studies proved useful in developing a critique of 
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technological determinism by illustrating that the trajectory of innovation was a 
product of social variables, their general reluctance to engage with issues of politics 
and power limited their scope to highlight social injustice and how technology might 
affect societal change. By contrast, Feenberg’s work explicitly addresses these 
limitations by enabling a hermeneutic reading of technology through an analysis of 
how design and implementation practices are embedded within broader sets of values, 
processes and taken-for-granted assumptions. Furthermore, through his concept of 
‘instrumentalization theory’, he elaborates a position where the translation of public 
demands into technically rational systems is possible. As such, it adopts an ontological 
position which is mindful of both substantivist and poststructural traditions and 
supports a reading of design praxis which leverages their respective strengths. 
STS and Critical Perspectives: A Synthesis 
STS (science, technology and society) studies emerged from critiques of determinism 
which understood technology as a decontextualized and self-generating entity with its 
own immutable imperatives to which society must adapt and conform (Bijker, 1997: 
281). A counter argument to this thesis emerged in the early 1980s with the advent of 
a constructivist sociology of technology which demonstrated the socially contingent 
nature of technological development and attempted to problematize design and 
innovation. It was developed primarily from a synthesis of four broad academic 
traditions – the sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK), the sociology of industrial 
organisations, technology policy studies and certain approaches within the economics 
of technological change (Williams & Edge, 1996). 
This interpretative approach both examines the content of technology and 
offers an exploration of the particular processes and contexts that frame its 
development. The approach proposes a constitutive entanglement between the social 
and technical realms leading to their co-production (Latour, 1983; Kling, 1980; 
Orlikowski & Scott, 2008). Methodologically, STS involves studying technical 
innovation and noting points of “interpretative flexibility” or “branch points”, which 
had the potential to launch multiple technical designs on their own developmental path. 
The task is then to understand why one interpretation, rather than another, succeeded. 
A core principle of this approach is the notion that the workings of science (the end 
product, be it an artefact, theory or knowledge) be seen as the explanandum and not 
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the explanans. In other words, to avoid teleology, all technologies should be treated 
symmetrically which might then reveal their contingent and constructed nature (Bloor, 
1973; 1976). A consequence of this has meant that, for the most part, constructivist 
studies have adopted ontologies which lack a normative core and fail to situate 
technopolitics within broader political and cultural processes.  
Klein and Kleinman (2002) note that constructivist studies assume implicitly 
that all groups are equal and that all relevant social groups are present during in the 
innovation process. These assumptions fail to adequately account for the wider socio-
cultural and political milieu in which artefact development takes place. Some groups, 
women for example, may be entirely excluded from design and implementation 
processes, while others may not be groups at all but may be a diverse collection of 
subgroups for whom one actor claims to speak (Russell, 1986; Wajcman, 1991). Also, 
the assumption that the result of inter-group activity is usually consensus, leading to 
the stabilization of particular technologies (Bijker, 1997), is somewhat optimistic and 
overlooks both systematic asymmetries of power and how these asymmetries are 
rooted in the structural features of political and institutional life (Klein & Kleinman, 
2002).  
 
“The background conditions of group interactions, such as their relations to 
each other, the rules ordering their interactions, and factors contributing to 
differences in their power, remain largely invisible.....social construction of 
technology ignores the question of how existing groups were able to come into 
being, whether some individuals sharing common meanings were unable to 
unite into a group, and how groups entered the set of groups with access to the 
design process” (Klein & Kleinman, 2002: 3) 
A prominent conceptual model within this tradition - Actor Network Theory (Latour, 
2005) – is equally problematic. ANT’s proposes that entities have no inherent 
qualities: they acquire their form and functionality only through their relations with 
other entities in the network. It also proposes an ‘ontological symmetry’ among human 
and non-human ‘actants’, essentially arguing against any a-priori distinction between 
what is technical and what is not (Bloomfield & Vurdubakis, 1997). Non-human 
actants can include for example science, technology, economics and politics (Callon, 
1986). A ‘network’ of relations is formed through the enrolment of actants by means 
of negotiations. This process is explicated by the ‘sociology of translation’ which aims 
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to describe, rather than explain, the transitions and negations that take place as the 
network is configured or translated (Callon, 1986).  
While it has proven useful in describing the scope, diversity, and complexity of 
factors impacting the design and use of technology, its value-free relativism and the 
attendant lack of critical and ideological substance has tended to produce descriptive 
rather than explanatory insights. Sandra Harding (2008), for example, has criticized 
ANT for dismissing such basic social categories as race, class, and postcolonialism, 
concerns echoed by Casper and Clarke, (1998) and Star (1991). These concerns also 
resonate with explicitly feminist critiques of constructivist studies by Wajcman (1991; 
2000), Quinlan (2012) and Lagesen (2012). 
Kleinman (1998) suggests that an emphasis on agency has led ANT researchers 
to ignore or undervalue the restrictions placed on human actors in their efforts to act. 
Latour (1987), for example, suggests that the researcher should be attentive to actors 
and begin the analysis by following them through the networks they inhabit. Kleinman 
however notes that: 
 
“At a methodological level, restricting analysis to the world as seen by actors 
may lead us to ignore distributions of resources that are of no concern to the 
actor being followed. We may, furthermore, overlook institutional constraints 
to which actors are not particularly attentive.”  (Kleinman, 1998: 4) 
These concerns have been re-iterated within debates on contemporary 
urbanism. Brenner et al. (2011), proponents of a political economy approach to 
understanding and problematizing processes of neoliberal development, have 
highlighted that while assemblage theory (an approach modelled on actor network 
theory) may have methodological value in exploring previously neglected aspects of 
capitalist urbanization, at an ontological level it: 
 
“…displaces the investigation of capitalist urban development and the core 
concerns of urban political economy (e.g. the commodification of urban space, 
inequality and power relations, state intervention, polarization, uneven spatial 
development). In explicitly rejecting concepts of structure in favor of a ‘naïve 
objectivism’, it deprives itself of a key explanatory tool for understanding the 
sociospatial ‘context of contexts’ in which urban spaces and locally embedded 
social forces are positioned.” (Brenner et al., 2011: 7) 
This essentially paraphrases Feenberg’s position in relation to technology 
development. His ‘context of contexts’ resonates with the formulations and critiques 
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of the smart city paradigm previously outlined and is derived from historical insights 
on the alienating influence of capitalist economics (Marx, 1906) and the associated 
spread of bureaucratization and technocratic rationalization (Weber, 1964). The 
cumulative effect of these processes has resulted in a decontextualization of society 
where the dominant orthodoxy of calculation, optimization and control has replaced 
traditional values and ethics (Adorno & Horkheimer, 1972; Marcuse 1964; Lukács, 
1971). This reified rationality, and the technologies it produces, exploit the implied 
autonomy of science and technical progress and threatens the potential of agency to 
mobilize counter arguments and resistance. Insights derived from STS however – 
partial though they may be – suggest the potential of a reflexive or democratic 
rationalization. 
 
“While technology studies may lose part of the truth when it emphasises only 
the social complexity and embeddedness of technology and minimizes the 
distinctive emphasis on top-down control that accompanies technical 
rationalization it nevertheless allows any concrete thing to be grasped as a 
manipulable variable, and this includes human beings themselves.” (Feenberg, 
2003: 1) 
Critical theory of technology therefore incorporates the contingency and 
underdetermination of technical development demonstrated empirically through STS 
case studies into a framework which assumes apriori that dominant groups will 
actively seek to achieve self-interest through resisting particular designs and 
promoting others. The resulting decision rules or ‘technical codes’ which translate 
discursive and technical demands into a technology are the hegemonic realization of 
particular interests (for the most part institutional and bureaucratic) in a design solution 
where multiple alternate solutions are possible or desirable. The choice between these 
solutions appears to be made on the basis of technical efficiency, while in reality highly 
rationalized systems are as prone to bias as the minds which conceive them.   
 
 “Substantive bias is based on factually questionable beliefs, but efficient 
operations are often unfair even where bias in this ordinary sense is avoided. I 
have introduced the concept of “formal bias” to describe prejudicial social 
arrangements of this type. Formal bias prevails wherever the structure or 
context of rationalized systems or institutions favors a particular social 
group…critical theory of technology analyzes formal bias in technological 
design which, like the market, combines rational principles (calculation and 
optimization) with social determinants.” (Feenberg, 2008: 7)  
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This formal bias is comprised primarily of ‘constitutive’ and ‘implementation’ 
variants. Constitutive bias is evidenced in the values embodied in a theoretical system 
and is independent of context. Here, the technology systematically favours a particular 
social group irrespective of its social or geographic setting. Surveillance technologies, 
with some exceptions, operate to enhance the power of a minority with political power 
at the expense of the surveilled. It is not substantively biased because its primary 
intention is not to discriminate per se; it is merely acting in the service of enhanced 
efficiency and control. Implementation bias on the other hand is realised subsequently 
through contextualizations in the real world. Transportation systems which 
disenfranchise poor communities for example exhibit implementation bias. 
In this way, the interests and autonomy of powerful groups can be preserved 
and propagated behind the myth of neutrality. Despite these structural constraints, the 
possibility of radical transformation through political action exists. This potential is 
articulated through a concept of dialectical technological rationality which Feenberg’s 
terms instrumentalization theory. 
Instrumentalization Theory 
Instrumentalization theory is Feenberg’s conceptualization of the technology 
development process. He frames the dialectic between technocratic and democratic 
rationalizations in terms of two analytically distinct processes he terms primary and 
secondary instrumentalization, both of which have implications for the subjects 
(humans) and objects (technologies) of technical action.  
 
“The emphasis on purpose obscures another aspect of functional objects that I 
call “meaning.” The duality of function and meaning underlies the “double 
aspects” of the instrumentalization theory.” (Feenberg, 2010: 176) 
Primary instrumentalization involves processes of decontextualization and 
reduction, in which the instrumental or quantifiable aspects of technology are seen in 
isolation of its environments and simplified in order to make them manipulable by 
technical reason. Though largely neutral at this stage, such artefacts are vulnerable to 
capitalist and managerial projects of control which results in technology designs that 
reinforce Weberian notions of societal rationalization (Kirkpatrick, 2013). Through 
the hierarchical structure of modern organisations, the subjects of technical action are 
protected from the consequences of their actions. This encourages both an attitude of 
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strategic positioning and the differentiation or separation of the technical and social 
spheres. 
 
“One cannot "operate" workers or consumers as one would a machine, but one 
can position oneself strategically with respect to them so as to influence them 
to fulfill pre-existing programs they would not otherwise have chosen.” 
(Feenberg, 2000: 307) 
Primary instrumentalization therefore, embodies the technocratic orientation of many 
smart technologies and associated forms of governance. Unlike essentialist critics of 
technology, however, such as Heidegger (1977) and Borgmann (1984) who ontologize 
such characteristics, Feenberg proposes a secondary phase in the production of 
technology which offers the potential of counteracting the reifying effects of primary 
instrumentalization.  
Secondary instrumentalization is the process of recontextualizing a new 
technical arrangement to fit with its natural, technical and social environments. When 
supported by the appropriate normative and ethical orientation, this process of 
integration or ‘systemization’ provides an opportunity to insert meanings and values 
into the design and implementation process. This envisions a technical praxis where; 
 
“Power would devolve to the members of technical networks rather than 
concentrating at the top of administrative hierarchies. As more actors gained 
access to the design process, a wider range of valuative considerations would 
inform technical choices. These formal changes would result in new technical 
designs and new ways of achieving the efficiencies that characterize modern 
technological activity.”  (Feenberg, 2010: 77) 
Through the vocation and tactical initiative of historically subordinated actors, 
reflexive rationalization can reveal the basic norms and values underpinning either 
technology itself and the prevailing organisational and institutional logics. Through 
remediating strategies or democratic interventions such logics can be destabilised and 
reconfigured to perform in ways that are sympathetic to social values.  
 
“Secondary instrumentalizations support the reintegration of object with 
context, primary with secondary qualities, subject with object, and leadership 
with group through a reflexive meta-technical practice that treats technical 
objects and the technical relation itself as raw material for more complex forms 
of technical action.” (Feenberg, 2000: 16) 
[36] 
 
Reflexive secondary instrumentalization is exemplified by design approaches 
which merge multiple functions and technical attributes into an artefact or system 
thereby conserving a wide range of influences and contexts in a single technology. In 
this way, its functionalization can be accommodated to the requirements of its 
environment leading to innovation that is both technically and normatively 
progressive. Simondon (1958) describes this process as ‘concretization’ while 
Feenberg uses the metaphor of the palimpsest (a parchment comprising diverse layers) 
to capture the heterogeneity of the actors and inputs shaping the design process.  
2.4 Democratic Interventions and Recontextualization Strategies 
To support secondary instrumentalization, Feenberg articulates forms of democratic 
intervention which differ both quantitatively and qualitatively from traditional political 
representation. Technical politics arises from ‘participant interests’; issues of concern 
unifying particular individuals in relation to particular technical assemblages. Such 
interests comprise the diversity of impacts which shape quality of life issues for 
families, communities, workers and so on. For labour it may involve the manner in 
which technology acts to deskill or disempower; for families and communities 
concerns may focus on environmental damage, pervasive surveillance, health and 
safety concerns, or perhaps equitable access to infrastructure and services. Once 
motivated to coalesce around a technical issue and affect change then agency can be 
enacted through a variety of approaches which Feenberg co-opts from the field of 
science, technology and society. The result is a synthesis comprised of three primary 
strategies; innovative dialogue and participatory design, creative appropriations and 
forms of micropolitics. 
Innovative Dialogue and Participatory Design 
Innovative dialogue and participatory design embody the emergence of post-
technocratic political activity and offers the potential of both creative and inclusive 
solutions to the conflict between lay and professional actors. The participatory design 
community uses the concept of ‘agonistic’ engagements between a variety of 
stakeholders to capture the notion of disparate and sometimes conflictual interests, 
coming together to democratize innovation and produce technologies which 
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incorporates the goals and values of multiple interests (Bjögvinsson et al., 2012; Le 
Dantec & DiSalvo, 2013; Perng, 2017).  
The approach originated in Scandinavia in the 1970s with much of the early 
work being concerned with fostering democracy in the work-place by empowering 
employees to contribute to the design of technologies which were increasingly 
defining their lives. At this time few worker representatives had meaningful 
knowledge of computer technologies and so had been forced to either accept 
technologies which disempowered and/or deskilled or simply reject them (Spinuzzi, 
2005). Participatory design represented a third way that would allow workers retain a 
degree of control over of the nature and quality of their work. An early example was 
the much-studied UTOPIA project in Sweden which brought software engineers 
together with newspaper workers to develop innovative ways of computerizing the 
printing process (Feenberg, 1999). The concept of participatory design subsequently 
developed a commercial aspect when companies developed collaborative processes 
with lead or expert users to design new product and services (Von Hippel, 2005).  
In recent years the principles and practices of participatory design have been 
repurposed for innovation serving social rather than purely organisational needs. In 
addition to technical artefacts and systems, this process may also deliver a principle, 
an idea, a social movement or an intervention (Bjögvinsson et al., 2012). Participatory 
design typically comprises structured processes of engagement through which lay 
actors, civil institutions, and networks of scientific and technical expertise become 
involved in various forums (scenario workshops, experimentation, round table and 
consensus conferences, citizen panels and so on) in order to create solutions, guide 
policy makers and encourage public debate (Joss & Belluci, 2002). Bijker (2013) 
proposes such arrangements can lead to ‘pluriform’ or hybridized forms of governance 
which act to align social and institutional practices and goals, while Böschen (2013) 
refers to the process as creating meta-expertise – combining technocratic and 
instrumental reason with lay epistemologies to produce layered, creative solutions. He 
emphasises the notion of collective experimentation to problem solving which he 
describes as a social process of trial and error in which not only solutions for specific 
or bounded problems are found but also new settings of perceptions and forms of 
knowledge are created, and new social forms of co-operation and conflict resolution 
are being developed (Böschen, 2013). 
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From the perspective of supporting civic and governmental actors, these 
processes meet two important political objectives. Firstly, they strengthen civil society 
by encouraging citizens to participate in the resolution of issues impacting their lives. 
Secondly, they enable a reconfiguration of governance which promotes openness, 
transparency and adaptability. 
  
“A government does not stay as a coherent entity that includes or excludes 
particular values or partnerships with organisations. Instead, by articulating 
and enacting wider societal values associated with the experimentation in 
practical ways, a government is reshaped by the explorations of establishing 
alliances, adjustments and arrangements involving certain parts of a 
government with the hopes and accompanying challenges of affecting others” 
(Perng, 2017: 3) 
To avoid the risk of such practices being reduced to a consultative process for 
the legitimation or endorsement of policy initiatives and development plans, 
engagement needs to take place in an environment of trust, willingness and mutual 
respect (Bianco, 2016; Peng, 2017). Participatory design and innovative dialogue have 
been used effectively in the development of transportation systems (Cascetta & 
Pagliara, 2012), roads infrastructure (Roushan, 2004), municipal art projects (Perng, 
2017), health informatics systems (Pileman & Timpka, 2008), community housing and 
safe food initiatives (Manzini, 2013) and community informatics projects (Carroll & 
Rosson, 2007) amongst many others. Feenberg also notes that technologies produced 
iteratively through ongoing forms of engagement are likely to be inherently more 
sustainable, as constant revision and improvement through dialogue will inevitably 
incorporate a more democratic vision.  
Creative Appropriation 
Creative appropriation is a form of innovation where individuals participating in a 
technical network can reinvent an artefact or system by appropriating it to new 
purposes and investing it with new meanings (Feenberg, 2010). Hacklay (2013) 
describes this practice as a form of hacking and proposes that it operates at multiple 
levels of sophistication depending on the technical skills of the user.  
‘Meaning hacking’, for example, occurs when the participants do not make 
material changes to the operation of a technology but may use it or the data it produces, 
in a new context. Hacklay cites the example of ‘Map Action’ the humanitarian 
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organisation which supports aid agencies and governments by creating maps of 
disaster areas which act to support a shared operational picture and improve decision 
making.  Map Action volunteers will frequently augment their efforts with a variety of 
maps or geotagged photos of the affected areas which have been uploaded to the web, 
typically for unrelated reasons. In a similar vein, Becker et al. (2013) describes the 
example of the ‘EveryAware’ project which encourages citizens to use low cost 
sensing tools to assess the state of the environment and exploit the power of social 
media to spread data, information and knowledge in real-time as a form of political 
activism. In one instance, communities adjoining Heathrow were provided with a 
smartphone app – WideNoise - which monitored noise levels at the airport but also 
allowed the data to be annotated. Participants used this functionality to register their 
emotional responses to the noise being generated. This combination of quantitative 
(noise samples) and qualitative (feelings, opinions) data produced both meaningful and 
actionable results. The output from the initiative served as evidence to a governmental 
committee reviewing development plans for the airport. Again, this level of hacking 
requires no reconfiguration to the way the technology performs; its value coming from 
its potential to promote community interests and to use data to challenge dominant 
orthodoxies.  
Deeper hacking can be seen in the exploitation of Web 2.0 technologies to 
produce customized content such as mash ups (web integrations using APIs and web 
services, etc.), community or collaborative maps or a variety of user generated content 
such virtual communities or citizen journalism (Stillman & Johanson, 2007).  
More sophisticated forms of appropriation, however, may require considerable 
technical skills to fundamentally reconfigure existing systems or create new ones. In 
the 1980s, for example, the French telecommunication company Postes, Télégraphes 
et Téléphone implemented one of the first end-user videotext information systems – 
Minitel - which operated over telephones lines and was designed to support access to 
a centrally controlled menu of online information services. Users quickly discovered, 
however, that the system could be modified to support speech functionality and within 
months the service was being re-appropriated for online chat, companionship and sex.  
 
“Here we have a dramatic illustration of the “interpretative flexibility” of 
technology. A concatenation of devices configured by its designers as the 
solution to one problem—the distribution of information—was perceived by its 
users as the solution to quite another problem—human communication. The 
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new interpretation of the technology was soon incorporated into its structure 
through design changes and, ultimately, through a change in its very 
definition.”  (Feenberg, 1999: 145) 
The internet, which superseded the Minitel, is also a technology originally 
conceived to support institutional goals, but subsequently reworked through the 
innovative efforts of skilled users to become a communications platform serving a 
multiplicity of needs and interests.  
Activism and Advocacy 
In addition to participatory design and creative appropriations, recontextualizing 
strategies may also incorporate others forms of micropolitics, such as advocacy, 
activism and resistance (Feenberg, 2017). The power of social movements, for 
example, can play a prominent role in challenging orthodoxy leading to more 
responsive and conciliatory cultures. Ecological actors have been successful in 
effecting social and political reform leading to new laws, regulations and technical 
codes (Feenberg, 1999). These codes have translated social concern for the 
environment into new technical solutions which include renewable energy generation 
(wind energy, solar power, bioenergy, etc.), green computing (server virtualization, 
hardware optimization and high-density storage technologies), sustainable 
transportation (hybrid vehicles, smart bikeshare and carbon-neutral fuels), and so on 
(Watson et al., 2010). It has also led to emerging fields such as ‘Green Information 
Systems’ which explore the potential of integrating social, environmental and business 
interests in design solutions which make entire networks more sustainable (Brooks, et 
al., 2010; Dedrick, 2010). These environmental values are no longer seen as 
externalities which compromise efficiency and profit. They are now understood as 
imperatives around which financial and other interests much operate. This is a clear 
example of technical codes changing organically in response to societal pressure and 
demonstrates the capacity of social movements to effect change at a global scale. 
The power of agency to shape innovation is also evidenced in the retail sector. 
In recognition of the power of customers, deliberative, web-based platforms are now 
an integral feature of commercial portals and offer customer communities the 
opportunity to provide feedback not only on product design and service provision but 
also to shape strategy at an institutional level across a range of areas including 
sustainable practices, ethical procurement, data protection and so on (Boddy et al., 
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2008). Collaborative technologies are also enabling citizens as an important source of 
external innovation. This can be seen in the software sector, for example, where 
glitches and bugs are routinely identified and resolved by expert users and solutions 
then disseminated both within the user communities and to professional developers. 
As in the case of participatory design, this frames users as active collaborators in the 
innovation process, co-producing knowledge, insights and expertise (Laino & Laine, 
2012). 
Significantly, forms of agency can also operate within and across institutional 
settings when vocationally motivated actors wish to guide technical innovation in 
enlightened ways. Organisational leaders may champion particular initiatives or 
subordinates may operate in concert to subvert autocratic or conservative regimes by 
using guile, tact and situational awareness to create new socio-technical networks 
which deliver on more ethical agendas. An example of this is the development of 
online education technologies. Early instances of ICT mediated distance learning were 
developed under a technical code which emphasised service efficiency and cost saving 
(Feenberg, 2002). Accordingly, university administrators, in collaboration with 
computer companies, produced automated systems which oriented the field toward the 
delivery of unsupported, pre-packaged content over the Internet. However, after 
concerted resistance from the teaching profession, systems evolved to incorporate both 
human communication and information delivery (Noble, 1998). Today, technologies 
such as Blackboard and Moodle provide integrated and collaborative virtual 
environments which support sound pedagogical goals (Stone & Chaney, 2011).  
Similarly, we see many institutional technologists, despite operating in 
hierarchical, rule-bound structures, drawing on ethical, political and philosophical 
principles to question the foundational assumptions of their own professions. Karwat 
et al. (2015), discussing the emergence of the ‘activist engineer’ note that: 
 
“Activist engineers understand how the notions of apoliticism and ahistoricity 
result in the current engineering practice of offering only technological 
progress as a solution to any future problem…Employing praxis, activist 
engineers transform contemporary engineering practice as they are 
empowered to act on the political and value claims of their work. They thus 
reframe problems such as climate change and sustainability as socio-
ecological problems that cannot be exclusively addressed as technological 
problems.” (Karwat, et al., 2015: 4) 
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This can lead to a more a reflexive design culture which shifts the priority from profit 
and liability to long term resilience. In the transportation sector for example, this is 
evident in the efforts of engineers and urban planners who use their strategic positions 
in technical networks to advocate for more sustainable development such as 
pedestrianized streets, cycle infrastructure, public bikeshare, more integrated public 
transit systems and so on. Again, this demonstrates how governmental structures may 
be adapted from within to form new socio-political arrangements in the pursuit of 
progressive infrastructuring (Marres, 2012; Perng, 2017).  
These various forms of agency offer cities the potential to enrich and 
contextualize instrumental reasoning and the partial, realist epistemologies which 
support it. By encouraging a more nuanced and relational understanding of cities as 
places of diversity and complexity, democratic interventions can lead to technologies 
which are more social, inclusive and emancipatory. However, the extent to which 
secondary instrumentalization can mobilize these strategies will be dependent on the 
particularities of place and the capacity of individual cities to overcome cultural, 
economic and socio-political obstacles in the pursuit of new forms of technical politics 
(Zukin, 1995).   
 
“…no two cities hold the same qualities, having different histories, populations, 
cultures, economies, politics, legacy infrastructures and systems, political and 
administrative geographies, modes of governance, sense of place, hinterlands, 
interconnections and interdependencies with other places, and so on…. Little 
is known, as yet, as to the specificities of these differences and their effects, and 
yet smart city technologies are still being developed and marketed as universal 
solutions to urban issues”. (Kitchin, 2016: 8) 
Accordingly, smart cities call for a set of comparative studies which examine 
how smart technologies are formulated in different places under the influence of such 
local contingencies. This research addresses this call by empirically investigating one 
such technology – pubic smart bikeshare systems - and uses the tools provided by 
instrumentalization theory as a conceptual and analytic framework. Smart bikeshare 
schemes are sociotechnical assemblages comprising a variety of technologies, 
institutions, stakeholders and processes which in turn operate within a diversity of 
social-cultural and political milieus conditioned to a greater or lesser degree by broader 
smart city narratives. Instrumentalization theory operates hermeneutically by tracing 
the configuration of concretized designs back to the assumptions, decision-making 
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practices and logics producing them. In the process, the nature of the smart city 
landscape, as it emerges in different cities, can be unpacked and the conditions 
required for more productive and egalitarian forms of technopolitics identified.  
In sum then, by explicitly positioning design processes as inherently political 
and providing the conceptual means to analyse the interplay of structure and agency, 
instrumentalization theory preserves a conception of technical democracy lacking in 
either dystopian accounts from the substantivist tradition or in the largely descriptive 
and value neutral accounts of design provided by much of the STS canon. For this 
reason, it has been chosen as the lens through which the systems will be analysed. In 
the interest of clarity, instrumentalization theory is summarized as follows: 
 
1. Instrumentalization theory is a critique of rationality loosely based on the work 
of Marx, Weber and the Frankfurt school.  
 
2. The theory proposes the formal bias of highly rationalized systems and 
artefacts.  
 
3. A hermeneutic reading of technology should reveal the analytically 
distinguishable primary and secondary instrumentalizations.  
 
4. Instrumental rationality, concerned with efficiency and functionality, appears 
at the level of the primary instrumentalization. This instrumentality has 
minimal social constraints. 
 
5. Secondary instrumentalization is the process of embedding artefacts and 
systems in a real-world context where their realization will favour one or 
another powerful group. 
 
6. Technical codes form the decision rules which stabilize the design of technical 
artefacts and systems.  
 
7. Conflict between design and its habitat give rise to demands that may be 
expressed in new codes and designs. 
 
The next chapter provides a discussion of smart bikeshare and its relationship with the 
smart city construct.  
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Chapter 3 - Smart Bikeshare 
Introduction 
Smart bikeshare programmes are a form of transportation sharing in which bikes are 
made available for use, typically on a short-term basis, from a network of strategically 
positioned stations, distributed throughout the urban environment. Typically, schemes 
are engineered to support point-to-point-based trips. Though the concept originated in 
the 1960’s, its proliferation is generally associated with the emergence of viable 
technical formats in the late 1990s which supported its use and maintenance, and which 
mitigated the limitations and constraints of earlier approaches. Contemporary designs, 
which are generally augmented by sophisticated telecommunications systems, smart 
access technologies and e-payment options, deliver high levels of automation, 
improved management and operations processes and reduced cost. Consequently, the 
concept has proliferated in recent years and smart bikeshare is now a pervasive urban 
transportation infrastructure, with municipal systems operating throughout the world 
(Fishman, et al., 2013; Meddin & DeMaio, 2015). This growth has been underpinned 
by significant policy interest. From a city management perspective, smart bikeshare 
can reduce greenhouse gases and other emissions from the transportation sector by 
curbing the volume of motorized vehicles on the road (Midgley, 2011). It can also be 
used as a strategy for managing congestion, improving public health, reducing 
infrastructure costs, and extending the reach of the public transit network through 
integrations with other modes (Murphy & Usher, 2015). Despite pre-dating the smart 
city, smart bikeshare is increasingly positioned as an important policy intervention for 
making cities ‘smarter’ and more connected (Cuddy et al., 2014; Rani & Vyas, 2017). 
Smart bikeshare has also been proposed as a way of promoting social equity 
and inclusion (Buck, 2012).  In recent years there has been significant research interest 
in the subject of transport disadvantage which has revealed the economic, social and 
educational constraints experienced by those unable to fulfil their mobility needs 
(Clark & Curl, 2015). By distributing smart bikeshare services as an equitable means 
of mobilizing individuals and communities, such disadvantage may be mitigated 
(Fishman, 2016; Hannig, 2016). This emancipatory aspect of smart bikeshare positions 
it as an object of political discourse and associates it more generally with the 
renaissance in cycling which can be understood, at least in part, as a form of 
oppositional culture challenging the orthodoxy of private transportation (Horton, 
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2016). Smart bikeshare is also aligned ideologically with new and emerging models of 
collective urban consumption which are less commercial, more collaborative and 
underpinned by notions of urban citizenship and rights to the city (Agyeman & 
McLaren, 2015).   
Therefore, and in addition to its technical or instrumental capabilities, smart 
bikeshare has become emblematic of both environmental and social justice and its 
adoption is increasingly seen as a rite of passage for cities wishing to position 
themselves as ethically informed, citizen-centric and progressive (Fishman et al., 
2013; Agyeman & McLaren, 2015; Wayne, 2016). However, despite smart bikeshare’s 
exponential growth and the rhetoric of equity and inclusion supporting it, several 
studies have begun to question the politics underpinning the configuration and 
implementation of many systems (Fishman et al., 2013; Hannig, 2016).  In a manner 
characteristic of the smart city, smart bikeshare is emerging as a technology 
appropriated by powerful interests leading to its implication in processes of capital 
accumulation and gentrification. This is manifest in patterns of implementation bias 
characterized by socio-economic and spatial inequality and in forms of constitutive 
bias embedded at the level of technical design which act to operationalize various 
forms of social sorting (Hannig, 2016; Duarte & Firmino, 2017).  
This chapter reviews the history and evolution of bikeshare, maps its 
relationship with the city and explores the way that the design and implementation of 
contemporary systems participates in the ongoing corporatization of city management 
and technocratic governance. It also examines the ways in which technical politics and 
agency of various kinds may be used to reconfigure smart bikeshare as a platform for 
social and technical innovation. 
3.1 Bike Sharing: An Overview 
History and Evolution 
Bikeshare initiatives have developed significantly since their introduction in Europe 
in the 1960’s and are generally regarded as having gone through four generations of 
implementation and design in the interim. The 1st generation, deployed in Amsterdam 
in 1965, was characterised by the use of general-purpose bikes, custom painted for 
identification, and available to the public to borrow from, and return to, any location. 
The system was unmanaged and depended heavily on the integrity of users to 
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appropriate the bikes responsibly. The scheme failed quickly however, as the majority 
of the fleet was vandalised or stolen. In addition, the poor quality of the bikes, coupled 
with the lack of incentives to treat them with care, meant that bikes proved less than 
durable (Midgley, 2009). 
The 2nd generation of systems, pioneered by Bycyken or 9city bikes of 
Copenhagen in 1995, were designed to address these shortcomings and proved 
somewhat more successful (DeMaio, 2009). The construction of the bikes was more 
robust and the introduction of a coin deposit system as a way of accessing the bikes 
meant that a degree of control had been introduced. The Copenhagen model led to a 
series of European bike sharing programs including Bycykler in Sandnes, Norway 
(1996), City Bikes in Helsinki, Finland (2000), and Bycykel in Arhus, Denmark 
(2005). Though bikesharing’s history in North America is somewhat shorter, multiple 
coin operated schemes had emerged there by the late 90s also. Programs included 
Olympia Bike Library in Olympia, Washington (1996); Yellow Bike in Austin, Texas 
(1997); Red Bikes in Madison, Wisconsin (launched as a free bikesharing system in 
1995 and evolved into a coin-deposit model a few years later); Freewheels in 
Princeton, New Jersey (1998); and Decatur Yellow Bike in Decatur, Georgia (2002) 
(Shaheen et al., 2010). 
Though somewhat more manageable, experience with these schemes 
demonstrated that second generation designs were prohibitively expensive to operate 
(Midgley, 2011). Non-profit groups were frequently created to administer the 
bikesharing programs and, in many cases, local governments provided bikesharing 
organizations with funding (Shaheen et al., 2010). Theft however remained a problem 
due primarily to the anonymity of the users. In addition, time usage was not limited, 
and so bikes were frequently kept for extended periods of time making fleet 
management extremely difficult (Shaheen et al., 2010). Although bikesharing began 
as a way to reduce motor vehicle use, Bonnette (2009) notes that:  
 
“…both the first and second generation bikesharing schemes provided 
welcome opportunities to cycle but did not provide adequate enough support 
nor reliable service to alter motorized transportation choices and influence 
people to make significant changes”.  (Bonnette, 2009: 22) 
These limitations persisted until the emergence of viable technical formats in 
the late 1990s which effectively exploited the capacity of information and 
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communications technologies to automate systems and address the shortcomings of 
previous designs. Launched in Rennes in France in 1998, the Vélo à la Carte system 
is generally recognised as the first implementation of 3rd generation or “smart bike” 
systems. These architectures, which represent the vast majority of current bikeshare 
schemes, typically use networked docking stations capable of automatically checking-
out and returning bikes. Users, who can avail of annual subscriptions or short-term 
passes, typically pay for services using credit card-based e-payment systems and can 
then access the bikes through a variety of technologies include smart cards, fobs, 
mobile phone applications or even SMS (Buttner et al., 2011). Day-to-day fleet 
management and operations is supported through tracking technologies which relay 
information on usage patterns and fleet location via the docking stations to central 
information systems. These improvements have made 3rd generation schemes much 
more feasible in larger urban environments with many fleets now running into the 
thousands (Shaheen et al, 2012).  
Though introduced in 1998, the adoption of 3rd generation systems was 
somewhat limited until 2005 when Lyon launched its scheme with a fleet of 1500 
bikes. Given its scale and subsequent success, this system is generally viewed as the 
primary catalyst for the accelerated adoption of smart bikesharing within Europe 
(Bührmann, 2008). The introduction in 2010 of an innovative scheme (Bixi) by 
Montreal – is credited with having had a similar impact on diffusion in North America 
(Shaheen et al, 2013). The design pioneered a number of innovations such as the use 
of mobile, solar powered docking stations which meant that infrastructure could be 
moved with relative ease making the network effectively demand responsive.  
The Bixi scheme was also noted by Shaheen et al. (2013) as being the catalyst 
for the emergence of a 4th generation of systems which they categorized as including 
all the main components seen in 3rd generation systems but with the additional goal of 
seamless integration with public transportation and other modes. This involves 
integrated ticketing and high levels of physical and digital alignment between smart 
bikeshare infrastructure, parking facilities and public transit services. Other 
innovations associated with 4th generation designs are the use of dockless architectures 
which allows bikes to be distributed freely within the urban landscape and tracked 
using GPS technology, the use of electric-hybrid vehicles, incentives to encourage 
sustainable fleet distribution and the incorporation of collaborative digital platforms 
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and Web 2.0 technologies to enhance performance and improved communication with 
riders (Bradshaw & Donnellan, 2012; Shaheen et al., 2013).  
As of 2015, the number of smart bikeshare programmes is estimated to be 900, 
operating in more than 50 countries and 5 continents, with a global fleet in excess of 
one million bicycles (Meddin & DeMaio, 2015). By comparison, there were 213 smart 
bikesharing schemes operating in 14 countries using 73,500 bicycles in 2008 
(Midgley, 2011). China, a relative latecomer to bikeshare, has already the largest 
number of schemes at 237, with Italy and Spain representing the largest European 
markets at 114 and 113 respectively. The USA, which has historically lagged Europe 
by 3 to 5 years, operated schemes in 54 cities as of 2015 (Meddin & DeMaio, 2015). 
Provisioning Models 
The success of modern IT-based schemes has increased the variety of vendors and 
implementation models operating in the smart bikeshare sector (Buhrmann, 2008). 
While providers may include national governments, local authorities, transit agencies, 
for-profit and not-for-profit organisations, the most popular source of bikesharing 
services to-date, particularly in Europe, has been through the outdoor advertising 
model (Fishman, 2016). With this approach, advertising companies such as JCDecaux 
and Clear Channel, run the service on behalf of the city, typically in exchange for the 
right to use public space to display revenue generating advertisements (Midgely, 
2011). Examples include Dublin, Paris, Lyon, Brussels, Seville, Brisbane, Toyama, 
Milan and Stockholm (cyclocity.com, 2017). While this approach may represent a 
convenient way for cities to implement transportation infrastructure, some researchers 
have raised the issue of moral hazard (Bonnette, 2009; DeMaio, 2009; Duarte & 
Firmino, 2017). As the advertising companies generally do not benefit directly from 
revenues generated by the system (typically these go to the jurisdiction) there may be 
little incentive for operators to maintain high levels of service quality or to fund 
ongoing innovation and system development (DeMaio, 2009; Buttner et al., 2011). 
Furthermore, while the service may appear to have little or no cost to the taxpayer 
there is still a cost to the municipality in the form of forgone advertising revenues (Gris 
Orange, 2009; Midgley, 2011). These partnerships also carry inherent additional risks, 
i.e. path dependency (Kitchin, 2015), hidden costs (Bonnette, 2007) and lack of 
alignment between public and private interests (Holland, 2009).  
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These concerns, in addition to public unease at the notion of auctioning public 
spaces to secure bikeshare services, have motivated some countries to re-evaluate the 
wisdom of using the advertising model. Increasingly, European cities have begun to 
negotiate new relationships with vendors which operate on the basis of service 
contracts. These arrangements offer cities the potential of exploiting external 
experience and expertise while maintaining higher levels of strategic control (DeMaio, 
2009; Shaheen, et al., 2013). This is especially the case when services are provided in 
conjunction with transportation authorities. In a review of implementation strategies, 
DeMaio (2009) proposed that this model may offer the greatest benefits to the city in 
terms of effective integration with other transit modes as smart bikeshare is likely to 
become a natural extension of the city’s other mobility offerings.  
In North America, the advertising model which characterized the European 
experience did not prove popular, which in part accounts for the fact that European 
schemes have historically been somewhat larger (Fishman, 2016).  SmartBike DC, a 
system supplied and operated by Clear Channel in Washington DC between 2008 and 
2010, was a notable exception. Having performed poorly, however, it was 
subsequently replaced by Capital Bikeshare, a city owned scheme run through a public 
private partnership with the bikeshare vendor ‘Motivate’. For the most part, schemes 
in the US and Canada tend to use either this publicly owned/contractor run model - 
Boston, Ottawa, San Francisco and Chicago are examples - or implement through not-
for-profit organisations created specifically to deliver these services. Examples of the 
latter approach include Kansas, Montreal, Boulder, Denver and Houston (Shaheen, et 
al., 2014).  
Historically, the for-profit model has found little traction (Fishman, 2016).  
Nextbike, a German based operator, and Citi Bike, which currently provides services 
to New York City, are two early examples of privately owned and run systems. 
However, this situation is rapidly changing. Griffith (2017) has noted the dramatic 
impact that Chinese start-up companies have had on the industry since their recent 
arrival. Using a 4th generation dockless design, these companies can distribute bikes 
without the need for capital-intensive fixed infrastructure or government subsidies. All 
that is required is venture capital. Mobike for example, the largest of these start-ups, 
launched in Washington, DC in September of 2017, with Ofo, its nearest rival, 
launching in Seattle just a few weeks previously. US companies have responded 
accordingly. San Francisco based LimeBike, another dockless operator which was 
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started in 2017, has already raised $70 million through venture capital and operates in 
20 US markets including Seattle and Dallas (Dickey, 2018).  
 
“The market is getting crowded. Five bike-share companies are operating in 
Washington, DC—Mobike, LimeBike, Ofo, Spin, and JumpDC. It’s reminiscent 
of the early days of ride-hailing, when it felt possible that Hailo, TaxiMagic, 
Gett, Juno, or Whisk might take significant market share.” (Griffith, 2017: n.p.) 
The public smart bikeshare sector is also heavily reliant on corporate 
participation. Research has shown that while capital expenditure has traditionally been 
absorbed by state agencies (local authorities, governments, transportation authorities 
and so on), a combination of advertising sales and private sponsorship deals is 
currently funding an average of 70% of operating costs globally (Shaheen, et al., 2013; 
Fishman, 2016).  
The capital and annual operating costs of schemes vary significantly depending 
on technical architecture (station based or dockless for example), population density, 
service area, and fleet size (Cohen et al., 2013). Capital expenditure will include the 
fabrication and installation of hardware (bikes, and stations if applicable), licences or 
the purchase of back-end systems used to run the equipment, access technologies 
(cards, fobs, keys and so on) and the purchase or rental of distribution vehicles 
(DeMaio, 2009). Capital costs are often expressed as a ‘cost per bike’, defined as the 
total cost of the system divided the number of bikes in that system. Operating costs 
include maintenance, bike distribution (also known as system rebalancing), staff, 
insurance, office space, storage facilities, website hosting and maintenance, and 
electricity (if necessary) (DeMaio, 2009). Midgley (2011) estimated the average 
capital and operating cost of 3rd generation schemes at $4,000 and $2,000 respectively.  
The cost of emergent models such as those using dockless architectures is estimated 
to be approximately 25% of their 3rd generation equivalent (Bradshaw & Donnellan, 
2012). 
Instrumental and Social Value to Cities 
The policy interest in smart bikeshare, and cycling more generally, has been spurred 
to a large degree by the growing recognition of the negative environmental and health 
impacts of car usage and climate change (Fishman & Brennan, 2010). Smart bikeshare 
is positioned as a way of mitigating many of these impacts while simultaneously 
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enhancing public health and environmental awareness (Shaheen et al, 2013). From a 
transportation perspective smart bikeshare can complement and enhance public transit 
by overcoming the so-called last mile connectivity problem. When station distribution 
is configured to connect effectively with buses and trains, cities can expect an increase 
in usage of these modes as people opt to use smart bikeshare as part of multimodal 
trips.  This has been demonstrated in schemes in Europe (Murphy & Usher, 2015; 
Goodman & Cheshire, 2014), Asia (Mateo-Babiano et al., 2016), Australia (Fishman, 
2016) and North America (Shaheen et al., 2013). Environmental benefits are magnified 
by the modal shift away from cars which leads to reductions in fuel consumption and 
the associated production of atmospheric pollutants. Analysis conducted by Shaheen 
et al. (2013) for example concluded that, while results varied significantly across cities 
based on different assumptions about user behaviour, trip distribution and trip 
substitution, smart bikeshare still yielded an average CO2 saving of 1.5 kg per trip. 
Though research on smart bikeshare’s impact on public health is limited given its 
recent adoption, the health benefits of cycling are well established (Andersen et al., 
2000; Cavill & Davis 2007; Shepard, 2008). Bullock et al. (2017) also note that: 
 
“Many instances of heart disease, type-2 diabetes, breast cancer and colon 
cancer could be avoided by maintaining a moderate level of activity for 30 min 
per day….Although it is notoriously difficult to attribute overall health benefits 
to any one activity, PBS [Public Bike share] provides a distinct contribution in 
this respect as it allows for exercise in association with work or other trips as 
distinct from cycling for leisure or dedicated fitness activities.” (Bullock, et al., 
2017: 2) 
From an economic perspective, shopping patterns have been shown to migrate 
towards areas serviced by station infrastructure, with benefits derived for both 
businesses and riders. Businesses experience increase customer traffic and sales while 
riders benefit from reduced transport costs (Buehler & Hamre, 2014). Smart bikeshare 
is also understood as a mechanism for improving work force mobility leading to 
benefits in urban economies. Having analysed data from Dublin’s scheme – 
Dublinbikes - researchers concluded that the integrative and time saving capabilities 
of smart bikesharing have led to the city being more efficient and productive (Bullock 
et al., 2017). Other economic benefits noted in the literature include increased tourism, 
reduced expenditure on public health care and savings on infrastructure such as public 
transit and car parking (DeMaio, 2009; Buttner, 2011; Shaheen et al., 2013). 
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In addition to its capacity to support transportation efficiencies and economic 
optimization, smart bikeshare may also be understood through social, political and 
cultural modalities. Some researchers, for example, have speculated that its 
proliferation is related to what has been called the ‘bike renaissance’ (Pucher, et al., 
2011). This renaissance is characterized by the spread of dedicated infrastructure 
(cycle lanes, bikes paths, dedicated traffic lights, parking facilities and so on), the 
incorporation of the bicycle as part of multimodal networks (bike racks on buses, bike-
friendly transit systems), new legal and regulatory frameworks protecting the interests 
of cyclists (speed limits, overtaking restrictions, driver penalties), and urban design 
practices informed by more progressive and democratic notions of liveability and 
community  (Buck & Buehler, 2012; Ehrgott et al., 2012; Caulfield, 2014). This aligns 
smart bikeshare with cycling as a form of social and ecological counter culture. 
In a similar vein, Clark and Curl (2015) have noted that a growing 
understanding of the interdependencies between urban form and modal choice has 
revealed the economic, educational and social disadvantages suffered by those unable 
to fulfil their mobility needs. The dominance of the car has had an organic effect on 
land use patterns with the result that urban activity has become increasingly freed from 
the constraints of public transport routes. The resulting polarization between those 
owning and those lacking private transport fosters disadvantage such as exclusion from 
employment, learning, healthcare, social and cultural networks and so on (Hine & 
Mitchell, 2003; Muller, 2004). This problem has been exacerbated by historic and 
ongoing failures in public transportation policy. 
  
“By and large, transport projects are assessed in terms of reducing transport 
costs, improving efficiency, and promoting economic growth. The contribution 
of transport operations to poverty alleviation [has been] seen, in general, as 
indirect and stemming from broadly based economic development”. (Gannon 
& Liu, 1997: 3) 
The resulting inequality in the distribution of transport and mobility 
infrastructure, especially in developed countries, is well documented in the literature 
(Hook & Howe 2005; Markovich & Lucas, 2011; Starkey & Hine, 2014). It is also 
acknowledged by international agencies such as the World Bank (Jennings, 2014), the 
World Health Organisation (WHO, 2016) and the International Transport Forum 
(Lewis, 2011). The literal and metaphorical disconnect which follows operates to 
amplify social and economic isolation (Gannon & Liu, 1997; Gwilliam, 2003) 
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“Today, the life of the low-income urban resident, living on the periphery, 
largely remains one of long wait and travel times, multiple transfers, long travel 
distances, and a significant percentage of income spent on declining and poor-
quality transport options”. (Jennings, 2014: 6) 
Part of the promise of smart bikeshare is its potential for mitigating this 
disadvantage by providing communities with an affordable and accessible form of 
mobility (Shaheen et al., 2013; O’Brien et al., 2014). In addition to creating more 
employment opportunities and alleviating poverty, it has the potential to enhance 
social participation and social cohesion (Jennings, 2014; Joshi et al., 2015). When used 
to support marginalized groups, smart bikeshare offers the potential ‘of pulling the 
various facets of everyday life back into close physical proximity’ (Horton, 2006: 10). 
Smart bikeshare has also been aligned with models of collaborative 
consumption and co-production which are less profit driven and underpinned by ideals 
of urban justice and inclusivity (Agyeman & McLaren, 2015). After a historical 
decline in the culture of ‘sharing’ associated with the development of consumer 
capitalism and the pervasive privatization of urban spaces and resources, a significant 
resurgence of interest in a shared public realm has emerged in recent years (Ivanova, 
2011). Initiatives such as transportation sharing (car and bike share), tool sharing, 
community-use centres, multi-purpose streets, land sharing in the form of community 
gardens and mixed-use development and sharing through digital platforms such as E-
bay and Gumtree, all operate to reconfigure the city as a place of engagement, 
exchange and co-operation (Sustaintrust.org, 2017). As such, sharing offers cities a 
sustainable foundation for urban justice and a transformative approach to urban 
futures. It also offers the potential to build greater empathy and solidarity between 
socially, culturally and economically divided communities (Agyeman & McLaren, 
2015). This re-emphasises smart bikeshare’s role in a broader political discourse 
concerned with democracy, social and environmental cohesion and rights to the city 
(Horton, 2006). 
3.2 Smart Bike Share and Smart City Narratives 
Ongoing technical innovation, combined with its socio-political and normative 
connotations, has positioned smart bikeshare at the nexus of a number of smart city 
narratives and objectives (Fishman, 2014; Duarte & Firmino, 2017). From a purely 
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technical perspective, innovations such as advanced tracking technologies, low-power 
sensors, real-time information and transit apps, mobile infrastructure and physical and 
digital integration with other modes and systems are leading to increased 
sophistication in the configuration of contemporary systems and positioning smart 
bikeshare as an important component of the ‘sustainable’, ‘intelligent’ and ‘connected’ 
city (Rani & Vyas, 2017). Cuddy et al., (2015) for example have proposed that smart 
bikeshare is both an emerging node on the Internet of Things (IoT) and a form of 
‘mobility-as-a-service’ (MAAS) and as such, part of an ecosystem of technologies 
such as public transportation, traffic management systems, integrated ticketing, smart 
parking, smart carsharing and so on, which function in interconnected and 
complimentary ways to deliver enhanced mobility and improved performance and 
efficiencies for cities. This is also reflected in developments at an industry level.  In 
2015, ThingWorx, a leading IoT platform provider, partnered with Smoove, a French 
developer of smart bikeshare systems, to power its service in cities throughout the 
world (PTC.com, 2015) while in 2017, Mobike and Ofo both announced similar IoT 
partnerships with AT&T/Qualcomm Technologies and Chinese Telecoms/Huawei 
respectively (Att.com, 2017; huawei.com, 2017). In a related manner, Smart bikeshare 
is also increasingly seen as an important source of ‘big data’ (Romanillos et al., 2016) 
with the availability of granular, GPS-based spatio-temporal data likely to lead to 
improved service provision, business intelligence and city planning. Under the right 
circumstances it may also see smart bikeshare function as an environmental sensing 
platform. 
 
“With the right attachments a bike is a weather monitor, an air quality detector, 
noise detector and a vibration monitor, telling the city in real time exactly what 
is happening at street level…This more intensive data capture is facilitated by 
bikes that have regular access to a power supply – which means especially 
bikeshare bikes.” (Wayne, 2017: n.p.) 
From a political or discursive perspective, many cities have also strategically 
mobilized the symbolic value of smart bikeshare as a way of demonstrating their 
commitment to progressive modes of development and as a means of counteracting 
many of the negatives that have become synonymous with the smart city project, i.e. 
techno-fetishism, neoliberal governance, splintered urbanism and so on (Agyeman et 
al., 2013; Hannig, 2015; Fishman, 2016; Duarte & Firmino, 2017). Smart city 
programmes around the world routinely link their schemes to addressing issues of 
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social disadvantage. ‘Smart City Cleveland’ for example explicitly associates its 
scheme with improving opportunities for low-income communities, the disabled, 
senior citizens and students (Smart City Cleveland, 2016). ‘Smart Dublin’ has 
marketed its system using similar rhetoric. It frames Dublinbikes as an integral part of 
its efforts to create a more open, connected and engaged society (Smart Dublin, 2017). 
This discourse of inclusion and equality has now become commonplace with the 
adoption of smart bikeshare increasingly seen as a litmus test for cities wishing to 
promote themselves as egalitarian and progressive (Fishman et al., 2013; Duarte & 
Firmino, 2017). 
 
“Besides the relatively technical aspects, it is also noteworthy to see mayors, 
governors, and even presidents and prime ministers riding bicycles. And they 
do so not as bicycle users, but as bicycle promoters. In the political arena, 
bicycles, and in particular bike-sharing systems, became a sign of social 
equity.”  (Duarte & Firmino, 2017: 50) 
This is also reflected in smart bikeshare’s growing profile at smart city expos, 
workshops, and summits and in funding initiatives such as smart city challenges, which 
typically position it within narratives of innovation, environmental sustainability and 
social responsibility (futurecities.skift.com; smartcitiesworld.net, 2017; smart-city-
expo-Barcelona, 2017).  
Despite this however, several critical researchers have begun to problematize 
the political and economic interests producing the smart bikeshare phenomenon (Buck, 
2012; Hannig, 2016; Fishman et al., 2013). Contrary to the prevailing discourse, their 
analysis is revealing smart bikeshare as complicit in processes of capital accumulation 
and neoliberal governance, leading in many instances, to the systematic segregation 
and marginalization of particular people and places. Through values embedded at the 
level of design and implementation, smart bikeshare is emerging as increasingly 
aligned, both practically and ideologically, with the broader smart city paradigm and 
the corporatized notions of citizenship which inform it (Agyeman & McClaren, 2015; 
Hannig, 2016) 
3.3 Smart Bikeshare and Social Justice 
Despite bikeshare’s proliferation, a number of research studies have begun to detail 
patterns of socio-economic and spatial disparity in the distribution of smart bikeshare 
services across cities around the world.  For the most part, smart bikeshare represents 
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a predominantly young, white, male, middle-class, well-educated demographic 
(Fishman et al., 2013; LDA Consulting, 2014; McNeil et al., 2017). Furthermore, these 
characteristics tend to be consistent across geographies, cultures and political 
inclinations (Buck & Buehler, 2013). Research in North America for example has 
demonstrated that schemes in San Francisco, Washington, New York, Philadelphia, 
Montreal, Toronto, and Minneapolis and St Paul (The Twin Cities) all show a 
significant under representation of minorities and low-income communities (Shaheen 
et al., 2012; Hoe & Kaloustian 2014; LDA Consulting, 2014), while many programmes 
in Europe, Asia and South America exhibit similar bias. In London, for example, 
nearly 90% of respondents to a transportation survey identified as being white, with 
the majority disproportionately wealthy relative to the general population (Transport 
for London, 2014; Goodman & Cheshire, 2014). In Dublin, the findings from a similar 
survey suggest that marginalized groups were significantly underrepresented in the 
city’s scheme, with the unemployed and low paid accounting for only 4% of the 2250 
respondents. The majority of participants - nearly 80% - were found to be in the ABC1 
social grouping - the demographic most associated with wealth and privilege (Delve 
Research, 2011). Analysis also revealed that only 22% of Dublin’s membership is 
female (Murphy & Usher, 2015). Similar patterns of exclusion and inequality were 
found in Melbourne and Brisbane (Fishman, 2016), Rio de Janeiro (Duarte & Firmino, 
2017), Buenos Aires (Hannig, 2016) and Mexico City (Grabar, 2013; Jaffe, 2014). 
Kodransky and Lewenstein (2014) propose that barriers to equitable access fall 
into three broad categories: structural, financial and cultural. Structural barriers include 
‘procedural and operational’ obstacles such as the requirement to have a credit card, 
bank account or drivers’ licence to secure membership. In relation to credit cards, 
Ethan Cohen-Cole (2011) has highlighted the spatial correlation between ethnicity and 
banks cards noting that minorities will tend to be poorer and have lower credit quality. 
Having a requirement for these technologies to access smart bikesharing services 
essentially acts to disproportionately eliminate low-income citizens (Hannig, 2016). 
Financial barriers typically relate to the cost of using schemes - which can at times be 
prohibitive - and the common practice of requiring significant security deposits from 
new members. Citing Kodransky and Lewenstein’s research, Hannig (2016) notes that: 
 
“Informational barriers (e.g. lack of information, understanding and language 
translation) prevent potential low incomes users from understanding the 
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benefits of bikeshare or even how to use it. Cultural barriers include distrust of 
authority, discomfort with shared mobility systems or a preference for more 
culturally acceptable modes of transportation such as cars.” (Hannig, 2016: 
206) 
Of the impediments to equity noted in this research, the most pressing is the 
issue of basic access to the service. While the relationship between station distribution 
and population density may explain the tendency to situate schemes in populous city 
centre locations (Buttner, 2011; Toole Design Group, 2012), in many instances 
network design is being patterned by other socio-spatial factors. Buck (2012), for 
example, notes that wealth and social class are key variables impacting the distribution 
of service infrastructure. Typically, low-income, medium density areas are served 
more poorly than their affluent but equally populous counterparts (Clark & Curl, 2015; 
Fishman, 2016; Hannig, 2016). Duarte and Firmino (2017), highlight the case of Rio 
de Janeiro, a city characterized by socio-economic divisions. The city recently 
implemented a bikesharing scheme with most of the infrastructure being located along 
the seashore and adjacent higher income neighbourhoods. Significantly, Rio’s outdoor 
advertising regulations are quite prohibitive and the use of billboards and panels in 
much of these areas is forbidden. The main sponsor of the system is Itaú, one of the 
country’s leading banks. It uses the bike system as a mobile platform to carry its logos 
and colours and thereby strategically circumvent regulations which are spatially static. 
It also allows Itaú to target affluent consumers while associating its brand with 
environmentally and socially responsible projects. These relationships have become 
widespread throughout the industry (López-Pumarejo, 2011; Shaheen et al., 2012; 
Griffith, 2017). In London, the title sponsor is Santander; in New York, Citibank; in 
Barcelona, Vodafone; in Portland, Nike; in Dublin, Coca Cola, and so on. This 
essentially corporatizes the provision of public smart bikeshare services, leading to the 
promotion of privilege rather than inclusion. 
 
“When one sees flagship cities delaying or stalling their bike-sharing systems 
expansion to more peripheral and/or poor neighborhoods, one must consider 
the reasons behind it. By locating docking stations in more upmarket 
neighborhoods, bike-sharing systems operators are not only targeting richer 
(credit-card holders serve as a proxy) potential users, but also richer 
consumers who do not need to ride bicycles, and who welcome the bike-sharing 
systems as a sign of an environmentally friendly and modern lifestyle.”                                                        
(Duarte & Firmino, 2017: 57) 
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The reliance on credit cards and other e-payment systems may also have 
implications for privacy. Electronic IDs, smart cards, e-keys, mobile phone apps and 
other electronic access technologies routinely gather detailed personal data about 
riders as they interact with systems. Once integrated with tracking technologies such 
as GPS, it provides system operators with fine-grained information on how particular 
riders navigate particular regions of the city. Such data may become additionally 
valuable if combined with credit card information. An agreement between bikeshare 
vendors and credit companies for example may link two critical market data, 
enhancing their value significantly in the process - especially to marketers (Duarte & 
Firmino, 2017). This aspect of smart bikeshare resonates with well-established and 
critical discourses on the smart city relating to pervasive and extensive forms of state 
and corporate surveillance.  
 
“The everyday practices we enact, and the places in which we live, are now 
deeply augmented, monitored and regulated by dense assemblages of data-
enabled infrastructures and technologies on behalf of a small number of 
entities. The age of big data means a deluge of continuous (real-time), varied, 
exhaustive, fine-grained and often indexical, relational, flexible and 
extensional data. We are no longer simply lost in the crowd; we can be spotted, 
tracked and traced.” (Kitchin, 2016b: 6) 
The European Cyclist federation (2017), cognisant of the risks, have 
recommended that private smart bikeshare data should only be used in accordance with 
EU data security and privacy legislation, including the storage of such data within the 
European regulatory space and not remotely, where best practice standards may not 
apply. The threats posed serve to highlight the need for rigor, transparency and 
accountability as state actors negotiate and implement partnerships with the vendors, 
system operators and sponsors (Cuddy et al., 2014).  
3.4 Equity and Community Focused Solutions 
In response to issues of social justice, several cities have attempted to systematically 
remove barriers and improve the reach of smart bikesharing for underserved 
populations. Buck (2012) reports on the findings from a number of North American 
cities which developed equity programmes and deployed strategies to reverse industry 
trends. These strategies included locating station infrastructure in vulnerable areas 
(Minneapolis), subsidizing membership fees or offering tiered pricing (Boston, 
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Minnesota, Arlington and Maryland Counties), experimenting with cashless payment 
options (Arlington) and partnering with non-profits to recruit members (Denver and 
Montreal). Despite modest success, however, vulnerable groups still tend to be 
underrepresented (Buck, 2012). Hannig (2016) proposes that while mitigating barriers 
has merit, the measures deployed are often based on limited or broad data and 
developed in isolation, without the participation and engagement of communities. 
Accordingly, there is a risk of the personal values of planners and operators prevailing 
over the needs and wishes of citizens (Hannig, 2015). Accordingly, there is an 
emerging consensus that the most equitable programmes are those which invest time 
and effort in developing partnerships between decision makers, community partners 
and communities (NACTO, 2015). These partnerships foster camaraderie, collegiality 
and mutual respect;  
 
“When communities are included in the decision-making process, the possible 
ideas and solutions are virtually endless. Many practitioners may feel that 
opening the public would result in infeasible, unusable feedback that would 
interfere with developing consensus. However progressive guidance and case 
studies indicate that fostering meaningful involvement with communities as a 
partner in developing solutions can impart a sense of ownership and overcome 
cynicism and mistrust.” (Hannig, 2016: 209) 
The potential of smart bikeshare to act as a catalyst of systemic social change 
is also noted in the literature. Smart bikeshare implementation can be leveraged as 
form of tactical urbanism in that it can be used in the development of social capital 
between citizens and the building of organizational capacity between public-private 
institutions, non-profits, and their constituents (Lydon et al., 2011; Wesley et al., 
2016). Given that smart bikeshare is naturally aligned with a range of issues related to 
progressive urbanism (cycling infrastructure, active transportation, open streets, 
health, and sustainable practices, etc.) the possibility exists to use its implementation 
as a catalyst for building networks of influence which extend far beyond its boundaries. 
Used purposefully, smart bikeshare can become a part of a hybrid forum where 
conflicting interests can create knowledge controversies that can be resolved through 
various forms of democratic interventions - dialogue, experimentation, tactical 
resistance, collaborative design and so on (Callon et al., 2009). These processes, which 
may enrol a multiplicity of actors (urban planners, the public, traffic engineers, 
political representatives and other communities of interest), offer the potential of 
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producing technical (and social) infrastructure which strengthens civil society (Wesley 
et al., 2015). Davidson (2013) emphasises the technical aspect of this process. He 
describes it as ‘a play on the physical and political landscape, manifested as a design 
intervention’. Agyeman et al. (2013) reiterate the relationship between technology 
design and the politics of equality: 
 
“Crucially, equity needs to be considered in the design of sharing programs – 
ideally with the participation of likely users. Currently it is all too often an 
afterthought in formal sharing schemes such as bike and car sharing programs 
where technologies effectively exclude those on low incomes. However, those 
on lower incomes are typically more generous, charitable, trusting and helpful 
when compared to those on higher incomes, exhibiting greater compassion and 
commitment to egalitarian values. (Agyeman et al., 2013: 18) 
 
Design and Democratization 
The ongoing technical innovations which are energising 4th generation or demand 
responsive smart bikeshare models offer the promise not only of functional and 
technical improvements but also the potential to engage with riders in new and more 
socially progressive ways.   
The use of GPS has precipitated the development of stationless or dockless 
systems which make the need for networks of hardwired infrastructure redundant. In 
turn, this has significantly reduced cost which lowers economic barriers to more 
equitable service distribution. Stationless approaches also afford riders higher levels 
of flexibility and trip customization (Parkes et al., 2013). In addition, while the use of 
GPS may improve planning and management processes, it may also serve to enhance 
democracy by supporting communities to advocate more effectively for access to 
bikeshare and related infrastructure. Being able to use openly available GeoJSON data 
files to demonstrate bias or partiality in the way schemes are configured, for example, 
provides important opportunities for agency and makes this data a catalyst for greater 
political participation and social activism (Outram et al., 2010; Fishman, 2016). GPS 
may also be deployed to keep bikes within prescribed geographic areas by alerting 
bikesharing operators when bicycles leave permitted zones. This might be coupled 
with dynamic pricing models which reward riders who return bikes to depleted zones 
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and act to naturally rebalance the scheme. SobiHamilton, a scheme implemented in 
Hamilton, Canada has operationalized this feature. 
The growth of smart bikeshare has also coincided with a similarly rapid growth 
in e-bike performance, affordability and usage (Fishman, 2016). This innovation is 
becoming increasingly popular in Europe (Electric Bike Report, 2017), and Asia in 
particular (Munkácsy & Monzón, 2017).  This technology overcomes what researchers 
in MIT’s SENSEable City Lab identified as some of the primary obstacles to cycling 
in an urban environment – longer trip distances and challenging topography (Outram 
et al., 2010). Mitigating these factors offers the potential of making smart bikeshare 
accessible to more user groups. In particular, it may encourage older rides or people 
with mobility issues to participate more constructively in their own lives (Outram et 
al., 2010). In addition, many schemes have reported a correlation between topography 
and re-balancing requirements. Unsurprisingly, bikes tend to collect at the bottom of 
hills and the financial and environmental cost of bike distribution (typically this 
requires fleets of diesel-powered trucks) can be considerable (Jurdak, 2013). Hybrid 
bikes may be instrumental in reducing such costs and play an important role in the 
improved reach and penetration of schemes. Improving physical and digital integration 
with other modes enhances reach and usability and acts to legitimize smart bikeshare 
as a bona fide form of public transportation by embedding it in the technical and 
cultural fabric of the city. Consequently, it may be that smart bikeshare benefits from 
the levels of subvention typically seen in other areas of the transit network. This would 
encourage higher levels of state control and sustainable development rather than 
growth dependent on profit accumulation (Bradshaw & Donnellan, 2011). Boston 
represents a case in point: 
 
“Boston has a multimodal public transport system, including commuter rail, 
subway, BRT and bus; the bike-sharing system covers four municipalities...the 
main sponsors of the bike-sharing system are public authorities, including city 
councils, some planning and transport metropolitan authorities; and 
advertising is forbidden in areas of the system, such as Cambridge…Thirty-one 
of the 131 subway stations have a bikesharing stations within a 100m radius of 
a subway, and all but one of the most used subway stations has an adjacent 
bike-sharing station.” (Duarte & Firmino, 2017: 54) 
Philadelphia’s scheme is also noteworthy in this regard. The city owns the scheme and 
runs it through Indego, a private company. However, they employ an access manager 
to operate within Indego’s offices to ensure that key aspects of the service contract 
[62] 
 
(equity issues, data compliance and service quality, etc.), are honoured as part of day 
to day operations (Kinny, 2016). 
The incorporation of social media platforms as a deliberative or interactive 
component of schemes may offer the potential of strengthening the co-production of 
services by integrating riders in knowledge sharing and decision-making practices. 
Combined with GIS tools, these platforms may be used to enable riders contribute 
environmental and technical information which might be used to adjust infrastructure 
or contribute to other service quality improvements. ‘Social Bicycles’ (SoBi) is an 
example of a service provider providing such functionality. Using technology this way 
to promote engagement and dialogue could (re)position riders as active participants in 
the creation of the systems they appropriate (Outram et al., 2010). It would also 
introduce enhanced levels of transparency and accountability into the service 
provisioning process and provide the city with an important source of secondary data 
with which to support urban planning activities (Bradshaw & Donnellan, 2013). 
3.5 Conclusion 
Smart bikeshare schemes are extensive socio-technical networks comprising 
hardware, software, communications technologies, data and business processes, 
funding models and implementation strategies. They may differ significantly in how 
they function, the affordances they offer, the goals they are intended to serve, the 
manner in which they are integrated into their respective environments, and the ways 
they are operationalized and supported. These differences have a material impact on 
the degree to which they meet the needs of civil society and position schemes, and the 
intentions underpinning their design and implementation, as socially relevant.  
Though the current literature has begun to map the relationship between social 
justice and smart bikeshare, to-date, no detailed case studies have been undertaken 
which specifically examine the situated and context dependent practices which 
produce system configurations in different cities. Despite the pervasive 
neoliberalisation of the smart bikeshare sector, the process has not been universal. 
While some city administrations have been complicit in the prioritization of business 
interests to the detriment of communities already stigmatized by disadvantage, others 
have managed to engage authentically with smart bikeshare’s normative and political 
potential by creating technologies which espouse genuinely egalitarian values.  
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Understanding how forces in given locations coalesce to legitimize the 
adoption of particular designs addresses knowledge gaps in the critical technology, 
smart city and smart bikeshare literatures. By providing detailed empirical and 
theoretical accounts of the processes by which cities produce, what is ostensibly, the 
same technical proposition, this thesis explores the ways in which cities are engaging 
with notions of democracy and technical citizenry and, the degree to which these 
notions are being shaped by broader smart city discourses. 
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Chapter 4 - Methodology 
Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a description of, and a justification for, the 
methodological choices made in support of the research. The discussion is informed 
by a conceptual framework known as the ‘research onion’ developed by Saunders et 
al., (2007) which describes the successive layers which must be negotiated as effective 
research is developed (see figure 4.1 below). The framework understands this process 
as beginning with the researcher’s philosophical orientation and progressing logically 
through a series of interdependent and increasingly granular layers leading ultimately 
to the collection and analysis of data and the production of useful insights.  
Accordingly, the chapter begins with a discussion of critical philosophy 
through explaining the ontological and epistemological assumptions of the project and 
outlines how these assumptions fit with the methodology being used. Stemming 
directly from the work’s philosophical and theoretical orientation is the method of 
reasoning guiding the research. While abduction, the approach most commonly 
associated with critical research, was adopted to support this study, the investigation 
also retained both deductive and inductive elements. The chapter explains why the 
application of this mixed approach was both necessary and appropriate. 
A comparative case study, which included smart bikeshare schemes in Dublin, 
Ireland and Hamilton, Canada, was the strategy adopted for the research. The 
appropriateness of the case study approach is discussed here, as is the process of 
identifying these particular schemes as likely to provide explanatory insights into how 
different cities create technologies with fundamentally different outcomes for citizens. 
Given the constraints of the research, and in keeping with the case study strategy, the 
investigation was cross-sectional rather than longitudinal in nature, with data sources 
primarily comprising interview and documentary evidence. These aspects of the 
research are explained and critically reflected upon in the chapter. 
To ensure methodological rigor, the data analysis used thematic or analytic 
coding, a process informed by the constructs developed from Feenberg’s critical 
theory. It also drew on critical hermeneutics as a method of integrating the multiple 
data sources to produce a holistic understanding of the cases. In particular, the 
interpretation drew on the work of Paul Ricoeur (1977). Ricoeur’s approach to the 
interpretation of texts and text analogues (processes, institutional arrangements and 
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technologies, for example) aligned with the project’s conceptual orientation and a 
discussion of critical hermeneutics, and its application in this context, is provided. 
Figure 4.1: Research Onion  
 
Source: Adapted from Saunders et al. (2009: 108)       
4.1 The Critical Paradigm 
The purpose of this research is to investigate the ways in which technology is 
actualized in different geographic locations under the influence of local and supra-
local forces. As discussed in Chapter 2, there is an assumption that technical 
infrastructure has politics and that powerful stakeholders, typically neoliberal and 
bureaucratic institutions, will use their influence to configure design specifications and 
implementation strategies to protect and perpetuate their own interests, often to the 
detriment of other social groups. The research is concerned with the ways in which 
agency, in the form of democratic interventions, can be mobilized to challenge 
institutional control leading to technologies which are ethically progressive. This 
aligns the research with the broad ideological and political aims of the critical tradition 
making its adoption as a philosophical position from which to investigate the case 
study environments both appropriate and logical. In particular, the work is aligned with 
Feenberg’s theoretical position which specifically identifies technology as another 
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form of domination and calls for its democratization as part of a broader program of 
social transformation. 
While the contexts of application define particular variants of critical research 
such as Marxism, feminism, race theory (and critical theory of technology), the 
approach has inherent a set of ontological and epistemological assumptions which 
broadly define it and which, given their methodological implications, warrant 
discussion and clarification.  
Assumptions underpinning Critical Research 
Critical research is typically concerned with power dynamics and the liberation of 
disenfranchised sections of society from the “false consciousness” created by the 
dominant orthodoxy. Therefore, research in this tradition is essentially committed to 
an emancipatory agenda which creates change that benefits these groups (Lincoln et 
al., 2011). Ontologically, the critical position posits that reality is both historically 
constituted and apprehendable, and the causes for its present incarnation can be 
understood through an investigative process which acknowledges the social, cultural, 
economic and political forces which act to subjugate and control (Guba & Lincoln, 
1994). Hence, critical research proceeds through the subjective experiences of people 
(phenomenology) which uncover the mechanisms and processes which act to 
(re)produce networks of power. In this regard it acts to: 
 
"...establish a dialectical stance with respect to the researcher-participant 
relationship that serves to empower the participants and stimulate 
transformation of oppressive conditions to more equitable one."  (Ponterotto et 
al., 2013: 44) 
Critical scholarship therefore seeks to overcome taken-for-granted beliefs, 
ideologies and structures by developing self-awareness through critical reflection and 
by encouraging an emancipatory consciousness in research participants and society 
more generally (Denzin, 1994). This pre-existing normative orientation, which 
prioritizes certain political and ethical goals, is therefore informed by a value-laden 
axiology which transparently links the production of knowledge, at least in part, to the 
historicity of the researcher. Therefore, critical research problematizes the subjective-
objective dualism found, for example, in positivist research and instead understands 
epistemology and the production of ‘truth’ or knowledge to be intersubjective. In this 
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sense, it also fundamentally challenges traditional distinctions between ontology and 
epistemology in that what can be known is inevitably influenced by the interaction 
between a particular investigator and a particular object or group. Here, critical 
research is similar to social constructionism, however, unlike constructionism critical 
research proposes that as knowledge claims are always embedded in regimes of truth, 
consideration should be given to asymmetries in power which act to exclude or 
marginalize (Ceci et al., 2002). For this reason, critical philosophy can be said to be 
anti-foundational. Reality is alterable by human action and the transformative power 
of knowledge is embraced (Scotland, 2012). 
Methodologically, and in keeping with these fundamental assumptions, critical 
research generally adopts a transactional, dialogic and dialectic approach intended to 
foster conversation and critical reflection. The transactional nature of the engagement 
between the researcher and the researched necessitates a recursive, iterative dialogue 
in order to provide a holistic understanding of the motivations, ideologies and 
rationales underpinning the phenomena under investigation. It is dialectical in the 
sense that it is ultimately intended to produce insights which may liberate people from 
ideologically static notions of structure and agency. 
These assumptions – ontological, epistemological and methodological - shaped 
the manner in which the research process unfolded. In particular, they influenced the 
choice of methods used to collect data and the analytic framework used to 
subsequently interpret it. These aspects of the research are discussed in some detail 
later in the chapter. 
The research proceeded using a largely abductive approach. Unlike deductive 
and inductive reasoning which focus on theory testing and theory building 
respectively, abductive reasoning relies more heavily on intuition and logical 
inference, and ultimately on the overall coherence and plausibility of the narratives 
and explanations developed during the research process (Shuster, 2012; Asvoll, 2014; 
Cardullo & Kitchin, 2017). From the perspective of this research, the abductive 
approach involved deploying Feenberg's critical framework as a set of sensitizing 
concepts through which the case study environments might be translated and analysed. 
While this was not designed to prove or disprove critical theory of technology per se, 
the process nevertheless retained both deductive and inductive modes, as the theory 
(as a starting hypothesis) was continually subject to evaluation and the possibility of 
elaboration and development. This produced a hybrid methodology characterized by 
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an ongoing dialogue between constructs and research sites which acted to refine the 
application of the theory and strengthen the interpretative process.  
4.2 Case Study as a Research Strategy 
The case study strategy is generally acknowledged to be an appropriate means of 
generating in-depth and multi-faceted understandings of complex phenomena 
operating within their natural context (Yin, 2009). While it can be used within a variety 
of disciplines and paradigms (Yin, 2009), it is commonly associated with the social 
sciences and interpretative research (Flyvbjerg, 2006). In contrast, for example, to 
experimental or positivist approaches where the researcher may often attempt to exert 
direct control over variables, the case study approach is viewed as promoting a 
naturalistic understanding of the issues (Crowe et al., 2011).  
While case studies can be exploratory or purely descriptive, Yin (2009) 
proposes that the case study strategy is especially suited to explanatory research which 
is concerned with answering ‘how’ and ‘why’ type questions and which attempts to 
reveal the motives, rationales, and processes which lead to certain phenomena or 
outcomes. As such, the case study approach is aligned with the aims of the research. 
Citing Schramm (1971), for example, Yin (2009: 17) notes that; 
 
“The essence of the case study, the central tendency among all types of case 
study, is that it tries to illuminate a decision or set of decisions; why were they 
taken, how were they implemented, and with what result. 
As opposed to purely historical research, the case study strategy is also well 
suited to the investigation of contemporary events. Historical in this sense refers to 
scenarios where no relevant persons are alive to report, even retrospectively, what 
occurred. Historical influences in the more traditional sense are routinely included in 
case study investigations as part of a holistic understanding of the phenomena (Yin, 
2009). Yin also notes that the case study inquiry typically relies on multiple sources 
of data which need to converge in a triangulatory fashion, and as such, benefits from 
the prior development of a theoretical or conceptual framework which acts to guide 
the collection and interpretation of data (Yin, 2009). From the perspective of this 
research, the use of Feenberg’s theoretical constructs enhanced the internal validity of 
the findings by supporting the identification of casual rather than purely spurious 
relationships.  
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Stake (1995), in an effort to define the case study in relation to scientific 
enquiry, has characterized three main types of case study; intrinsic, instrumental and 
collective. Intrinsic is generally adopted when investigating a unique phenomenon, 
while instrumental is used in a particular case to develop a broader appreciation of a 
given issue. Collective or multiple cases are generally undertaken, either 
simultaneously or sequentially, to develop deeper insights and understandings. This 
resonates with Miles and Huberman (1994), who note that by virtue of cross case 
analysis, multiple case studies tend to be more comprehensive and explanatory and 
have the added potential of producing findings which may be generalizable i.e. these 
findings have enhanced external reliability.  
Yin (2009) also distinguishes between two primary multiple case study designs; 
holistic and embedded. A holistic approach is one that treats the environments being 
investigated as whole or integrated entities where a single phenomenon or unit of 
analysis is being explored. A unit of analysis might be an individual, a group, a 
process, an organisational entity and so on. Embedded studies on the other hand occur 
where there are multiple and disparate sub units of analysis. This research involved 
understanding the manner in which the constitution and configuration of particular 
smart bikeshare schemes under investigation were mediated and shaped by a diversity 
of context specific forces and, as such, are the primary focus of the investigation. 
Accordingly, the case studies are holistic in nature. As noted by MacQuarrie, (2012): 
 
“The design, implementation, and analysis [of holistic cases] should facilitate 
a synergistic combination of various aspects or elements of the case study. 
Thus, a holistic case study is composed of various components, and the 
challenge for the researcher is to create a credible synthesis of these elements 
of knowledge.” (MacQuarrie, 2012: 2)) 
4.3 Conceptual Framework Supporting the Case Studies 
A conceptual framework (see Figure 4.2) developed from Feng and Feenberg (2008) 
was used to guide the research and explore key concepts and ideas. The framework 
understands schemes to be the product of technical codes or cultural horizons which 
act to shape design and implementation processes. Technical elements and functional 
attributes (primary instrumentalization), which tend to have relatively little bias and 
form the basic ingredients of technical practice, are actualized in the city though an 
assemblage of forces effected largely by institutional actors, policies and processes 
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(secondary instrumentalization). It is here that schemes become integrated into specific 
practices, are connected to other devices, and are ascribed specific meanings and use. 
The feedback loop connecting the actualized systems with processes of secondary 
instrumentalization is an adaptation to the original framework as developed by Feng 
and Feenberg (2008) and allows for the impact of environmental contexts on the 
ongoing development of the systems. The broken line including primary 
instrumentalization in this process acknowledges that even the choice of basic 
technical elements can have a valuative and/or political aspect, however minimal. 
Figure 4.2: Conceptual Framework  
 
Source: Adapted from Feng & Feenberg (2008) 
The particular constructs which comprise both instrumentalizations and which 
contributed both theoretically and methodically to the coding and interpretation of data 
collected are described below. 
Primary Instrumentalization: Functionalization 
This instrumentalization consists of four moments of technical practice. The first two 
relate to characteristics of the object and approximate to Heidegger’s notion of a 
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decontextualized ‘revealing’, while the latter two define the subject and are 
sympathetic to Habermas’ concept of Communicative Action i.e. they suggest the 
intrusion of a functionalist or technocratic rationality into the ‘life world’.  
Decontextualization - Reduction 
Decontextualization and reduction are interrelated steps which capture the processes 
by which objects are essentially separated from their natural environment for the 
purposes of utilitarian, technocratic evaluation. Together, they operate to negate those 
attributes and qualities which might otherwise meet socially relevant goals. 
“Inventions such as the knife or the wheel take qualities such as the sharpness 
or roundness of some natural thing, such as a rock or tree trunk, and release 
them as technical properties from the role they play in nature. Technology is 
constructed from such fragments of nature that, after being abstracted from all 
specific contexts, appear in a technically useful form.” (Feenberg, 1999: 203) 
In effect, these processes of objectivication simplify artefacts in order that may be 
integrated into technical networks and systems. Feenberg calls what remains ‘primary 
qualities’; primary that is from the standpoint of the technical subject for whom they 
are a power base. 
 
“The tree trunk, reduced to its primary quality of roundness in becoming a 
wheel, loses its secondary qualities as a habitat, a source of shade, and a living, 
growing member of its species. To the extent that all of reality comes under the 
sign of technique, the real is progressively reduced to such primary qualities.” 
(Feenberg, 1999: 203) 
Primary qualities may include anything about objects that makes them 
amenable to control, formalization and quantification (weight, size, shape and so on). 
In this sense decontextualization and reduction resonate with Heideggerian 
substantivism; the contraction of all of technology’s potential to the most abstract and 
instrumental capacities and, in the process, the sacrificing of those secondary qualities 
which have social and ethical value. 
Autonomization - Positioning 
These concepts are the antithesis of reciprocity and involve a separation of technical 
subject from the object of control making redundant the natural feedback loop that 
typically mediates and conditions such a relationship. 
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“The subject is largely unaffected by the object on which it acts, thus forming 
an apparent exception to Newton's law...Administrative action too, as a 
technical relationship between human beings, presupposes the autonomization 
of the manager as subject, who must neither fear nor pity the laid-off worker. 
Their relationship must be functional.”  (Feenberg, 1999: 203) 
 
The technical subject situates or positions itself strategically to navigate among 
its objects and control them. This positioning is highly characteristic of the 
technocratic control one sees in modern, hierarchical organisations and is marked by 
an indifference to the social and environmental consequences of the pursuit of 
optimization and/or self-perpetuation. Feenberg proposes the design of artefacts is 
complicit in this process by inducing workers and consumers to fulfil pre-existing 
programs that may otherwise have not chosen. This reaffirms technology’s positional 
character. 
Secondary Instrumentalization: Realization 
Secondary instrumentalization is also defined by four moments. While primary 
instrumentalization defines the basic technical orientation of the object and subject, a 
process of secondary instrumentalization is required to integrate a device or system 
into a real-world context. Though highly constrained under a technical rationality, this 
recontextualization process offers an opportunity to embed the technology in a 
multitude of technical and social networks through mediations that are cognisant of 
normative and aesthetic considerations. In this sense it offers the potential to 
compensate for the reifying effects of primary instrumentalization. Therefore, each 
moment of the secondary instrumentalization can be seen to as a foil or counterpoint 
to those outlined above. Again, the first two concepts relate to the object and the latter 
two to the subject. 
Systematization - Mediation 
Systematization and mediation are processes through which the artefact can be 
recontextualized and designed with multiple contexts and use cases in mind. In the 
vernacular of ANT, they represent the “enrolment” of an object in a network (Latour, 
1992) where the artefact or system assumes a multitude of technical and cultural 
identities and meanings. The technically underdetermined way this is accomplished 
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allows for the intervention of socially relevant interests and values and the moral and 
ethical imperatives of a broader spectrum of user groups. When supported by the 
appropriate valuative mediations, systematization can harness the inherent capacities 
or ‘secondary qualities’ of technology to inset it seamlessly into a new social context. 
Characterized by commodification under a neoliberal orthodoxy, these processes 
retain the capacity to give the concretized or realized object an additional dimension 
and redefine not only its ‘function’ but its ‘meaning’. Feenberg’s examples of online 
education platforms and the Minitel system, which demonstrate the capacity of goal-
oriented systems to assimilate the concerns and interests of affected communities, are 
illustrative in this regard.  
Vocation – Initiative 
These processes speak directly to the democratic interventions described in Chapter 2. 
It is through the modalities of vocation and initiative that such interventions can 
mediate and reconfigure the effects of autonomy characteristic of primary 
instrumentalization. In so doing, the technical subject is no longer isolated from objects 
of control but is reshaped by their relation to them. This reciprocity accounts for the 
co-constitution of subject and object. 
 
"Vocation" is the best term we have for this reverse impact on users of their 
involvement with the tools of their trade. The idea of vocation or "way" is an 
essential dimension of even the most humble technical practices...but tends to 
be artificially reserved for professions such as medicine in most industrial 
societies.” (Feenberg, 1999: 206) 
 
When motivated by a sense of vocation, tactical actors (implicated publics and 
institutional subordinates for example) can mobilize initiative to circumvent the 
strategic power of executive, instrumentally-oriented decision-makers. As previously 
described, such agency may take many forms such as resistance, advocacy, 
collaborative design, and collegiality.  
 
“Collegiality is an alternative to bureaucratic control in modern societies with 
widespread if imperfect applications in the organization of professionals such 
as teachers and doctors. Reformed and generalized, it has the potential for 
reducing alienation through substituting self-organization for control from 
above.” (Feenberg, 1999: 203) 
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It is through such interventions that the tension between conservation of hierarchy and 
democratic rationalization can be productively resolved. Table 4.1 below illustrates 
these concepts and the relations between them. 
Table 4.1: Instrumentalization and associated concepts 
 
 Functionalization Realization 
 
Objectivication 
(Technology) 
 
 
Decontextualization 
 
Reduction 
Systematization 
 
Mediation 
Subjectivication 
(Human) 
Autonomization 
 
Positioning 
Vocation/identity 
 
Initiative 
 
 Source: (Feenberg, 1999: 208)  
In keeping with the critical paradigm, the concepts defined above were not 
applied prescriptively, but instead used as a means to support a critical reflection of 
the substantive issues impacting the relationships between society and technology.  
4.4 Choosing the Case Studies 
Stake (1995) proposes a case to be a “specific, complex, functioning thing” with the 
primary factor influencing selection being the case’s capacity “to maximize what we 
can learn” (1995: 4). Creswell (2007) adds that, despite not knowing in advance which 
cases may prove exemplary in addressing a set of research questions, purposeful 
sampling enables the researcher to include cases which have the potential for greater 
probative value in unpacking the phenomena under investigating. Accordingly, the 
bikeshare schemes comprising the study were selected using an information-oriented 
technique, rather than a random or stratified sampling logic.  
The choice of Dublinbikes and SobiHamilton as appropriate case studies was 
influenced primarily by prior knowledge developed through previous study. In 2011 
and in pursuance of a master’s degree in information systems, I undertook a research 
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project which aimed to understand the degree to which the design of bikeshare 
schemes could be optimized from the perspective of environmental sustainability 
using an informatics-based framework. Both Dublinbikes and Social Bicycles were 
included as subjects of this research. While the work was largely instrumental in 
nature, focusing on the capacity of technical architectures to reduce cost and enhance 
usage through information exchange between riders and system operators, the process 
uncovered a diversity of schemes (systems in Copenhagen, Denmark and Baltimore, 
USA were also included in the study) whose design characteristics were technically 
underdetermined and mediated, to a greater or lesser degree, by geographic, political, 
economic and cultural contexts. Due to the limitations of the research, these issues 
remained largely unexamined but given their significance as factors influencing design 
praxis, and given the themes motivating this thesis, the cases represented an important 
opportunity for deeper critical analysis. 
Prior to the final selection of the cases, additional research was conducted to 
understand the current status of the systems. This comprised of preliminary 
conversations with stakeholders from both cities in order to develop a better 
understanding of the contexts impacting system design and identify any technical 
adaptations or innovations which might have occurred in the interim. These 
discussions proved especially fruitful in the case of SobiHamilton as the scheme has 
not been implemented at the time my MSc was undertaken and so prior research had 
been limited primarily to exploring SoBi’s architecture as a design concept with a set 
of technical and social potentials. SoBi’s CEO provided invaluable detail and insight 
into key issues relating the schemes development and implementation which, in 
addition to informing the case selection process, also informed much of the field work 
when data gathering began.  
This preparatory phase of case selection was also supplemented by a review of 
historic and contemporary media accounts of both schemes (websites, blogs, 
newspaper articles and social media platforms for example) and a review of the 
literature dealing specifically with smart bikeshare and equity. The latter aided in 
framing and interpreting technical activity in both cases though a socio-political lens.   
 What this exploratory stage of the thesis established then was that the systems 
were conceived in contextually disparate environments and each articulated 
fundamentally different notions of democracy, citizenship and innovation. 
Dublinbikes, a traditional 3rd generation scheme implemented through a public private 
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partnership (PPP) with French outdoor advertising firm JCDecaux, was controversial 
from its inception, with the manner of its planning, implementation and subsequent 
operation drawing criticism from a variety of political and social commentators. In 
particular, concern centred on the nature and quality of decision making within city 
management and the effect this had on the rationales and motivations shaping the 
scheme’s design and performance. Despite articulating a progressive smart city 
narrative which ostensibly promotes creativity, openness, and inclusivity, Dublin’s 
scheme had experienced little technical or social innovation since its deployment and 
had been configured largely to serve areas of economic and social prosperity. By 
contrast, SobiHamilton represented the industry’s first large scale, 4th generation 
implementation and was widely recognised as an important contribution to solving 
many of the technical and normative issues characterising the industry (Shaheen et al., 
2010; Bradshaw & Donnellan, 2013; Fishman, 2016). The implementation, which 
needed to negotiate considerable historic, geo-political and economic barriers, 
represented a diversity of interests and stakeholders. Significantly, this was achieved 
in the absence of an explicit or overarching ‘smart city’ agenda. 
Given their paradigmatic nature, Dublinbikes and SobiHamilton represented 
critical cases through which issues and themes relevant to the research could be 
investigated. As previously mentioned, detailed critical case study research involves 
critical reflection on current practices, questions taken-for-granted assumptions, and 
attempts to critique the status quo and the role of dominant actors in the shaping of 
social relations. In particular, the studies were chosen to serve the following research 
question: 
How may the design and implementation of smart bikeshare systems preserve notions 
of equality, democratization and citizenship?  
4.5 Data Collection 
Data sources to support the research comprised interviews and documentary evidence. 
To support a holistic understanding of system creation, implementation and use, 
interviewees comprised stakeholders from the following groups: system designers and 
operators (Hamilton), system members or users, advocacy groups, civil servants, 
politicians, journalists, and industry experts. The number and category of participants 
is outlined in Table 4.2 below.  
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Participants became involved by being formally approached due to their 
situated knowledge of the bikeshare scheme and/or the processes leading to their 
creation. Contact was made initially via email, with follow up phone calls made to 
discuss in some detail the purpose and aims of the research. Subsequent participants 
were mainly recruited through snowball sampling, based on recommendations and 
introductions made by these primary contacts. System users in the Hamilton case were 
recruited primarily through engaging with the city’s network of residents and 
community organisations located in the schemes service area. 
Representatives from JCDecaux - system designers and operators for 
Dublinbikes - refused to participate in the research. Likewise, their counterparts in 
Dublin City Council with responsibility for the commissioning and implementation 
the system also refused an invitation to participate in the interview process. While a 
junior manager representing Dublinbikes agreed to a meeting to discuss issues relating 
the system, he declined to sign a consent form, making the information gathered 
essentially unusable. This was compensated for by enrolling key informants (identified 
through newspaper articles, planning documents and snowball sampling, etc.) who had 
particular historical knowledge of the project and so could provide testimony relating 
to critical development and implementation processes influencing the system’s 
creation. 
As Dublin does not have the dense network of community and residents’ groups 
characteristic of Hamilton, system users (scheme members) were recruited by 
invitation using a number of social media platforms i.e. Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn 
and Boards.ie (a public forum). Significantly, more men responded to this process than 
women which is consistent with the gender imbalance of the scheme noted in Chapter 
3. 
Interviews 
Interviews can be structured, semi-structured or in-depth. Semi-structured interviews 
were chosen as the most appropriate instruments for this investigation. Structured 
interviews are analogous to surveys and are standardised and quantitative in nature. 
They do not support an open dialogue and cannot be modified as contexts change. In-
depth or unstructured interviews tend to be conversational, without scripted agendas 
or pre-set themes. They are sometimes called ‘non-directive’ as the interviewer makes 
[78] 
 
no attempt to direct the interviewee. Semi-structured interviews combine elements of 
both the other approaches. The researcher can develop a set of themes and questions 
to be covered while allowing the flexibility to modify the questions as contexts change. 
Questions may be omitted, and the order of questions may be changed given the nature 
of the circumstances (Sanders, 2009). The process supports an open, interactive 
dialogue, while at the same time ensuring the focus remains on the key constructs 
under investigation. For these reasons a semi-structured interview format was adopted 
across both participating cases. 53 discrete interviews (comprising 20 female and 33 
male participants) were conducted, with some stakeholders occupying more than one 
category. For example, a number of system users in both cities were also community 
advocates, civil servants or academics etc.  
It should be noted at this juncture that the concept of equity informing the 
research, and the interview process, was understood primarily through the lens of 
social disadvantage. The design of the systems, the distribution of network 
infrastructure and the willingness or otherwise of either city to engage in consensus 
building practices were largely shaped by socio-economic factors. While cycling and 
smart bikeshare does demonstrate a gender imbalance, research conducted in Dublin 
by Brereton (2016) and Dennehy (2016) attributed this, at least in part, to additional 
responsibilities that women tend to have in relation to shopping or to the transportation 
of children which make them more likely to choose other modes of transport. This 
research also noted the impact of issues such as poor traffic management and the 
inadequate provision of appropriate cycling infrastructure (segregated cycle lanes for 
example) which tend to differentially increase the perception of risk in women and 
undermine their sense of self-efficacy. As these issues are beyond the scope of the 
thesis, they were not explored in the research, although the capacity of bikeshare to 
energize cycling related agendas is discussed in the Hamilton case. Also, where 
stakeholders were cognisant of the needs of racial and ethnic minorities – also a feature 
of SobiHamilton - this is duly noted in the findings. 
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Table 4.2: Category and Distribution of Interview Participants 
 
Type Dublin Hamilton  
System Members/Users 9 6 
Journalists 1 2 
Activists - Advocates 5 6 
Civil Servants 4 4 
System Operators  0  2 
System Designers 0  2 
Academics 1 2 
Politicians 3 1 
Industry Experts * 9 9 
 
*The information developed through industry experts was applied to the evaluation of 
both cases. These experts include system developers (3), transportation and data 
analytic scholars (4), systems software developers (1), and Industry officials (1). 
While interviews, were primarily based on one-time contact, additional short 
or supplementary interviews were conducted to develop additional insights or to 
clarify issues and points of interest as they arose during the data collection process. 
In accordance with recommended ethical procedures, interviewees were 
offered complete anonymity and informed consent was received from each participant 
(see Appendices 4 & 5). Additional information sheets and consent forms were 
supplied where interviewees may have required permission from their respective 
organisations to participate in the process. Where applicable, participants had it made 
clear to them that the organisations they represented would be identified in the 
research. 
In addition, interviewees had explained to them the precise nature and purpose 
of the research study, the reasons for their selection, the procedures to be undertaken 
and any risks that might be involved. They were offered the opportunity to ask any 
questions and have such questions fully answered both before and after interviews. 
Interviewees were also advised that they could withdraw from the process at any time 
without prejudice. The researchers contact detail were supplied to allow interviewees 
clarify any aspect of the process or to withdraw their contributions if they so wished. 
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All interviewees, with the exception of a representative of Dublin City Council, waived 
anonymity and were willing to be identified in the study. 
Documentary Sources 
Documentary sources supporting the research varied depending on availability. It 
included company and government reports, strategy and policy documentation, 
organisational websites, letters, emails, procurement and contract documents, patents, 
physical artefacts (the systems themselves), formal studies, academic papers and 
newspaper and website articles. Together these provided important historical, political, 
and technical accounts which supplemented the interview process and provided 
additional contextual material to which critical analysis was applied.  
Yin (2009) notes, for example, that documentary evidence is stable (can be 
reviewed repeatedly), unobtrusive (not created as a result of the case study), exact 
(contains exact names, references and details of events) and provides broad coverage 
(may cover a long time-span and include many events and settings). In addition, while 
documentary evidence may not present a literal recording of events, when used 
judiciously it may act to corroborate or contradict interview testimonies. As such it 
offers the potential of considerable probative value. 
Documents were sourced both prior to and during field work. Prior to field work 
a systematic internet search revealed important issues relating to the schemes. In the 
case of Dublin for example, newspaper articles and advocacy websites provided 
important historical accounts of controversies and disputations which proved pivotal 
to an understanding of the formative phases of the project. Once field work 
commenced, these issues informed both the interview process and the types of 
additional documentation necessary to develop a more coherent picture of how and 
why these issues arose and how they were managed. A number of these documents 
had initially not been released to the public domain and had to be secured subsequently 
by a national newspaper using freedom of information (FOI) legislation. In particular, 
these included tending/request for proposal (RFP) documentation, the initial 
concession contract (2006) and the contract defining the schemes’ subsequent 
expansion (2013). While this documentation provided valuable information on the 
nature of the structural and financial relationships between DCC and JCDecaux and 
supported a critical an analysis of the formative phase of the scheme, they failed to 
[81] 
 
confirm the participation of other vendors in the tendering process. Information 
relating to other bidders had been specifically requested but none was provided. Given 
the obfuscation and expedience which would characterize much of the decision-
making relating to the project, this omission may imply that negotiations were bilateral 
and uncompetitive from the outset. This aspect of the project is noted in the empirical 
findings. 
In the case of Hamilton, a combination of business planning and public 
engagement documentation, also secured prior to field work through the city’s office 
of active transportation, provided a detailed chronology of the events leading to the 
implementation of the scheme and systematically identified key stakeholders based on 
their participation at various developmental phases of the project. Again, this 
information identified issues and points of interest which were developed through the 
interview process. As with the Dublin case, additional institutional documents such as 
contracts, independent reports and strategic planning documents were secured once 
field work commenced and proved especially useful in corroborating (and in some 
cases challenging) data developed through other sources. 
Formal bikeshare studies and academic articles, developed primarily from the 
literature review, provided grounding in the technical and political issues confronting 
the industry and so aided in the development of problem definitions and interview 
design. Patent documents and video material supported an understanding of the 
performance characteristics of the systems and the implications of these characteristic 
for the various stakeholder groups associated with them. Furthermore, video material 
made available on social media platforms which documented key pre-implementation 
debates in the council chambers of both cities also helped to clarify the political and 
cultural environments shaping design processes. 
4.6 Data Analysis 
Critical Hermeneutics 
Prior to and in conjunction with the process of thematic coding, which involved 
applying Feenberg’s theoretical construct to the data, the case studies were read and 
re-read using a critical hermeneutic lens to allow the multiple accounts and testimonies 
from across both case studies to be evaluated as a holistic whole rather than be biased 
by individual or partial accounts. 
[82] 
 
Hermeneutics was originally developed as an approach to the interpretation of 
ancient and biblical texts but has, over time, become an increasingly popular 
methodological tool within the social sciences in particular (Kinsella, 2006). Myers 
(2016), for example, has proposed that all qualitative research, concerned as it is with 
meaning making and the understanding of human experience (phenomenology) 
involves a hermeneutic component, as testimonies (text or their analogues) are 
interpreted by necessity as part of the analytic process (Myers, 2016).  Kinsella (2006) 
adds that: 
“Qualitative research is by its very nature informed by hermeneutic thought. 
Given that the emphasis in qualitative research is on understanding and 
interpretation as opposed to explanation and verification…the connection 
between qualitative research and hermeneutic thought becomes self-evident.” 
(Kinsella, 2006: 2) 
While a number of hermeneutic approaches exist, for example those of 
Gadamer, Heidegger and Husserl – it is the critical potential inherent the work of Paul 
Ricoeur (1971) that offered the best opportunity for congruence between the critical 
philosophy underpinning this research and the methodological processes actualizing 
findings (Geanellos, 1999). Though critical theory and critical hermeneutics are not 
necessarily synonymous given that Ricoeur’s work does not decide apriori which 
dialectics and oppositions will be most significant, it is widely accepted that much 
critical enquiry today is informed by the critical hermeneutic process (Rorty, 1991; 
Wallace, 2000; Kinsella, 2006; Myers, 2016). Kögler (1996) for example has proposed 
that many contemporary critical scholars draw on Ricoeur’s framework as a 
methodological tool to support deconstruction and interpretation. In addition, 
Feenberg has identified Ricoeur’s work in particular as an important contribution to 
the development of a hermeneutics of technology (the analysis of the artefact) and a 
natural methodological choice in the application of his work (Feenberg, 1992). While 
hermeneutic phenomenology focuses on the conscious constructions and interpretive 
activities employed by actors as they encounter phenomena, critical hermeneutics 
offers an additional layer which addresses issues of power and ideology and situates 
the interpretative process in a wider social, cultural, economic and historical setting. It 
assumes apriori that the constructions that individuals make operate not only in a sense 
making or interpretative way but to reproduce (or resist) the underlying ideological 
assumptions inherent in a given context. Its epistemic orientation also acknowledges 
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that no observation or description is free from the effects of the observer's experiences, 
pre-suppositions, and projections of his or her own personal values and expectations 
(Ricoeur, 1981).  
Critical hermeneutics’ alignment with critical theory therefore distinguishes it 
from pure hermeneutics which proposes that the text (or analogue) is in some sense 
‘out there’ as a disembodied object that is amenable to objective analysis in the 
positivist tradition (Bleicher, 1982). It differs also from a purely poststructuralist 
approach which suggests that there is no such thing as an objective or true meaning of 
a text (Madison, 1990 as cited in Myers, 2004). Critical hermeneutics recognizes that 
the interpretive act is one that can never be closed as there is always a possible 
alternative interpretation. Using this approach, the interpreter constructs the context as 
another form of text, which can then itself be critically analyzed. In this sense the 
interpreter is recursively creating a text upon a text, and the process whereby the 
textual interpretation occurs is self-critically reflected upon (Ricoeur, 1977). As with 
critical theory, an essential concept in this approach is the interpreter’s recognition of 
their own historicality. Therefore, the dialectic between text and interpreter leads to an 
iterative and reflexive series of interpretations which synthesizes an approximation the 
‘truth’. In this way, the approach acknowledges the interrelationship between 
epistemology (interpretation) and ontology (interpreter) and provides researchers with 
a method of developing intersubjective knowledge. 
Methodologically and conceptually, Ricoeur proposes that interpretation 
proceeds from naive understanding, where the interpreter has a superficial grasp of the 
whole of the text, to a deeper understanding, where the meaning of individual texts 
and the ‘whole’ are mutually constitutive and emerge through an ongoing dialogue 
with one another (Ghasemi et al., 2011). This process is known as the hermeneutic 
circle. Significantly, the interpretative processes associated with the hermeneutic circle 
are guided by anticipated explanations (Gadamer, 1976). For the purpose of this 
research, these anticipated explanations are conditioned by the underlying theoretical 
framework derived from critical theory of technology. The critical hermeneutic 
process also encompasses not only an interpretive - dialectic reading of interviews and 
documentary sources, but also understands text analogues such as socio-political and 
cultural contexts, organisational structures and behaviours, the performance of 
projects, and importantly, the nature of the technological artefact itself to be significant 
and subject to interpretation (Myers, 1994).  
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This situates the analysis of written texts within a broader or global process 
which attempts to bring clarity and coherence to an object of study which may appear 
confused, incomplete or contradictory in one way or another (Taylor, 1976). This 
process requires that the researcher does not necessarily merely accept the self-
understanding or accounts of participants, but seeks to critically engage with the 
totality of understandings in a given situation (Myers, 1994). Within the context of this 
research, critical hermeneutics added substance and direction to the application of 
Feenberg’s constructs and provided a ‘recta-theory’ or framework for the iterative 
analysis and integration of a diversity of sources. 
Thematic Coding 
In a manner consistent with the hermeneutic tradition, an important aspect of 
Feenberg’s critical theory of technology is the interrelationships between local or 
situated decision making and the broader socio-political and economic milieu within 
which these processes occur. Consequently, the research process was designed both to 
develop an understanding of the pre-existing contextual landscapes in both case study 
environments and then map, in chronological order, the developmental processes 
which led to the design, implementation and ongoing management of the schemes. 
MAXQDA was used to assist in the analysis of the data and the following broad 
categories were created to structure the data logically and sequentially. 
 Contexts (Historic, political, economic, cultural and geographic) – Pre-
implementation – System Design and Configuration – Management and Operations - 
Ongoing Innovation. 
Each developmental phase was then subdivided into the construct categories or 
dimensions derived from Feenberg’s work i.e. Positioning – Initiative, Autonimization 
– Vocation, Reduction – Mediation, Decontextualization – Systematization.  
The data was then structured further into factors illuminating these dimensions 
both descriptively and analytically. For example, in the Hamilton case, many variables 
impacting the degree to which the system was designed and implemented to integrate 
into the physical, cultural and technical environments (decontextualization – 
systematization) were identified. For illustrative purposes a sample are shown below 
in figures 4.3 and 4.4.   
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The following extract from an interview with a system developer at 
SobiHamilton demonstrates the impact of Google on systematization and innovation. 
The extract deals with processes of developing open standards for smart bikeshare data 
being pioneered by the scheme.  
 
“I was in Chicago recently at a conference and of course they have bikeshare 
there, quite a large system but we were trying to get around the city and Google 
maps doesn’t tell me where the bikeshare stations are so I have Google maps 
running on my phone because that’s how I’m navigating but to get a bike I have 
to go to their site, open their app and try to locate where I am in on that map 
by referencing my position on Google maps. So, I have two maps...so Google 
doesn’t have the bikes because there was no open standard. So now if we can 
agree on a standard, companies like Google need to only design one key to 
access the data from multiple systems and they’ll take the time to do that 
properly. I mean with the transit data there was a standard and any city that 
wanted their transit information on Google had to present the data in that 
format or Google just wouldn’t engage with it.  
This passage was also coded as relevant to the role of ‘technical design’, ‘data’ 
and ‘connection to other systems’ in patterning the systematization and configuration 
of the scheme. Additionally, it speaks to the willingness within the SobiHamilton 
organisation to respond to the broader systems landscape with technical 
experimentation and innovation. Many other examples developed in the case study 
corroborate this attitude of openness and enterprise and are discussed in detail in the 
findings chapter. 
The role of ‘cycling safety’, ‘traffic infrastructure’, and ‘advocacy’ on 
systemization is demonstrated in this passage from an interview with a local cycling 
campaigner. 
 
“So, I think that one of the really interesting things for me and my role in “Yes 
We Cannon” (advocacy organization) is that we actually used the fact that Bike 
Share was coming as an impetus for the installation of the Cannon Street Bike 
Lane. We highlighted to Council that ‘you know, you guys already approved 
this, we know the money is coming. These systems work best where there are 
proper networks of infrastructure so if you want it to be successful you need to 
be able to provide people, especially in the lower city, with a decent East – 
West route because there wasn’t one until Cannon Street’.” 
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Figure 4.3: Sample of Coding  
for Hamilton 
Figure 4.4: Sample of Coding  
for Hamilton 
 
 
 
 
The importance of ‘initiative’ and ‘vocation’ also proved pivotal to the character of 
Hamilton’s scheme and led to the categories illustrated in figure 4.5.  The following 
quote from a local activist for example describing the efforts of the city’s 
transportation demand manager to mobilize support for the project was coded under 
‘leadership’, ‘hacking – tactical’ and ‘citizen engagement’. 
 
“Somebody had to take the leadership role, somebody had to organize, and to 
capture all of that civic engagement and put it together. Somebody had to tie 
all that together and present it as a package and it simply wouldn’t have 
happened without him. He took a big political risk as a staffer. This is not a city 
that rewards innovation and progressive thinking.....no good deed goes 
unpunished in this town (laughs). I mean as a staffer he has to lead on this but 
also to stay out of the limelight and not be seen to be antagonistic to his own 
organization and so he’s doing an enormous amount of work that can be all but 
invisible to a lot of people.” 
The quote also suggests some of the political conservatism that had to be negotiated in 
order for the project to materialize.  
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Figure 4.5: Sample of Coding Structure for Hamilton 
 
In the case of Dublin - which emerged as the product of a fundamentally 
different set of rationales and ideologies – this segment from an interview with a 
community activist involved in appealing key planning decisions taken by Dublin City 
Council captures the frustration felt at the manner in which the democratic process - 
and environmental legislation - were circumvented for the sake of expedience.  
 
“Well as group we felt that the steps that were taken were reversed.  There was 
a contract, then public representatives were informed and then a more general 
notification to the public that Dublin Bikes were on their way and they were 
going to be a wonderful thing…I would say that the Aarhus convention 
particularly points out that for anything that has an impact on the environment, 
and has a significant impact on the quality of life for people within cities, the 
first thing that happens is proper public consultation. We made that point of 
course but nobody listened.” 
The segment was categorized as a ‘pre-implementation’ activity and coded as 
examples of autonomization and strategic positioning within city governance.  
It should be noted that coding was initially provisional and went through a 
number of iterative phases as the dynamics both within and across cases unfolded and 
judgements guiding the analytic process became incrementally more refined and 
discriminating. This was the value of the hermeneutic process which continued after 
the coding process completed until a satisfactory approximation of the ‘truth’ was 
reached.  
 
“In intensive, case study research, the movement of understanding is constantly 
from the whole to the part and back to the whole; in other words, the more 
interviews we conduct and the more information we gather, the more we 
understand the case study as a whole and its constituent parts. This 
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hermeneutic process continues until the apparent absurdities, contradictions, 
and oppositions…no longer appear strange, but make sense.”  (Myers, 1995: 
56) 
4.7 Lessons Learned 
Through undertaking the research process a number of issues emerged which should 
be noted in the interest of informing future researchers. Firstly, the length of time 
required to transcribe interviews was significantly under-estimated. It was assumed at 
the out-set that one hour of dialogue would take 2 - 3 hours of transcription, however, 
this proved somewhat optimistic. In addition, the semi-structured nature of the process 
encouraged interviewees to be expansive in their responses. While this contributed 
positively to understanding the contextual dimensions of the cases and improved the 
findings considerably, it also meant that some interviews took significantly longer than 
expected, with the inevitable impact on the duration of both transcription and analysis.  
Secondly, it should not be assumed that all elements of the interview strategy 
will be implemented precisely as intended. As noted previously, key stakeholders 
within both JCDecaux and Dublin City Council with direct responsibility for 
developing and running the scheme refused repeated invitations to participate in the 
study – significant, given the overall findings. The effect was mitigated, however, by 
the inclusion of additional stakeholders who provided valuable insights and critical 
reflection which strengthened the study.  
Finally, it should not be assumed that all the interview participants short listed 
at the outset will be available as and when required by the research. All interviewees 
for this project were initially contacted in the early part of 2016, a number of months 
prior to the commencement of the data gathering process. They were advised as to the 
nature of the research and were invited informally to participate. They were then 
contacted intermittently in the intervening period both to advise them of progress and 
to maintain the profile of the project. In parallel with this, and to mitigate the risk of 
unavailability, an alternate list of interviewees representing other potential schemes 
was developed which could have been used should circumstances have required it.  
4.8 Summary 
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As originally described, the research process was informed by the layers of Sanders’ 
research onion. The initial schematic has been updated to illustrate the path that was 
chosen through these various layers to best support the investigation (see figure 4.6).  
Figure 4.6: Path through Research Onion 
 
 
Source: Based on Saunders et al. (2009: 108) 
An abductive comparative study was at the heart of the research process. It used 
primarily qualitative data comprising interview and documentary evidence to which 
both critical hermeneutics and thematic coding were applied in order to complete 
analysis process. Due to the time constraints that applied, the research was conducted 
using a cross-sectional approach.  
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Chapter 5 - Dublinbikes 
Introduction 
Dublinbikes represents something of a paradox. Implemented in 2009 through a public 
private partnership (PPP), the scheme is currently promoted by municipal actors as an 
exemplar of creative urban design which has revolutionized the transportation 
landscape, improved the quality of life in the natural and built environments and 
consolidated Dublin’s core as culturally and socially integrated (Dublin City Council, 
2011). As such the scheme is positioned as creating a more connected, sustainable and 
healthier city and one which embodies progressive notions of equity and innovation. 
This is made explicit in Dublin City Council’s stated commitments to the scheme 
which include: ensuring that Dublinbikes contributes to the evolution of socially 
integrated economic and residential communities; maximizing access to the service by 
developing a robust network of stations which facilitates sustainable, city-wide 
movement for all citizens; and, ensuring that the design and construction of the 
Dublinbikes system is of the highest quality and is appropriate to the scale and context 
of its environmental surroundings  (Dublin City Council,  2011).  
Taken at face value then, this positions Dublinbikes as an archetype – a 
planning and implementation blueprint – for addressing the structural, cultural and 
technical barriers to equity discussed in Chapter 3.  Certainly, when judged purely 
from the perspective of usage, Dublinbikes is comparable with many of the more 
positively cited international systems, e.g. Paris, Barcelona, New York, Lyon and 
Mexico City (Cohen et al., 2013). Perhaps unsurprisingly, Dublin City Council has 
been eager to emphasize this aspect of its performance through discourses which 
conflate high levels of demand with overall success. This rhetoric has also been 
effective in conditioning public opinion, with much of the recent media coverage of 
the scheme being celebratory in tone (Pope, 2016; White, 2017). However, when the 
manner of Dublinbikes’ planning, implementation and management is subjected to a 
normative or ethical analysis this veneer of success begins to dissipate and a much 
more problematic picture of emerges. Contrary to the narratives of social inclusion, 
Dublinbikes, from its inception, has been characterized by corporatization and 
neoliberal governance and has operated explicitly in the interests of ‘special people 
and places’. In the process it has fragmented the experience of the city’s most 
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disadvantaged citizens and contributed to ongoing processes of economic and spatial 
segregation.  
This chapter explores these issues through a detailed empirical examination of 
the project from pre-implementation contingencies through to DublinBike’s current 
status, paying particular attention to the rationales, motivations and behaviours 
formative to the concretized design. As such, it provides a thick description of the 
interconnectedness of technology production and the modes of governance 
characterizing the city. Two contexts in particular emerged as crucial to the 
development of the scheme. Firstly, the emergence of entrepreneurial forms of 
governance at both a national and municipal level, and secondly, local governments’ 
need to resolve an historic problem relating to the spread of unauthorized outdoor 
advertising infrastructure. These factors would coalesce to produce many of the 
decision rules and taken-for-granted assumptions shaping the scheme’s technical and 
normative core. 
5.1 Entrepreneurial Governance as a Prelude to Dublinbikes 
For the two decades prior to the inception of Dublin’s bikesharing scheme in 2009, 
urban governance in Ireland had become increasingly oriented towards 
entrepreneurialism, a trend characterized by the promotion of local economic 
development through partnerships with private capital and away from historical modes 
of administration which were viewed as largely “passive” or depoliticised. Studies 
such as those conducted by MacLaran et al. (2007) attributed this transformation in 
Dublin in particular to central-government urban renewal policies in the 1990s 
designed to enhance the role of the private sector which precipitated a philosophy of 
neoliberalism within the culture of the city’s local governance structures.  
The shift in the Irish context was not an isolated one. Urban governance in 
Dublin was part of a pattern which had its genesis in the economic stagnation of the 
1970s. Exemplified in the UK by the conservative party, entrepreneurial governance – 
in conjunction with financial liberalization and deregulation - was seen as fundamental 
to revitalizing the economy. In practice, this involved privatizing many national 
industries, and stressing the importance of risk taking, investing and wealth 
accumulation (Hall & Hubbard, 1996). By the 1990s this turn towards an 
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entrepreneurial form of governance had become the received wisdom for many 
western English-speaking cities, including Dublin (MacLaran et al., 2007).  
Opponents of this trend countered that it was the state control of key public 
assets that provided co-ordinated integration of infrastructure, continuity of service 
and equitable access for users (Herne, 2009).  Despite this, and considering the 
ideological changes occurring abroad, Ireland became more vulnerable to the notion 
that the adoption of a neoliberal ethos and increased engagement with the private 
sector would enhance governance and prove more beneficial to the country’s economic 
and social fortunes (Herne, 2009). An integral component of the process was the 
increased use of public private partnerships (PPPs) as a mechanism for procuring new 
services and infrastructure. After a tentative beginning, the extent to which successive 
Irish Governments engaged with the PPP model led to Deloitte in 2006 describing 
Ireland as having one of the most mature PPP markets (Reeves, 2013a). Used initially 
on a pilot basis in 1999, PPPs were subsequently used to provide roads infrastructure, 
civic buildings, light rail, schools infrastructure, social housing, water and waste 
treatment, and waste and environmental services (Reeves, 2013b).  
This process of enhanced collaboration with private capital was (and continues 
to be) predicated on two primary assumptions: value for money and improved 
outcomes for citizens. These assumptions seemed almost axiomatic given the private 
sector’s reputation for speed, efficiency, cost effectiveness and innovation. However, 
despite the subsequent scale and penetration of the PPP model in Ireland, such claims 
have been challenged by a number of studies conducted by independent researchers.  
It has been noted for example that while entrepreneurial governance brought a 
fluidity and a re-distribution of roles and responsibilities within the urban planning 
process, with greater executive power divested to city officials to work with 
stakeholders in the interest of local communities, the politics and practice of local 
government all too often ceded power to the private sector or to quasi-government 
organisations. This trend tended to lead to the marginalization of citizens and advocacy 
groups.  Essentially, due to significant power differentials between citizen’s groups 
and other stakeholders, social, cultural and environmental objectives were either 
ignored or deprioritized (MacLaran et al., 2007). This pattern, found countrywide, was 
especially applicable to the Dublin context given the level of development activity 
taking place. 
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Research undertaken by Reeves (2013a), which reviewed the performance of 
PPPs since their inception also highlighted the contradiction of key government actors 
positioned as advocates of PPP policy whilst simultaneously acting as guardians of the 
public purse. Reflecting on the implications for transparency and accountability he 
notes that: 
 
“The Irish PPP experience to date has been characterised by a distinct scarcity 
of information that is made available to Irish citizens (including academics and 
other independent researchers). This scarcity also extends to statutory bodies 
charged with duties of oversight in the public interest. This has obvious 
implications for making decision makers accountable for their actions.” 
(Reeves, 2013a: 13) 
His research also challenges many of the assumptions regarding PPP’s superior 
economic performance. He notes, for example, that when one considers the increased 
transaction costs associated with the PPP model (typically legal, technical and 
financial advisory costs) combined with the higher cost of borrowing for the private 
sector then the case for PPPs being cost effective becomes more difficult to make 
(Reeves, 2013b). This is in addition to the tendency of the private sector to minimize 
its exposure to risk, leading to greater liability for the state and the tax payer.  
In relation to the planning environment, studies conducted by Fox-Rogers et al. 
(2011) and Grist (2008; 2013) have demonstrated that the considerable change to the 
form, and interpretation of planning regulations since 2000 has been explicitly 
intended to promote private sector interests. Such changes include curtailing the 
circumstances under which infrastructural projects can be appealed, shifting the role 
of the planning appeals board from one of decision maker to one of facilitator of 
strategic infrastructure, and removing a number of controls which had previously 
offered the most vulnerable communities a degree of protection and security. The ‘pre-
planning’ meeting is a case in point. It provides a forum for discussions between 
corporate interests, local-authority planners and senior management leading Fox and 
Murphy (2014) to propose that a shadow planning system exists adjacent to the 
‘official’ planning system, which can be accessed only by powerful economic 
interests’. These forums would prove especially problematic when used to expedite 
infrastructure associated with the Dublin bikeshare project. 
In summary then, the mode of governance which was actively shaping the 
economic, political and cultural life of Dublin during the implementation of the 
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bikeshare scheme was increasingly neoliberal, in both theory and practice, and 
characterized by strategies, policies and practices intended to encourage and support 
the objectives of private capital. These trends would define the broader decision-
making landscape within which the design and development of Dublinbikes would 
take place 
5.2 Pre-implementation: From Outdoor Advertising to Bikeshare 
While entrepreneurial governance, and the use of Public Private Partnerships, would 
influence a number of the structural decisions relating to the scheme’s implementation, 
at a micro level it was Dublinbikes’ relationship with another network of urban 
infrastructure that would ultimately shape many aspects of its design and valuative 
content.  
For many decades Dublin had had a significant problem with the spread of 
unmanaged and unauthorized outdoor advertising infrastructure. Prior to the planning 
and development act of 1963, outdoor advertising had essentially been managed 
independently by local authorities using a permit-based system. Though the new act 
attempted to regulate the advertising industry by requiring that subsequent 
infrastructure would comply with the terms and conditions of a formal, standardized 
planning process, in practice it did little to address the problems associated with 
historic advertising. A Built Environment & Heritage Officer with An Taisce, an 
independent charity that operates to preserve and protect Ireland's natural and built 
heritage, explained: 
 
“It was like a general absolution that was granted in 1963 and legacy 
advertising structures were given legal status as of that date, but importantly, 
any new development or alternation to these structures would require 
additional permissions. And of course what happened, due largely to poor 
enforcement, was that all of the advertising companies effectively behaved like 
cowboy operators and did as they pleased and so the problem just got worse 
despite the changes to the legislation.” (Heritage Officer, An Taisce, 2016) 
This was compounded by the fact that under current planning law, once a seven-year 
period has elapsed without enforcement proceedings being initiated, Dublin City 
Council is prohibited from taking any further action. For all intents and purposes this 
represents a statute of limitations after which the advertising in question becomes legal 
in perpetuity (Dept. of the Environment, 2012). The result was that many companies 
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were emboldened to exploit this loop hole and allow structures to stand without 
applying for new permissions for their extended use.  
The cumulative effect of these practices had become so problematic by the late 
1990s that An Taisce had begun commissioning their own studies to quantify the 
extent of the problem. In a report published in 1999 (An Taisce, 1999), they noted that 
while there was a large number of smaller advertising companies complicit in the 
maintenance of unauthorized structures, the three major companies - which together 
had formed the Outdoor Media Association (OMA) - were David Allen & Sons, More 
O ‘Ferrall, and TDI. Of these, David Allen & Sons Ltd was by far the largest single 
operator (see Appendix 1). The report noted that the majority of the company’s 
structures were either erected without permission or had been allowed to stand after 
their period of authorization had expired. It also revealed that Dublin City Council and 
the OMA had been in extensive negotiations for the preceding 18 months with the 
terms of the discussions between them based on the principle of the OMA offering the 
removal of an agreed number of hoardings from particular areas in return for 
permission being granted for new, strategically located, infrastructures to be erected. 
The report’s main conclusions were as follows: 
 
1. The major proportion of outdoor advertising structures in Dublin was unauthorized 
and operated by Dave Allen & and Sons. 
2. The extent of maintenance of unauthorized use of advertising structures seriously 
compromised the credibility and integrity of the Planning and Development Acts 
and the planning system. 
3. The extent of unauthorized advertising hoarding development in Dublin called into 
question Local Government’s administrative and managerial competence as a 
planning authority. 
4. The internalized discussions between the OMA and Dublin City Council were 
potentially prejudicial to Dublin City Council’s determination of ensuing planning 
applications in excluding prescribed bodies and third parties. 
 
In 1999, and concurrent with these internal discussions taking place with 
Dublin City Council, Dave Allen & Sons was purchased by the French advertising 
multinational JCDecaux. The company had originated in Lyon, France, in the early 
1960s and specialized in the provision of bus stop advertising systems and street 
[96] 
 
furniture. In the years that followed, it expanded aggressively, partly through the 
acquisition of smaller companies, and by the early 1990s it had developed a major 
international presence. The regime change, however, did little to alter the culture of 
non-compliance in Dublin. On the contrary, “the pattern of systemic illegality and 
contempt for the planning laws that had characterized the previous administration 
became even more pervasive” (Heritage Officer, An Taisce, 2016).  
In October of 2005, and in an attempt to address this problem, DCC invited 
proposals for a citywide project which, in addition to the requirement to rationalize 
advertising infrastructure, invited bidders to provide for the public realm with a range 
of amenities “such as way finding systems, information and communications systems 
or bike rental services” (DCC, 2005).  
The inclusion of bike rental services might appear somewhat arbitrary until one 
considers that in 2003 JCDecaux had purchased the Vienna based media company 
Gewista, which had pioneered the smart bikeshare movement in Austria that same year 
by implementing a scheme in the city (JCDecaux, 2003). JCDecaux, aware of the 
increasing importance of both smart technologies and environmental sustainability for 
urban policy makers, had subsequently developed the concept through a newly created 
subsidiary, Cyclocity, and strategically used the offer of smart bikeshare services as 
part of their negotiations with city authorities throughout Europe. By the time the 
procurement process for the Dublin project was concluding, this “bikes-for-billboards” 
model as it became known, had been successful in securing the company access to 
lucrative, publicly owned space in Angers, Lyon, Toulouse, Marseille, Seville and 
Paris, amongst others (Meddin & DeMaio, 2015; Cyclocity, 2017). 
In 2007, DCC announced that the procurement process, which had been 
conducted in the absence of either public consultation or democratic oversight, had 
been completed and JCDecaux had been chosen as the successful bidder.  
 
“The signing of the deal was framed as an executive decision, not a reserve 
decision for elected representatives, so basically management felt they didn’t 
require it to be ratified by the council. We [councillors] had no visibility of the 
deal at all until the negotiations were done. Even after that, information was 
very limited.” (Dublin City Councillor, 2016) 
Due to ‘commercial sensitivity’ DCC refused to make public the details of this 
process and the identities of the other tendering parties have never been made known. 
What was revealed, however, was that in exchange for the decommissioning of 100 
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historic advertising hoardings and the provision of a number of public amenities - to 
include a bikeshare scheme, a public information system (civic messaging) and a way 
finding network - DCC would entertain planning applications from JCDecaux for 120 
new structures to be erected on publicly owned property.  
The deal was immediately criticized in the media and elsewhere on the basis 
that it was ill conceived, lacked transparency and would inevitably have a detrimental 
impact on the aesthetics, culture and liveability of the city (Coyle, 2008; MacEoin, 
2008; McDonald, 2008; Murphy, 2008). Watchdog and advocacy groups questioned 
the probity and impartiality of the planning process given that DCC had essentially 
entered into a quid pro quo deal which appeared to guarantee apriori planning 
permission to JCDecaux (Coyle, 2008). They also argued that the provision of a 
bikeshare scheme under such circumstances was little more than a cynical attempt to 
mitigate the overall effects of JCDecaux’s business practices in the city. 
  
“It was a stitch-up between Dublin City Council officials and the Advertising 
Company JCDecaux. The amazing thing is that many of the signs they're 
removing never had planning permission in the first place, and they haven't 
even made public the list of what is being removed. JCDecaux know their way 
around Dublin, and I've no doubt that they've picked the highest value sites for 
their urban clutter… Oh, they're throwing in a few free bikes as a sop to the 
Council, but as far as I'm concerned the whole idea should have been killed at 
birth.” (Ciaran Cuffe, City Councillor and former minister for planning, 
BlogSpot, July 15th, 2008) 
Furthermore, political and social commentators suggested that to partner with 
JCDecaux in the first place, given their documented history of disreputable behaviour 
seriously compromised the credibility and integrity of governance in the city.  
 
“We considered it a scandal that JCDecaux, a company with such a rotten 
record of illegality here was awarded that contract…and there were well 
publicized allegations of corruption abroad as well. Even a cursory browse on 
the net will attest to that.  (Heritage Officer, An Taisce, 2016) 
It is certainly the case that in the years prior to the awarding of the contract, JCDecaux 
had developed an international reputation for predatory business practices which had 
led to a number of high-profile convictions for bribery, fraud and corruption. 
In 1992, Jean-Claude Decaux, then owner and Chairman of the JCDecaux 
organisation, was convicted of unlawfully contributing money to the re-election 
expenses of the major of Liege, Belgium. He received a one-year prison sentence, 
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which was subsequently suspended (the times.co.uk, 2016). In 1996, French politician 
Jacques Valade, was indicted on charges of favouritism in awarding a public contract 
to JCDecaux for the installation of electronic notice-boards in more than 160 high 
schools and, also in 1996, the Belgian manager of JCDecaux was convicted in Antwerp 
for his part in the provision of fraudulent invoices to finance political parties (Mecklin 
& Cothran, 1998). In 1998, the French department for fraud control, having 
investigated JCDecaux, issued a report recommending that the company be fined 14.3 
million French francs for two practices in particular: the length of its street furniture 
contracts with local authorities (typically 15 years) and additional clauses in the 
contracts which often permitted Decaux to extend these contracts indefinitely without 
going through a competitive bid (The Independent (London), April 25, 1998 as cited 
by Mecklin & Cothran 1998). In 2000 Jean-Claude Decaux was again convicted of 
corruption, this time in France. He was fined 100,000 French francs and given a six-
month suspended jail sentence for collusion after being improperly awarded a public 
contract. The court found that the pre-contractual negotiations that the parties had 
entered into had contravened the rules of public works contract code and constituted a 
breach of procurement law (Marketingweek.com, 2000). In 2000 and 2001 JCDecaux 
funnelled illegal political contributions to the Mayor of Philadelphia in an effort to 
expand their portfolio of advertising contracts at the city’s airport. An agent acting on 
the company’s behalf was convicted of conspiracy and fraud and sentenced to a 
lengthy term of imprisonment (Hinkelman, 2007). And in June 2005, JCDecaux was 
fined €10m by the French Competition Council for failure to comply with injunctions 
relating to street furniture contracts dating back to 1998 (Campaignlive.co.uk, 2006).  
All of these cases were in the public domain while DCC was purportedly 
carrying out due diligence to establish the appropriateness of entering into a long term 
(15 year) partnership with JCDecaux. The fact that negotiations continued regardless 
of the company’s history led to speculation that the outcome of the process was 
essentially a fait accompli. 
 
“Well realistically how could DCC deal with any other operator? It was 
farcical to suggest that the tendering process was open and competitive when 
the only way to resolve this historic problem was to ensure that JCDecaux were 
part of the solution. They could, and should, have taken the legal route of 
course but chose not to. It was easier to do what they did.” (Heritage Officer, 
An Taisce, 2016) 
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Coupling the provision of a bikeshare scheme with an attempt to resolve issues related 
advertising also caused concern: 
 
“The bike scheme was simply a mechanism for regaining control of advertising 
within the city and I would argue that there was already a system of control for 
advertising within the city and that was the planning process. The bike scheme 
should have been implemented using an entirely separate, independent process. 
Instead it became implicated in this business and we see the result of that 
today.” (Community activist, 2016) 
5.3 Implementation: Strategic Manipulation and Failed Contestation 
Criticisms of city governance only intensified once the project transitioned to the 
implementation phase and the logics and imperatives giving it momentum became 
more transparent. The manner in which the planning process in particular was 
manipulated to exempt both sets of infrastructures – advertising and bikeshare - from 
legal and democratic safeguards was especially controversial.  
When JCDecaux applied for planning permission for its new structures, the 
company used a tactic known as ‘project splitting’ to navigate – or circumnavigate - 
the application process. Project splitting refers to the practice of strategically splitting 
a larger project into its constituent elements in order to minimize its apparent size and 
impact and so absent it from certain controls and regulations which would otherwise 
apply (European Commission, 2015). In this instance, it was used to exempt the 
infrastructure from an Environmental Impact Assessment which would have evaluated 
it in terms of its inter-related socio-economic, cultural and human-health impacts. A 
lecturer in urban planning at a third level institute in the city explained that: 
 
“It was a clear example of project splitting which has been a huge problem for 
these kinds of projects. Basically, you make the project so cumbersome and so 
expensive to challenge that it gets through on its own momentum. Plus, you’re 
unlikely to see the wider effects of what the project will bring because at any 
one time you’re dealing with only parts rather than the whole. This could only 
have been done with the co-operation of DCC.” (Lecturer in Urban Planning, 
2016) 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, DCC would go on to approve all 120 applications made to it, 
in spite of formal objections from An Taisce, environmental and advocacy groups, the 
Dublin business community, and a number of private citizens. Subsequent appeals to 
An Bord Pleanála were rejected, despite the recommendations of their own 
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investigators who had found that the proposals adversely impacted on the public realm, 
endangered public safety, and detracted from the character of the city (An Bord 
Pleanála, Inspector’s Report, 2007). 
 In time however, a number of applications were abandoned. Some were 
withdrawn voluntarily by JCDecaux because of highly critical commentary in the 
press, while others were discontinued after concerted pressure was brought to bear on 
DCC by activists and elected representatives. The final number of sites was reduced 
to 72. Consequently, the number of historic advertising units that JCDecaux were 
obligated to decommission was adjusted accordingly by DCC from 100 to 50. This 
raised another issue. Under the particulars of the planning permission granted, the deal 
could not progress if 100 units were not decommissioned. Therefore, the decision by 
DCC to bilaterally renegotiate the terms of the agreement outside of the planning 
framework was interpreted by An Taisce to be unlawful. In March of 2008, they duly 
wrote to the National Bureau of Criminal Investigations, citing Part 8 of the Planning 
Act 2000, which makes clear that to knowingly proceed with development in the 
absence of appropriate permission was a criminal offence. Specifically, they claimed 
that the renegotiation between JCDecaux and DCC represented: 
 
“…a conspiracy, to breach the Planning Acts with the full knowledge of both 
parties, with millions being at stake, and the environment of the city being at 
issue.” (Heritage Officer, An Taisce, 2008) 
The letter received no acknowledgement from the National Bureau of Criminal 
Investigation. A subsequent application to DCC under the Freedom of Information Act 
(FOI) seeking to clarify this issue was similarly ignored (An Taisce, 2016). 
Furthermore, and in a move that would prove especially contentious, JCDecaux 
were given carte blanche by DCC to select the sites they wished to decommission. 
Plan magazine, a bi-monthly architecture and design publication based in Dublin 
which carried out inspections of all identifiable locations provided by JCDecaux, 
revealed that the addresses consisted primarily of: obsolete units on sites which had 
been redeveloped; sites where development consent had already been granted or sites 
newly obscured by recent development.  In other cases, the addresses provided did not 
actually exist at all. 
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“In one case JCDecaux provided an address that has not stood for decades, at 
30 Lower Gardiner Street; separately 64 Richmond Road is also listed although 
again it is not known when any billboard was ever there. 43 Ravensdale Road 
in Crumlin is also listed yet Plan can find no such address. 533 North Circular 
Road is listed – a house on the corner of Russell Street that was demolished 
last January. From here, three billboards are claimed to have been removed.” 
(Journalist, Plan Magazine, 2016) 
The roll out of bike stations, when it occurred more than a year later, was no 
less problematic. Again, the project was split into its contributive elements (40 
stations), but this time the intent was to circumvent the planning process entirely. Part 
8 of the planning and development regulations 2001–2013 (DCC, 2017) which define 
requirements in respect of development being conducted by local authorities, obligates 
such authorities to be subject to the normal provisions of planning law when the value 
of the work being undertaken exceeds €126,000. This is to ensure that work of an 
operational or functional nature, such as maintenance to sewers, water pipes and other 
infrastructure, can be expedited as a matter of routine, whereas more significant 
developments should be subject to democratic oversight. In such instances, the 
regulations specifically require the local authority to provide the public with 
information on the nature and extent of the proposed development which might then 
be used as a basis for meaningful public participation. Once the stations were assessed 
as standalone structures, however, their individual value fell short of the €126,000 
threshold and so DCC claimed them to be exempt from any permissions process. A 
representative of the cycling advocacy organisation ‘The Dublin Cycling Campaign’, 
noted: 
 
“To be honest I didn't know anything about it, nobody did as far as I’m aware, 
and I was involved with the Strategic Policy Committee for Transportation at 
the time and had been for a number of years. I mean as a cycling advocate, yes 
of course, I would have been supportive of it, but nobody had a chance to object. 
It seemed to just take place in the background. It was a funny sort of a 
background deal.” (Dublin Cycling Campaign, 2016) 
Strategic Policy Committees (SPCs) are local authority committees charged with the 
task of formulating, developing and reviewing policy across particular domains 
(housing.gov.ie, 2017). They are intended to give councillors and relevant sectoral 
interests (social, cultural, economic, environmental, etc.) an opportunity for full 
participation in the policy making process from the earliest stages. That proposals for 
a major piece of transportation infrastructure had not been made visible at this level of 
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governance should have been cause for concern, but for some senior politicians it came 
as no surprise. Eamon Ryan, T.D., Leader of Ireland’s Green Party and former 
Government Minister, observed that:  
 
“Yes, there’s an element of contempt there for the political system [within 
DCC], a disregard for both the general public and for elected representatives. 
It was especially obvious for me when it came to rezoning land for development 
purposes. They would mow down any bit of green land to get a development 
done…it’s a kind of macho, chauvinist, ‘can do’ attitude that glorifies being 
able to overcome all adversaries and all odds. So, no, there are no surprises 
here at all.” (Eamon Ryan, TD, 2016) 
There were those too who felt that the manner of the scheme’s implementation 
violated the Aarhus convention. The convention – from the United Nations Economic 
Commission for Europe - grants the public rights regarding access to information, 
public participation in decision-making, and access to justice. It focuses primarily on 
interactions between the public and public authorities. The Convention is legally 
binding on States that have become parties to it. Ireland signed the Aarhus Convention 
on 25 June 1998 (citizensinformation.ie, 2017). 
 
“Well, as group we felt that the steps that were taken were reversed.  There was 
a contract, then public representatives were informed and then a more general 
notification to the public that Dublinbikes were on their way and they were 
going to be a wonderful thing. I would say that the Aarhus convention 
particularly points out that for anything that has an impact on the environment 
and has a significant impact on the quality of life for people within cities, the 
first thing that happens is proper public consultation. We made that point of 
course, but nobody listened.” (Community Activist, 2016) 
DCC management would face resistance from councillors, but with contracts already 
signed many felt that continued resistance would have negligible impact. 
 
“Some of the councillors didn’t like the way the deal was handled, and they put 
down a motion of no confidence in it. Legally perhaps it might have complicated 
things for management had it been passed. It certainly wouldn’t have looked 
good, but technically they could still have proceeded because the contract had 
been signed at that stage and that contract would have superseded any decision 
by the councillors.” (Dublin City Councillor, 2016) 
A local activist however felt relations between the parties had become fractious at this 
point with outcomes being shaped, at least in part, by intimidation and coercion.  
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“John Tierney [who was the City Manager at the time] was a particularly 
autocratic leader and he would often present councillors with no realistic 
options whatsoever. And, in fact, at one particularly heated council meeting 
that I attended during this period in 2007 he made it very clear that councillors 
could be held personally liable for any breach of that contract, which I thought 
was a very ‘interesting’ position to adopt.” (Local Activist, 2016) 
Details of this contract would remain confidential for almost two more years. 
In 2008, Colin Coyle, a journalist with the Irish Times newspaper, made an FOI request 
for a copy of all records related to the 'bikes - for - billboards' scheme. When DCC 
refused the application due to privacy commitments to JCDecaux, Coyle appealed the 
decision to the Office of the Information Commissioner, whose function it is to 
independently review decisions made by public bodies in relation to FOI requests.  
In a ruling issued in June of 2009, the Commissioner stated that in its dealings 
with her office, DCC had not acted in accordance with the provisions of the FOI Act, 
had persistently withheld information and documents relevant to her adjudication of 
the case, and had behaved in a manner so secretive that it carried with it scope for 
abuse (Office of the Information Commissioner, 2009). She went on to conclude that 
the advantages in terms of openness and accountability of disclosing the details of the 
agreement outweighed any possible harm to either DCC or JCDecaux. Accordingly, 
she annulled the original decision of the Council and directed the release of a number 
of key records, including the tendering and contracts documents. In addition to their 
failure to identify (or confirm the existence of) other participants in the bidding 
process, these documents would raise a number of other concerns.  
Firstly, they confirmed the suspicion that the signing of the contract in the 
absence of democratic oversight had violated due process.  A number of commentators 
had argued forcefully that under the terms of the 2001 Local Government Act the 
disposal of public land (for bikeshare or advertising infrastructure) was a reserved 
function to be performed only by elected representatives (MacEoin, 2008). Page four 
of DCC’s tendering document, “Revised Invitation to Bid”, explicitly acknowledges 
this requirement: 
 
“It should be noted that, insofar as there is a disposal of interest in land 
pursuant to the contract, the consent of the council under section 183 (1) of the 
Local Government Act 2001 will be required.” (Revised Invitation to Bid, 
DCC, 2005: 4) 
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Section 183 (1) also obligates that the local authority to make available to council all 
details pertaining to such a disposal or re-appropriation in order that consent be 
informed. For DCC to arbitrarily absent itself from the provisions of this Act and 
exclude councillors from exercising their political authority is highly problematic and 
confirms the role of bureaucratic rather than democratic power in expediting the 
project. 
Secondly, the documents demonstrate the failure by DCC to properly define 
requirements in relation to a bikesharing scheme. The substance of the documents is 
almost entirely concerned with the issue of advertising rationalization and they make 
only occasional and cursory references to “public amenities” as a postscript to the 
projects’ primary deliverable. Therefore, factors critical to a successful scheme, such 
as service assurance, bike distribution, system interoperability, innovation and 
development, and data ownership, amongst others - are entirely absent. That DCC 
would have no articulable vision for bikeshare at the contractual phase of the project 
supports the narrative that, at a conceptual level, it was little more than a contrivance 
designed primarily to progress an unrelated set of objectives. The expediency seen 
here would go on to characterize much of the scheme’s subsequent implementation 
and management. 
5.4 Distribution Bias and Socio-Economic Inequalities 
Infrastructure Distribution 
Once the two networks of infrastructure materialized in the city, a number of 
disparities and inequalities became apparent. While the preponderance of the 
advertising infrastructure was sited in heavily trafficked, less affluent suburban areas, 
the bike stations, by comparison, were located in well heeled, business centric 
locations in the south and south east of the inner-city centre and clearly intended to 
mobilize a largely middle class, professional clientele. The led to the charge that the 
communities most impacted by the advertising billboards received none of the benefit 
of the bikeshare services by way of exchange. See figure 5.1 below. 
DCC would counter that the decision to implement the first phase of the scheme 
in a city centre environment was merely following industry best practice, as 
understood at the time. They also attempted to align Dublinbikes with a broader “Smart 
Travel Policy” which was formulated explicitly to increase active and sustainable 
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modes of transportation. However, the “National Cycle Policy Framework”, the 
instrument through which smarter travel was to be delivered, would prove 
unashamedly biased in its orientation. For example, a key component of this 
framework, the “Cycle to Work Scheme” introduced in 2009, provides tax incentives 
to employees who purchase new bicycles though their employers. This form of 
subsidization has never made available to other sectors of society i.e. the unemployed, 
the elderly, students or indeed volunteers with social organisations, and so one can 
reasonably infer that the policy structures organising cycling (and bikeshare) within 
the city were inherently preferential and discriminatory. 
In relation to the advertising infrastructure, they claimed that the placement of 
the hoardings was consistent with its outdoor advertising policy as agreed with 
councillors and as encapsulated in a map entitled ‘Zones of Advertising Control’ which 
essentially describes the city in terms of geographic areas to which different 
advertising policies would apply. This map, however, leaked in early 2008 to the 
online Irish Architecture and Planning Magazine Archiseek, proved contentious: 
 
“Most notable is the absence of an official City Council stamp, or for that 
matter a date. So, the question must be asked: who drew up the map? And by 
what authority it is now being acted upon as if it were already adopted policy?”  
(Archiseek, May 2008) 
No elected representatives interviewed for this research had any participation in, or 
prior knowledge of, such a map or the policy decisions which informed it.  The 
philosophy behind it though was transparent nonetheless: 
 
“I suspect that the planning protection afforded to protected structures and 
architectural conservation areas meant that certain more affluent areas, 
particularly in the south east inner city, weren’t seen as appropriate places for 
the billboards. So in effect, the more run down the area, the more likely you 
were to see these hoardings. So yes, it’s a vicious circle really of run down 
area, poor public realm, ‘ah sure just bung in the ads there and we’ll be fine’!” 
(Lecturer in Planning, Dublin, 2016) 
 
 
 
[106] 
 
Figure 5.1: Distribution of Advertising and Bikeshare Networks Against 
Deprivation Index 
 
 
By contrast, and despite the mixed demographic of the bike scheme’s service 
area, the spatial distribution of the network managed to avoid many densely-populated 
areas generally acknowledged to be economically and socially deprived. A cycling 
advocate and journalist with a leading online cycling magazine felt that the placement 
of stations raised fundamental issues about governance in the city and, for the most 
part, reaffirmed the widely-held perception of DCC as insular and indifferent to 
consensus building.  
 
“There’s isn’t that public faced discussion at the micro level that you see in 
other cities. I mean it’s understandable that they’d implement initially in the 
city centre, you’ve a high concentration of people there and a poor public 
transportation network, but the particular placement of stations in this case is 
problematic. And querying them about it – or about anything controversial for 
that matter - invariably meets with the same stonewalling. The responses are 
very controlled, very slow and very bureaucratic.” (Cycling Advocate and 
Journalist, 2016) 
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5.5 Value Proposition and Capital Distribution 
Value for money calculations are based on prices as indicated on JCDecaux’s rating 
card which, in 2009, were made available on their website. Current rates are no longer 
in the public domain.  
The company’s new infrastructure consisted of 50 “metropole” (large format) 
and 22 “metropanel” (smaller, so called “6 sheet” format) hoardings. The majority of 
the structures are dual aspect i.e. they display advertising on both panels of the 
billboard. Depending on the location and the orientation of the hoardings, it may be 
that some panels offer less penetration than others and so custom rates may apply. 
Each panel can display 4 scrolling sheets or advertisements, resulting in 8 in total per 
billboard which are rented on a fortnightly cycle. The rates for the metropoles and 
metropanels in 2009 were €1250 and €425 respectively. A journalist with Plan 
magazine, who carried out site inspections of the hoardings and investigated the 
financial implications of the deal in 2009, estimated the value of the infrastructure at 
€170 million (MacEoin, 2009). This is in broad agreement with an assessment by the 
former CEO of a leading Irish advertising company operating in the sector at the time. 
 
“We modelled it at the time and estimated the value at over €150 million. And 
those figures weren’t plucked out the air; this was our business, so we made 
sure they stood up to close scrutiny. In fact, we were one of the first groups to 
object to this project and the value of the deal to the city was an important 
argument against it.” (Advertising Industry Expert, 2017) 
There is a significant disparity between these estimates and those outlined in Schedule 
2 of the concession contract, agreed in 2006. Predicated on the assumption that all 120 
installations would receive planning permission, JCDecaux projected net revenue of 
€109 million based on modest annual growth rates of 4%. Once adjusted to reflect the 
actual network of 72 structures which materialized, this figure is nearer €70 million. 
Given the refusal of DCC managers party to the agreement to participate in the 
research, no opportunity has been provided to reconcile the difference between the 
evaluations from independent commentators and those of JCDecaux.  
By way of mitigation, one must allow that in the intervening period Ireland 
experienced an economic recession which adversely impacted the advertising sector. 
A report issued in 2012 on behalf of the Association of Advertisers in Ireland (AAI) 
notes a steady decline in gross outdoor advertising spending for the years 2008 – 2011. 
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In addition, The Irish Times reported in 2018 that JCDecaux has experienced operating 
losses for much of the preceding decade (Woods, 2018). Despite this, the value of the 
infrastructure is still likely to significantly exceed the value of the amenities provided 
to the city, which DCC estimated at €54 million.  
This figure comprises €27 million for the bikeshare scheme, €4 million for a 
‘finger point’ wayfinding system intended to assist people navigate to various 
amenities within the city, and €23 million for a civic communication system (DCC, 
Report on Revenue Options to Facilitate Expansion, 2016). These figures refer to the 
lifetime of the 15-year contract. The civic communication system, which allows DCC 
to run public information campaigns, utilizes JCDecaux’s advertising network, and is 
comprised of access to 38 panels (21 faces on the metropole hoardings and 17 on the 
metropanel) charged at commercial rates. This essentially means that, at a time of 
fluctuating fortunes in the industry, the city is one of JCDecaux’s most profitable and 
stable customers. 
5.6 System Expansion: Technological Lock-in and Continued Exclusion 
In 2010, the scheme experienced a mini expansion with the addition of 4 new stations. 
The expansion was primarily funded through the provision of 6 additional advertising 
concessions which were made subject to the provisions of Part 8 of the Planning and 
Development Regulations – the same regulations which are reserved exclusively for 
the control of Local Government development. In effect, DCC applied to its own 
planning department on behalf of JCDecaux, using a process which excluded any right 
of appeal to an independent authority.  
 
“I would say is it is striking that having had very vigorous public objections 
using the existing planning laws, you then use a process that is reserved for 
local authority development which is effectively certain to succeed.” 
(Community Activist, 2016) 
In 2013, and in response to calls from the public for improved access to the 
service, the scheme underwent a major expansion, more than doubling in size to 
encompass 101 stations and 1550 bikes. In a report (DCC Report No 178/2013) DCC 
outlined that it had considered two primary options for managing the expansion: 
1. Engage in direct negotiations with JCDecaux. 
2. Go out to public tender. 
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The 2nd option came with the caveat that to pursue it would potentially result in 
a scheme that was incompatible with the existing network. JCDecaux, as part of their 
negotiations with DCC, had made clear that they would not entertain integrating their 
network with that of another service provider. This was confirmed by the Secretary of 
the Department of Transport in response to issues raised by the Public Accounts 
Committee which had expressed concern that the procurement process for the 
expansion appeared to be uncompetitive (see Appendix 2). The Department explained 
that, as the original contract had made no provision for system interoperability and 
given that the scheme’s hardware and supporting software systems were proprietary, 
JCDecaux were under no legal or contractual obligation to co-operate with any third-
party technology (Department of Transport, 2013). In effect, JCDecaux has achieved 
technological ‘lock-in’. Lock-in is a form of path dependence whereby a technology 
is chosen not because of its superior performance or cost effectiveness but because of 
its dominant position in the market (Kitchin, 2015). 
Accordingly, and once the appropriate permissions to negotiate directly with 
JCDecaux were received from the European Commission, DCC signed a new 10-year 
contract. Given the deep-seated hostility towards the bikes-for-billboards model, the 
decision was taken to develop the scheme using a service level contract. Under the 
terms of the deal, JCDecaux would be paid an annual fee of almost €2 million to cover 
the costs associated with running the expanded part of the network - 950 bikes and 57 
stations. This equates to a cost of €2,100 per bike. Analysis conducted by Urban 
Mobility Consultant and industry expert Peter Midgley in 2011 found that the 
operational costs for JCDecaux’s schemes in Paris and Velov ran at just €1,050 and 
€1,200 per bike respectively, with capital costs for both projects amounting to 
approximately €3,150 per bike. DCC would pay JCDecaux capital costs of almost €5 
million which equates to €5,300 per bike. The expenditure included stations, docking 
points, bikes, maintenance vans and so on. Despite the sums paid, JCDecaux retains 
complete ownership of the network. 
 
“Well, JCDecaux have patented that equipment, it’s their intellectual property, 
and so owning it would have been of no benefit to us. They’d still own all the 
control systems, all the back-end systems, so we wouldn’t be able to engage 
with anyone but them anyway. The truth is we didn’t want to own that 
equipment.” (Senior DCC Manager, 2016) 
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This begs the question, why would DCC feel compelled to compensate 
JCDecaux quite so generously for it? Either JCDecaux are paid on a service contract 
basis, in which case the city owns the infrastructure and incurs only the associated 
running costs, or alternatively, JCDecaux retains ownership of the network and then 
assumes the burden of liabilities and risks associated with this such as depreciation, 
damage, theft and so on. To incur all capital and operational expenditure without 
ensuring either ownership or control of the assets is problematic and reflects DCC’s 
severely compromised position at the negotiating table.  
DCC would defray some of the operational costs associated the expansion by 
enrolling Coca Cola as a commercial partner in 2014. In June of that year the scheme 
was renamed Coca-Cola Zero Dublinbikes and the company’s branding was added to 
the hardware, website, digital interfaces, advertising material and so on. It was a 
development that many members found perplexing. 
 
“Is it just me or is this completely counter intuitive? We have a growing health 
issue here and increasingly there’s the recognition that exercise should be an 
important part of our lives. And here’s a system that’s being touted as an 
important part of what the city is doing to address these issues and they allow 
Coca Cola to come in and essentially take over. Are the values of Coca Cola in 
some way sympathetic to the values of a bikeshare scheme?” (Scheme Member, 
No 1, 2016) 
Planning activities associated with the new infrastructure were again conducted 
in the absence of public or political consultation and while the scheme increased in 
both size and density, the configuration of the network continued to show the same 
patterns of socio-economic bias. Large swathes of the North West and South West 
inner city have continued to be excluded from the service area (see figure 5.2). An 
urban planner, and DublinBike’s member, captured the sentiments of many interview 
participants; 
 
“There’s just this implicit assumption that people of a certain socio-economic 
background will abuse the service or damage the bikes or claim off the scheme 
for injuries and so on. Look at Amien Street, Buckingham Street, Railways 
street, Sherriff Street [socially deprived, city centre areas]. Why aren’t the 
stations here? They’re in the core of the city centre? I mean there are thousands 
of people moving through these places every day but there’s also a lot of social 
housing there too and I wonder if that’s the reason.” (Urban Planner and 
Scheme Member, No 2, 2016) 
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Figure 5.2: Post Expansion Distribution of Bikeshare Network against 
Deprivation Index 
 
The findings from a survey conducted by Delve Research in 2011 on behalf of 
DCC into the perceptions and experiences of the service broadly reflect these concerns 
around disparity, access and exclusion. Results suggest that marginalized groups were 
found to be significantly underrepresented in the scheme’s membership with the 
unemployed accounting for only 4% of the 2250 respondents. The majority of 
members - nearly 80% - were found to be in the ABC1 social grouping - the 
demographic most associated with wealth and privilege (Delve Research, 2011).  
5.7 System Configuration, Innovation and Social Value 
The system provided by JCDecaux is a design utilising the first iteration of smart 
bikeshare technology developed in the mid-2000s and comprises a configuration of 
networked, automated stations controlled by a central information system. While 
bikesharing is an inherently sustainable form of mobility, the high levels of fixed 
infrastructure required by this configuration make it labour intensive, expensive and 
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impactful on the natural environment – especially when compared to more creative, 
contemporary approaches (see Appendix 3). 
Functionally, the scheme is reliant on RFID (Radio Frequency Identification) 
tags, which are fitted to each bike and read by docking point technology at the 
beginning and end of each trip. Essentially, they create a sensor network that monitors 
usage and generates system updates which are then made available to cyclists via kiosk 
interfaces or through web-based applications. The information also enables 
management and operational activities such as bike distribution and fleet management.  
RFID, as used in this arrangement, is a binary technology limited to recognising 
the availability of bikes and docking stands on a station by station basis. Unlike GPS, 
which generates real time spatial and temporal data, RFID does not support active 
tracking and so has limited capacity to mitigate the effects of vandalism and theft. The 
choice of this technology also limits the design’s capacity to inform planning or to 
foster the development of reciprocal relationships between cyclists and decision 
makers. Used generatively, fine grained GPS data can be a catalyst for collaboration 
across a range of practices and knowledge sharing activities including system design, 
transportation modelling and policy formation. Given that Dublinbikes has a minimal 
digital footprint, this form of design inspired co-operation is not possible. In addition, 
the data that Dublin’s scheme does generate was proprietary until 2013, when access 
to it was secured as part of the negotiations to expand the scheme. Prior to this, system 
information was protected by JCDecaux with no access being afforded to third parties, 
including the city.  
 
“There was a number of private apps that attempted to get off the ground after 
the scheme started but JCDecaux wouldn’t co-operate with them and they were 
shut down. In fact, they were threatened with legal action.” (Dublin City 
Councillor, 2016) 
Furthermore, the scheme does not import any external data sets and so is not 
animated by a range of information streams (real time transit schedules, weather 
forecast data, etc.) which have the potential to enhance usability, nurture behavioural 
change and extend the scope and penetration of the scheme through purposeful 
integrations with other systems. In this sense the scheme has become somewhat 
anachronistic given the increasing importance of data driven, networked 
infrastructures to the development of smart cities and smart citizens. 
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“Increasingly bikeshare data is becoming an important asset to cities. If you 
want to understand how cyclists appropriate the city, then the technology needs 
to be smart enough to tell you what’s going on. Likewise, if you want bikeshare 
to co-operate with other technologies then there needs to be seamless 
information exchange with other systems. You need to reduce friction between 
systems, they need to be open.” (Christine Outram, MIT, 2016) 
Outram had been a project Manager with MIT’s SENSEable City Lab in 2010 
and had overseen the development of the ‘Copenhagen Wheel’, a high-profile research 
project which created an electric-hybrid bicycle that also acted as a mobile 
environmental sensing unit capable of monitoring air pollution levels, traffic 
congestion and road conditions.  The concept, which functioned by harnessing the 
power of smart technologies and crowdsourcing, pioneered many of the technological 
and social innovations now appearing in contemporary 4th generation bikeshare 
schemes i.e. the use GPS, electric motors, integrated digital interfaces (telemetry), 
creative engagement with riders through social media platforms and so on (Outram et 
al., 2010) 
In 2014, an assistant professor at Trinity College Dublin (TCD), who had 
previously worked as an analyst on the Copenhagen Wheel project, brought research 
proposals to the city which involved instrumenting the Dublinbikes fleet with the same 
tracking and environmental technologies that had been used at the SENSEable City 
Lab. The research was a proof-of-concept intended to establish the viability of using 
distributed, mobile, low cost sensing technology as a means of supporting 
environmental management systems. The research also included a participatory 
sensing component, with riders to be invited to use the functionality of their 
smartphones (GPS, microphones, cameras, and other applications) to augment any 
data collected. The researcher hoped the findings would challenge the perception that 
‘cheap’ sensors could only produce ‘cheap’ (poor quality) data: 
 
“If you have a high-end monitoring stations that cost €10,000 you might be able 
to afford 5 or 6 but with the same amount of money you can lose perhaps a little 
accuracy but you gain enormously in terms of spatial resolution with sensors 
on perhaps hundreds of bikes So, yes, we felt the research was important, 
important technically but also important socially because it incorporated 
notions of ‘collective production’ and ‘eco-collaboration’ which are so 
important now. It was also an opportunity for JCDecaux to develop the scheme. 
The research findings would obviously have been shared with them.” (Assistant 
Professor, TCD, 2016) 
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JCDecaux, however, refused to participate in the research and instead, the 
project was implemented by the ‘Hubway’ bikeshare scheme in Boston, Massachusetts 
when the researcher transferred there as part of a Fulbright scholarship in 2015. The 
experience caused him to reflect on the way Dublin had chosen to manage the system: 
 
“It is often the case that new technologies can be viewed quite negatively or 
suspiciously by city administrations who may have to re-learn or re-train or re-
structure in order to exploit them effectively. If the culture is not supportive of 
that, then it becomes easy to see why there may be little interest in innovation 
or even active resistance to it. It also explains of course why these kinds of 
systems get outsourced. Perhaps there are implicit assumptions that 
‘troublesome’ developments are not likely to happen and even if they do, they 
become something for a third party to worry about. I don’t know. I certainly 
don’t believe that DCC have ever been proactive in looking for any kind of 
improvements, have they?” (Assistant Professor, TCD, 2016) 
This observation resonates with the experiences of a senior manager within the DCC 
organisation who asked to remain anonymous. 
 
“I think the public sector as a whole is full of challenges in terms of the types 
of people and the structures that they have in place. You have a very 
administrative side of the house and then you have the professional roles which 
are engineers, planners, legal, finance. You don't have roles dealing with data 
analysis or spatial analytics. And we haven’t had recruitment for years so from 
a smart city or a smart tech perspective procurement has become a problem 
because people simply aren’t up to speed on the latest innovations and 
technology and quite apart from the skills deficit, DCC is a very siloed 
organisation, structurally and culturally, so it’s a major challenge to develop 
data handling processes that span multiple areas.” (Senior Manager, DCC, 
2016) 
This may help explain, at least in part, the disparity between much of the rhetoric found 
in DCC’s strategy and policy documents and the relative sterility of Dublinbikes 
technical and ideological fabric. 
Dublin’s Digital Master Plan, for example – a document written in 2013 as 
negotiations to expand Dublinbikes were on-going – provides a macro level blueprint 
for the development of ‘Digital Dublin’ (Digital Dublin, 2013). It explicitly embraces 
technology innovation as the key to a smarter city and commits to improving Dublin’s 
technological capability through open and creative engagement with cross sectoral 
stakeholders. Accordingly, the plan provides a set of core guiding principles intended 
to inform and underpin all digital activities. These principles include: 
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 Developing Dublin as an innovation ecosystem and incentivising innovation; 
 Making the adoption of new technologies the key to realising innovation; 
 Promoting intersectional innovation by using Dublin City as a testbed;  
 Through open innovation, embracing a governance model which shares ideas, 
information and data between sectors, organisations, citizens and with other 
collaborating cities;  
 Embracing digital governance and technologies to increase democratic 
participation; 
 Future proofing the technical infrastructure to attractive to inward investment; 
 Celebrating and promoting innovators and entrepreneurs as heroes. 
 
The reality of Dublin’s ‘smart city’ project, however, is quite different from the 
one envisioned here. Behind the policy initiatives and the associated narratives of 
coherence and co-ordination lie processes and practices that are, for the most part, ad-
hoc and reactive. Research conducted by the Programmable City team (Coletta et al, 
2017) aimed at mapping and understanding the smart city concept from a Dublin 
perspective identified a number of key issues which were holding the city back from 
realising its goals. These included: 
 A piecemeal approach and a lack of a guiding strategy with associated mission and 
goals; 
 An absence of joined-up thinking and a preponderance of siloed-systems;  
 Weak governance structures and an absence of directed leadership;  
 A lack of a formalised process of engagement between stakeholders and others; 
 Under-resourcing of investment and weak staffing and skills capacity;  
 Inflexibility in the working practices and a staid cultural mindset with respect to 
procurement, experimentation, and operations. 
Coletta et al. (2017) go on to contend that: 
 
“Dublin as a smart city is being articulated as ‘open, engaged, connected’, but 
how this plays out on-the-ground is somewhat different to that hoped for.  
Rather than the smart city being ‘open as in open data’, ‘engaged as in engaged 
citizens’, and ‘connected as in a connected city’, it is ‘open as in open ended 
or open market’, ‘engaged as in otherwise engaged’, and ‘connected as in 
loosely coupled’.”  
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The absence of integrated thinking can be seen in a number of projects 
developed in conjunction with multinational technology corporations which were 
ostensibly framed as promoting improved access to governance and decision making. 
The city’s open data platform ‘Dublinked’, for example, which is represented as 
supporting citizens, developers, researchers and government through “sharing data, 
sharing ideas, and connecting the Dublin Region”, was developed primarily as a 
vehicle for enabling the city to make its data available to IBM.  
 
“Dublinked was only set up because DCC wanted to share data with IBM, but 
they couldn’t do that without making it available to the public as well, there 
would have been legal issues stopping them for releasing it to IBM only. So 
Dublinked was actually part of an attempt by DCC to get IBM to increase their 
presence in Dublin, provide more jobs, etc. That was its primary purpose. The 
platform hasn’t been handled with any great care since and has lost its way a 
bit.” (Senior DCC Manager, 2016) 
‘City Watch’ is another project where the goals are supposedly socially 
oriented. The initiative, which was a partnership between the city and the Intel 
Corporation, was framed as a participatory sensing platform which explored how data 
generated by citizens, in combination with data from utilities and municipalities, could 
be used to make cities sustainable and connected.  
 
“In reality, the data collected was simply dumped in a database and none of it 
got fed back into the organisation, none of it became operationalized. It was 
probably done to accommodate Intel develop a concept or product offering. 
That would have been typical. What is the point of something like this if it’s just 
to satisfy the needs of an industry partner? It has no social value, no value to 
the city. The cumulative effect of this kind of thinking of course is that we have 
a ton of sensors in the city, but nobody is doing anything with them.”  (Senior 
DCC Manager, 2016) 
We see disparities and inconsistencies at a project level also. The Dublinbikes 
Strategic Planning Framework (DCC, 2011), which articulates a future vision for the 
scheme, describes it as a vital and integrated component of the city’s smart public 
transportation infrastructure which will continue to benefit from ongoing investment 
and customization. The reality, however, is somewhat less sanguine. With the 
exception of an integration with Dublin’s public transport ticketing system in 2016, 
the Dublinbikes design has seen neither incremental nor disruptive change, despite the 
dynamic technical and social landscape within which it operates. 
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It has been suggested that JCDecaux’s architecture was developed with 
standardization and replicability as its key design parameters, and as such, is not easily 
configurable to local needs. The experience of other European cities, however, 
suggests otherwise. 
A member of the Dublinbikes scheme, currently working in Brussels, has had 
the opportunity to compare JCDecaux’s systems in both cities. He noted a number of 
key differences between their respective designs and the information and business 
processes supporting them. In addition to the use of contactless cards which allow 
users direct access to bikes, Brussels is also progressive in its use of social media. 
 
“Bikeshare schemes are basically distributed information systems and when 
run properly there should be feedback loops from users which regulate how the 
systems function. I mean that’s the whole idea of ‘smart’ isn’t it? So, in Brussels 
they use twitter to do this. You can report issues, make suggestions and so on 
and of course it’s visible to everyone, which increases information distribution 
but also transparency. Dublin has no presence at all on social media. The 
channels of communication are kept to a bare minimum, in fact getting through 
to them is so difficult that the tendency is to avoid it altogether, which is 
probably what they intended in the first place. You know, the idea of designing 
attrition into how it operates to deter people for engaging properly. It’s 
indicative of a much bigger issue though. There’s just this pathological 
aversion to dealing with the public.” (System Member, No 3, 2016) 
The scheme also closes operations at night, which distinguishes it not only from 
Brussels but from the rest of the international community. 
 
“As far as I’m aware, Dublin is the only place worldwide that places that kind 
of restriction on travel. We’re told it’s about “health and safety” which is 
perhaps the most abused term in the Irish public service and used continually 
to stymie or remove any issues from the agenda. I don’t believe that it’s 
acceptable. It’s simply using the language of bureaucracy to justify an 
unjustifiable position." (System Member, No 3, 2016) 
Other facets of the design also operate to constrain usage. Dublinbikes, for 
example, has no cash-based subscription options to accommodate people without bank 
accounts or credit cards and using the scheme requires a €150 deposit. This operates 
to reinforce the ideological statement made when the implementation of the network 
studiously avoided disadvantaged areas. It also blurs the distinction between the 
scheme as public transport infrastructure and commercial platform. 
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“How difficult would it be to come up with a solution that says, yes, equity is 
important to us as a city?  But you see this kind of indifference in the pricing 
structure too.  I mean it is €20 a year for membership with the first 30 minutes 
of every trip free, right? Think about that for a second. How is that sustainable? 
What sense does that make with so many communities excluded from the service 
area because of a lack of funding? And it’s additionally problematic when you 
consider that the membership is almost entirely comprised of people who could 
afford to pay reasonable charges. It tells me that DCC didn’t have the 
confidence to price it properly in the first place and now they can’t change it.” 
(System Member, No 3, 2016) 
Perhaps the most significant operational issue impacting the user experience is 
the chronic shortage of bikes at key locations and at key times. The problem, which is 
caused by inadequate bike distribution or system ‘balancing’, has dogged the scheme 
since its inception and was referenced repeatedly by riders as a major obstacle to 
service quality in Delve’s research report (2011). It has also been the subject of 
numerous official complaints to both JCDecaux and DCC (Gittens, 2015). For a 
number of commuters, the lack of service predictability has essentially rendered the 
scheme unusable.  
 
“As of last week, I’ve decided not to use the scheme any more. I got myself a 
banged up looking bike which I leave at Heuston [Dublin’s primary railway 
station linking the city to much of the rest of the country]. The Dublinbikes 
service was just so unreliable that I couldn’t keep on using it. It was just causing 
too much stress, so, I had to stop. I have a couple of friends who make exactly 
the same commute and their experience is the same also. They just couldn’t use 
the scheme.” (Former Dublinbikes member, 2016) 
The contract defining the expansion in 2013 is enlightening in this regard. 
Firstly, the document confirms that, for the first five years of the schemes’ operation, 
DCC had neglected to secure any commitments to service levels from the vendor, 
which effectively meant that no mechanism had existed whereby service or service 
quality could be quantified and monitored (Dublinbikes Expansion Contract, 2013). 
The city had effectively ceded full discretionary power to JCDecaux to deliver the 
scheme based on its own corporate notions of social responsibility. 
Secondly, the Service Level Agreement (SLA) developed between the parties 
in 2013, which supposedly sought to address this problem, is exceptional for its brevity 
and lack of detail. Effective SLAs are typically robust documents which 
comprehensively articulate the objectives that a vendor must achieve in order for 
service performance to meet agreed standards. They should also provide a detailed and 
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coherent set of evaluation criteria by which service delivery may be judged and 
meaningful penalties applied when required. The Dublinbikes’ Service Level 
Agreement, in its entirety, is less than a third of a page in length and its sole reference 
to system balancing is as follows:  
 
“For average rentals of up to 15,000 per day we will regulate on average 600 
bikes a day Monday to Friday (calculated on an annual basis)”. (McCann 
Fitzgerald, 2013)  
That the city would regard a performance specification as vague and poorly 
defined as this as adequate is troublesome. What are the service assurance implications 
of regulating 600 bikes in 15,000 rentals per day, i.e. what commitment does this level 
of regulation make to bike availability in a highly dynamic system with spatial and 
time dependant demand? Can this metric, such as it is, be independently tracked or is 
DCC reliant on the vendor to report instances where contract breaches occur? It should 
perhaps come as no surprise that DCC has applied no service level related penalties 
since the implementation of this agreement (DCC Manager, 2016). The problem of 
system balancing is aggravated by the National Transport Authority’s repeated refusal 
to allow JCDecaux’s fleet distribution trucks access to the city’s network of bus lanes 
which in turn significantly impacts their capacity to navigate the city at peak times. 
 
“Dublinbikes is not pure public transport is it, not in the sense that buses and 
trains are for example. It’s a blended mode, a hybrid really. It provides a public 
service, but it’s privately owned, so getting those bikes around the city is 
JCDecaux’s problem, it’s not my problem.” (NTA, 2016) 
It should be noted that, in addition to public buses, this infrastructure is 
currently made available to private buses and taxis. This failure by state transport 
authorities to support the integration of Dublinbikes into the broader public transit 
landscape has contributed not only to poor service quality but also to the perpetuation 
of the system as partial and proprietary. The lack of meaningful co-operation between 
the NTA and DCC on this issue may also suggest tensions arising from the NTA’s 
effective exclusion from the original planning and development process. 
5.8 Summary 
Contrary to the current narratives of inclusion, connectedness and innovation, 
Dublinbikes is an isolated and technically static platform which operates in the service 
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of corporate and bureaucratic interests with service distribution reflecting well 
established patterns of geographic and economic bias. This is exacerbated by the 
barriers to equity noted previously by Kodransky and Lewenstein (2014), such as poor 
communication, the requirement to pay a significant deposit or to have a credit card or 
bank account in order to access the system. These constraints essentially act as 
mechanisms which preferentially excludes vulnerable groups and contributes to 
marginalization through transportation disadvantage and related forms of deprivation 
(Clark & Curl, 2015; Hannig, 2016). As such, it perpetuates the notion of bikeshare as 
a form of middle class consumption.  
The result is an ideologically confused system which is neither public 
transportation nor purely private enterprise and so it bound by the imperatives of 
neither. Had Dublinbikes been conceived as a purely commercial enterprise, and 
operated in a competitive ecosystem, then the scheme may have developed organically 
in response to innovation, economic opportunities and a variety of social demands.  
Instead, the monopoly that the platform represents has led to technical stagnation, 
inferior service quality and negligible capital investment. 
Furthermore, the absence of design attributes and information processes which 
might support collaboration and dialogue acts to objectify riders and position them 
primarily as decontextualized service recipients. This belies the schemes’ enrolment 
in smart city narratives of reciprocity and egalitarianism. In this sense, the scheme is 
paradigmatic of the kinds of atomization characteristic of neoliberal development as 
identified previously in the critical technology and smart bikeshare literatures (Wiig, 
2015; Cardullo & Kitchin, 2017; Duarte & Firmino, 2017).  
The design and implementation of Dublinbikes can be understood as emerging 
as a function of both macro and micro level forces. At a macro level, the shift towards 
entrepreneurial governance and the increased use of public private partnerships for the 
provision of urban infrastructure were important factors shaping the culture of 
executive decision making in the city. At a micro level, an unrelated problem with 
advertising infrastructure, in combination with DCC’s particular modes of governance, 
had consequential effects on how these processes were enacted in practice. At the pre-
implementation stage, their bilateral negotiations with JCDecaux effectively created 
what Fox and Murphy (2014) described as a shadow planning system which acted 
primarily to preserve special interests and restrict the participation of either the public 
or public representatives. This set the ideological tone for the remainder of the project.  
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The deployment of Dublinbikes would subsequently be characterized by 
managerialism, negligent procurement and contract management, project splitting, and 
the manipulation of planning and environmental regulations in order to expedite the 
project without proper oversight. This has had two significant effects: firstly, it has 
inhibited the schemes capacity to participate meaningfully in the building of capital 
between the municipal government and citizens; and secondly, it has constrained 
Dublinbikes as a mode through which related political agendas might be developed. 
In addition, the performance of the public private partnership created to 
implement the system echoes many of the criticisms noted previously in the literature, 
i.e. there has been a marked absence of transparency and accountability from both 
partners; the partnership has operated to privatize profit and socialize risk; and 
Dublinbikes represents a dubious value for money proposition (Reeves. 2013a; 
2013b). It also reaffirms the claim by MacLaran et al. (2007) that power differentials 
between citizens and powerful stakeholders tend to lead to a deprioritization of social, 
cultural and environmental considerations. The lack of synergy between private and 
public interests in this context has resulted in a project characterized by a marked 
indifference to social imperatives, and a technical system which is obsolete, insular 
and path dependant. In this sense the scheme resonates with the concerns of Hollands 
(2009) and Kitchin (2015) as noted previously in Chapter 3.  However, the scheme has 
been particularly effective in protecting and perpetuating historically constituted 
hierarchies of knowledge and power, and in this sense is an affirmation of the role of 
structural constraints on the ethical and instrumental character of the technology 
production process. 
By contrast, the following chapter reports the findings from a scheme which 
understands and articulates fundamentally different notions of citizenship and 
participation. SobiHamilton, the scheme implemented by the city of Hamilton, 
Canada, illustrates the potential of vocation and initiative to materially pattern the form 
and function of technology. It also offers an important exploration of the ways in which 
institutional expertise and lay experience can combine in creative ways to produce 
solutions which embody a diverse but complimentary set of goals and ideologies. 
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Chapter 6 - SobiHamilton 
Introduction 
This chapter presents the findings from a case which represents an important 
counterpoint to the instrumentality and autocracy characterizing Dublin. As part of its 
development, SobiHamilton, the city of Hamilton’s smart bikeshare scheme, 
negotiated significant geographic and socio-political obstacles to its implementation, 
primarily through the vocational efforts of key stakeholders who worked 
collaboratively to progress the project as part of a broader movement of systemic urban 
transformation. In the process, this assemblage – comprising governmental, 
institutional, community and private actors – used a variety of democratic 
interventions to produce a platform which meets multiple needs and goals.  
In keeping with the structural format from the previous case, the discussion 
explores SobiHamilton’s development chronologically; beginning with an account of 
the challenges created by the city’s particular geopolitical configuration and 
continuing with a detailed description of the manner in which the project was guided 
through its lifecycle phases, i.e. design, implementation and management. Throughout, 
this account pays particular attention to the ways agency and citizens engagement were 
mobilized to build consensus, overcome institutional and cultural inertia and advance 
progressive notions of social justice and innovation. The chapter also demonstrates the 
capacity of smart bikeshare to incorporate democratic ideals without loss of 
functionality and sustainability. On the contrary, SobiHamilton embodies the notion 
of technological concretization i.e. the successful incorporation of a diversity interests 
and values into a single artefact through reflective design processes. 
6.1 Contexts and Challenges 
Hamilton, with a population of just over 700,000, is a Canadian port city in the 
province of Ontario, which is situated approximately 30 miles south west of Toronto. 
Geographically, the city is part an area known as the ‘Golden Horseshoe’, a 
particularly densely populated and industrialized region which sits within the Greater 
Toronto and Hamilton Area (GTHA) (Weaver, 2012). 
Historically, the economic engine of the city was the steel industry with ‘Stelco’ 
and ‘Dofasco’ providing employment to over 50,000 people at its peak in the 1970s. 
Due to the impact of various free trade agreements - in particular NAFTA - the 
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industry’s fortunes have suffered in recent decades and the effects on the city have 
been significant. 
 
“Canada has lost an enormous amount of industrial capacity in the last 25 
years....and most of that has gone to the Southern US and to Mexico and under 
the world trade organisation a lot of the work has migrated to places in China 
and Indochina to cheaper cost bases.” (Ryan McGreal, Journalist, Activist, 
System Member, 2016)                                                                                                            
The result was a major economic decline in the early 1990s, especially in the 
areas most reliant on the industry i.e. the east end of the city which located the mills 
and the adjacent downtown core. During this period, social deprivation increased 
sharply – with high unemployment, poverty, a reliance on social housing and a 
collapse of property prices – as tens of thousands of jobs were lost.  
 
“The real fear during that period was that it might just collapse completely, 
and we’d become another Detroit or Buffalo.” (Ryan McGreal, Journalist, 
Activist, System Member, 2016) 
In the last decade, however, Hamilton has experienced a renaissance. As the steel 
manufacturing sector all but collapsed, the city migrated slowly and organically to a 
more knowledge-based economy. The primary catalysts for this have been Hamilton’s 
Universities, McMaster and Mohawk.  
 
“I would say 15 years ago politicians had literally written this area off, much 
of the downtown was written off. It was a very suburban attitude. What 
happened though is you started to get concurrently, with the depressing 
economic times and the diverse location, a new generation demographically 
and people were coming to school, beginning to start their own businesses. I 
would say that started in the 2000s but didn't reach critical mass, until maybe 
five or six years ago.” (Civic Plan, Community Planning Organisation, 2016) 
Essentially, graduates from the local universities, equipped with enthusiasm and 
creativity, began exploiting depressed property prices to set up enterprises which are 
now slowing redefining the city, both culturally and geographically: 
 
“…the people running and hiring these businesses are of a generation where 
they are also interested in urban topologies; density, architecture, mixed use 
space, issues around liveability and community and so on. The other thing that 
happened was the orientation of the economy in Hamilton was largely towards 
the East end where you had the industrial cluster at the start...things have now 
shifted towards the west where McMaster is. So, there are almost corridors of 
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employment where you have businesses located downtown here, they might do 
some business towards here and the west end.” (Civic Plan, Community 
Planning Organisation, 2016) 
So, the city centre, once in free fall, is slowly emerging as a centre of creativity 
and innovation and the result is a mixed demographic where commercial and cultural 
interests in the form of art galleries, craft shops and design centres co-exist with 
residential and social housing. This movement towards a progressive urbanism, 
however, is not without its obstacles. City governance, historically conservative, has 
not kept pace with the ideological changes characterising the transformation in its core. 
This is partly due to the natural risk aversion and conservatism that tends to 
characterize bureaucratic city politics, and partly a product of the city’s cultural and 
social history. 
 
“The city has a huge inferiority complex, I think, which probably stems from 
our working-class roots and being seen historically as Toronto’s poor cousin. 
At the risk of applying pop psychology to how a city develops we have ‘this is 
good enough for the likes of you’ mentality in Hamilton and it means that 
anything that can be taken as liberal or urbanist is going is going to be much 
more difficult.” (Ryan McGreal, Journalist, Activist, System Member, 2016) 
This is especially evident in Hamilton’s attitude to public transportation. 
Frequently framed (especially in suburban quarters) as a necessary evil for people who 
cannot afford cars, transportation policy continues to prioritize investment in roads 
infrastructure in order to support the movement of goods.  
 
“They still haven't made that leap to it being a piece of modern infrastructure 
that links knowledge-based industries. The new economy is about brains and 
ideas and that is people moving not goods, so you want to move people from 
the hubs of knowledge - universities, downtown and parts in between - to their 
homes and for that you want cycling, walking and certain kinds of transit.” 
(Civic Plan, Community Planning Organisation, 2016)   
The genesis of this ideological schism has a historical dimension. Under the 
direction of the provincial government, the City of Hamilton merged with the adjacent 
regional municipalities in 2001 (Weaver, 2012). Essentially, the old city was 
amalgamated with a number of outlying districts which had previously been 
administratively distinct. This has had a significant impact on the politics and culture 
of the city. Hamilton is divided into 15 wards, each represented by a city councillor. 
While the suburban wards are less densely populated, a condition negotiated as part of 
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the amalgamation process ensured that all councillors had equal voting rights in 
municipal decision making.  
 
“Nobody wanted the amalgamation to take place. The city didn’t want it 
because there was a perception that turned out to be correct that, because of 
the way the wards were allocated, you’d have a ward in the city which has 3 
times as many residents as suburban wards and you have equal voting rights 
so there’s an extreme imbalance because in practice 1/3 of the population 
essentially has a veto over 2/3 of the population.” (Ryan McGreal, Journalist, 
Activist, System Member, 2016) 
The result is that many progressive initiatives intended to enhance the 
liveability and quality of life of the core of the city have been vetoed by suburban 
councillors who perceive them either as irrelevant or counterproductive to the interests 
of their voters. Cycling infrastructure has been a casualty of this tension. A legacy of 
the steel industry is a network of multi-lane, one-way streets that traverse the city and 
which were provided to accommodate the many thousands of cars that travelled daily 
to and from the mills when the industry was at its peak. This infrastructure now has 
surplus capacity, some of which could be repurposed for cycling. Initiatives such as 
these, however, have typically been viewed negatively by many suburbanites whose 
priority is navigating the city quickly and efficiently. The result is that, despite a 
comprehensive cycling master plan (City of Hamilton, 2009), the city’s cycling 
network is politicized and disintegrated with much of it appearing and disappearing at 
ward boundaries. 
 
“I think about the ward my parents are in and there are chunks of the system 
(cycling network) that are missing up there because Tom [local councillor] gets 
a couple of complaints from constituents and he blocks implementation.  So that 
kind of thing happens too, despite the master plan you still get councillors able 
to block it and there is a funny approach at City Hall. Often, when one 
councillor wants something for their ward, others will respect that because they 
in turn want the same support when they come to the rest of the council.  So 
that happens a lot.” (Director, Environment Hamilton, Advocacy Organisation, 
2016) 
Citizens haven’t remained passive in the face of these kinds of obstacles, 
however. On the contrary, the frustration felt by many people at the lack of coherent 
leadership has been the catalyst for a bottom up, grassroots movement by citizens and 
advocacy groups, intent on effecting real political and social change. This momentum, 
part of the broader economic and cultural revival taking place in the city, is capitalizing 
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on a network of politically engaged residents and community associations which began 
in the 1960s and 1970s in response to the kinds of destructive urban renewal policies 
which saw the city demolish many of its historic buildings in favour of concrete high 
rises. Initially, the groups were formed in key locations by affluent residents who had 
both social and political capital, but based on their successes, the principles of directed 
community co-operation migrated to more working-class neighbourhoods. Even 
though these groups had gone into a kind of stasis in the intervening period of 
economic depression, their connective tissue remained. 
 
“Somebody was always there to carry the torch but in the last 10 years or so 
they’ve become a lot more active I think as people have become more conscious 
of neighbourhood issues.” (Ryan McGreal, Journalist, Activist, System 
Member, 2016) 
This history is also evidenced in the areas’ political demography. In 2017, the 
provincial leader of Canada’s left wing New Democratic Party (NDP) was a former 
city-centre Hamilton councillor, as was the city’s federal representative. This is in 
sharp contrast to the political constitution of the rest of the city. 
 
“People living in the suburbs tend to be passive, people in the core tend to be 
quite vocal, so I think there’s a bit of a culture difference that way. The non-
vocal camp might show up and vote at the council elections every 4 years, but 
as long as the city doesn’t burn down they’re fairly content. And then there’s 
that other group which tends to roll over their councillors a lot more. They tend 
to change more frequently with the issues.” (Community Activist, Professor 
Mohawk University, 2016) 
It was into this landscape that the bikeshare scheme would be introduced. The 
project undoubtedly had to negotiate a particular set of historical, political and cultural 
challenges, but there was also a momentum at work in the city centre which gave cause 
for optimism.   
6.2 From Advocacy to Bikeshare 
The genesis of the bikeshare programme can be traced back to an initiate that stemmed 
from McMaster University’s Office of Sustainability in 2009. The office was 
originally created to foster sustainability within the confines of the campus and focused 
initially on routine operational issues such as waste management, carbon inventories, 
and so on. Over time, however, and largely through the stewardship of its director, the 
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office grew in scope, finally creating its own internship programme which gave 
students from diverse disciplines an opportunity to collaborate on various 
environmental initiatives while receiving academic recognition and support.  
 
“So, we said let’s connect with the academics who were giving course credits 
for experiential learning in various capacities. For engineering this might be a 
design component or maybe project management, but for sociology, it might 
need to encompass an element of social critique or demographic work. Once 
we found out what these faculties needed to achieve with their students, then it 
was up to me to work with them to provide these petri dishes, these campus of 
living labs for students to get involved with these projects; and part of that was 
making connections pan campus.” (Director, McMaster Office Sustainability, 
System Member, 2016) 
In practice, the scope of many of the projects which emerged ran naturally 
beyond the confines of the campus – community gardens, food security initiatives, etc. 
- and so the programme began developing connections not only across the university 
but also with organisations within the broader community. This dovetailed with the 
university’s agenda of enhanced collaboration with local partners which was intended 
to help refine its research and support programmes.  The concept of a bikeshare system 
was therefore ideal in that it satisfied the university’s micro and macro level strategies.  
The project was conceived by two students who initially envisioned it as a 
solely on-campus implementation. This changed quickly however once they analysed 
the results of their feasibility study. 
 
“Well, first off they found that the older 1st and 2nd generation systems were 
highly manual and no longer appropriate, so they recommended a 4th 
generation scheme. They also found that the population density of the 
downtown area would be sufficient to support a scheme. The whole city was too 
large a geographic area to consider for the project because the cost would be 
enormous. These were the primary learnings for that phase of the project.” 
(Director, McMaster Office Sustainability, System Member, 2016) 
 
At this point McMaster recognised its potential value to the city and connected 
with Hamilton’s Transportation Demand Manager (TDM), Pete Topalovic. In addition 
to being responsible for developing sustainable mobility initiatives, Topalovic is also 
professionally and personally invested in a number of related agendas – community 
engagement, health initiatives, civil rights, and so on. He currently lectures in 
sustainability in McMaster and is actively involved in a variety of groups and 
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organisations which are a committed to social equality and progressive urban 
development. 
As a Hamiltonian, he intuitively understood the challenges to implementing a 
bikeshare scheme in a city with Hamilton’s fractious political landscape and in an area 
that still retained a largely blue-collar demographic. Despite this, a recent shift in the 
province’s transportation policies suggested that, if handled tactfully, realizing a 
scheme might be possible. In 2008, the Metrolinx board of directors voted to adopt a 
regional transportation plan, named ‘The Big Move’ (Metrolinx, 2008a), which was 
designed to deliver a common vision for transportation in the greater Toronto and 
Hamilton area (GTHA). This initiative in turn had been driven by ‘The Places to Grow 
Act’ of 2005 (Province of Ontario, 2005) which was intended assist the Ontario 
government plan for growth in a coordinated and strategic way. Its objectives were to 
identify and plan for areas of growth, prevent sprawl, increase density, and protect 
natural resources. The Big Move was essentially the transportation component of this 
initiative. Phase one of The Big Move became known as ‘quick wins’ (Metrolinx 2008 
b). 
 
“So, The Big Move came to be in 2007 and right away they asked the cities for 
some projects that they could fund right now that fit with The Big Move and 
they called that quick wins and the only conditions were that they be capital 
projects and be innovative and transit related.”  (Peter Topalovic, TDM 
Hamilton, 2016) 
In 2009, Metrolinx awarded Hamilton thirty million dollars for the purpose of 
making improvements to its public transportation network – namely to its main bus 
corridors. By 2011, due to planning delays, a significant portion of that money has 
remained unspent and had accrued interest of almost two million dollars. Based on the 
provisional study carried out at McMaster, this amount would be sufficient to meet the 
capital costs of implementing a bikeshare scheme in the city centre and, given that it 
could framed, at least in part, as free money, it would go some way in allaying the 
concerns of city hall which might otherwise be tempted to block the idea at the outset. 
To strengthen the legitimacy of the project, Topalovic leveraged many networks of 
expertise in the planning process. 
Mohawk University’s Department of Transportation, Engineering and 
Technology was asked to consolidate the initial feasibility study by conducting a 
station location demographic analysis and provisionally identify the service area 
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boundaries. The analysis it produced became the main deliverable for a full credit 
capstone course created by Mohawk to support the graduate student undertaking the 
research. At the same time, mid-2011, a not-for-profit environmental organisation 
called ‘Green Venture’ was invited by Topalovic to collaborate with Mohawk to 
develop a business case. Green Venture had started in 1994 and been designed as an 
umbrella group to connect with, and co-ordinate, smaller environmental organizations 
of the day. Over time however, it became the region’s lead agency to promote 
sustainable living ideas. Topalovic had worked with the organisation previously on 
various initiatives such as sustainable school transportation projects, climate change 
workshops, and sustainable business initiatives. Once this phase had been completed 
and approval for the use of quick wins money had been secured from Metrolinx, ‘Civic 
Plan’, a community planning and research organisation, conducted some final 
statistical analysis which refined the service area and ensured the system being 
envisaged was consistent with best practice, as identified across a number of other US 
and Canadian schemes.   
The final report (City of Hamilton, 2013) which was submitted to City Hall in 
April 2013 emphasised that, while capital costs would be met by the city, no additional 
funding would be sought to support the running of the scheme, and in addition, the 
vendor - yet to be chosen - would run the scheme through a not-for-profit organisation 
for a period of five years during which they would be liable for any short fall between 
revenue generated and operating costs. It was also careful to emphasize bikeshare as 
transit rather than cycling.  
 
“The last thing we wanted to do was frame bikeshare as niche or aspirational 
or hipsterish. That kind of framing brings its own baggage. The demographic 
in the core may be changing, but it is still working-class or certainly mixed and 
what they want is to get around. That’s why we placed many of the hubs 
adjacent to bus stops, car parks and even carshare terminals. We needed to 
emphasise utility and for this to be part of the transit network for the city.”  
(Peter Topalovic, TDM Hamilton, 2016) 
Reassured that the city had been exposed to limited liability and satisfied that 
the project met the stated objectives for ‘quick wins’ as set out by Metrolinx, the 
council agreed that the project could proceed to tender. In December 2013, after and 
open and transparent selection process, Social Bicycles (SoBi) were announced as the 
winning bidders. 
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6.3 Social Bicycles (SoBi): Designing for Equity   
Social Bicycles was developed in 2007 by Ryan Rzepecki, a long-time cycling 
advocate, who had previously worked as a project manager at New York’s Department 
of Transportation bike program with responsibility for siting bike racks, editing 
cycling maps, and conducting field research on bike facilities. He had been interested 
in the concept of bikeshare since its emergence in Europe a few years previously and 
felt that the 3rd generation designs that the industry had become reliant on were 
restrictive and prohibitively expensive. With sustainability, elegance and equitable 
access as his design parameters, Rzepecki produced a system that innovated in a 
number of key respects. The SoBi model is based on an architecture which exploits 4th 
generation technologies such as GPS tracking, mobile communications and a custom-
built digital locking mechanism thereby obviating the need for hardwired, digital 
kiosks (see Appendix 3). However, it weds this design to a network of simple bike 
rack hubs which offers riders a greater degree of service predictability and helps to 
mitigate the anxieties of conservative local authorities. Initially conceived as a 
dockless architecture, this innovation was developed in response to expectations on 
the part of cities based on what other vendors had done historically. 
 
“So, I would say that the RFPs we worked on for the first two years effectively 
described the 3rd generation approaches that had developed traction in the 
market up to that point and we had to adapt our design and write some clever 
responses which explained how a very different architecture could meet those 
same requirements. And then it took us two years to basically reshape the 
market so that RFPs were written in an agnostic way that would allow for our 
type of system.”  (Ryan Rzepecki, CEO, SoBi) 
The result is a system that is a fraction of the cost and significantly less impactful on 
the environment than its predecessors. GPS tracking also produces rich data sets which 
have the potential to feed into municipal planning activates.  
 
“What’s important is that the core data can be very transformative for a city. 
If you know where people want to cycle you’re going to be able to identify where 
they may want to place bike infrastructure and if you know where people want 
to park you can decide where best to place your bike racks. So, when you 
designate a docking station (legacy 3rd generation approach) you’re doing that 
planning work up front …it’s prescriptive, it’s not reactive. You’re not able to 
modify the system according to actual demand. So, we have unencumbered data 
which can allow us to shape the system.” (Ryan Rzepecki, CEO, SoBi) 
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In addition to supporting cities plan infrastructure distribution, SoBi’s data can also be 
used to encourage reciprocity with riders. 
 
“The system can also display any of the routes taken by a user through data 
visualisation that we developed. So, you have the opportunity to name the route 
that you take and add some secondary data like what kind of trip it was; errand, 
work related, recreational, and so on. You can also annotate those routes with 
other information, like the conditions of the trip, was it safe, where are the 
problems or issues and so on. And this information can be shared with other 
riders both within the system or exported to various social media platforms like 
Facebook or Google+. And again, at some point in the future this may be useful 
in transportation modelling or to bike planning professionals, urban planners, 
etc. For that to happen of course we need cities to want it.” (Ryan Rzepecki, 
CEO, SoBi) 
By designing a demand responsive, low cost, scalable solution that fostered 
collaborative relationships between riders, operators and municipalities, Rzepecki was 
trying to overcome some of the technical and social barriers that constrained the spread 
of what he saw as the first truly disruptive transportation technology since bus rapid 
transit. However, despite the advantages to the system, SoBi discovered early in its 
development how risk adverse cities could be. 
 
“Cities tend to be incredibly conservative and driven towards reliability and 
proven track record which makes it very difficult to enter a market. We were 
only able to do so in Hamilton because of the failure of the biggest vendor and 
because the industry is relatively new and cites were just a little more flexible 
in how they engaged with it.” (Ryan Rzepecki, CEO, SoBi) 
The vendor Rzepecki was referring to was Bixi. Bixi was a not-for-profit public 
bikesharing scheme developed and implemented in Montreal, Canada in 2008 which 
subsequently expanded to a number of cities in North America. In January 2014, the 
company filed for bankruptcy citing $46 million in debt (Goodyear, 2014). The 
primary cause of the company’s collapse stemmed from a legal dispute with their 
software supplier – 8D technologies - which led to significant delays in high profile 
implementations in New York, Chicago and San Francisco (Fried, 2014). The 
company did not survive the controversies that ensued. Hamilton’s Request for 
Proposal (RFP) process was conducted during this period and though Bixi responded 
to the tender, an administrative error in their response automatically disqualified them 
from the process. With hindsight, it is arguable that Bixi may have chosen to 
constructively eliminate itself from consideration at this time given its downward 
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trajectory. Deliberate or not, their difficulties gave SoBi the opportunity it had been 
waiting for. 
 
“So, yeah, we had implemented in a few smaller places at this point in Tampa 
and Santa Monica, but Hamilton was our first implementation of real size and 
a great opportunity to show what we and the technology could do. If you get a 
40 or a 100-bike project off the ground it’s easy for that to be dismissed so we 
needed a large-scale case - a proof of concept if you will - and yes, things went 
our way and we got Hamilton.”  (Ryan Rzepecki, CEO SoBi) 
For SoBi then, the Hamilton project represented an important point on their 
developmental path. It essentially provided them with a test-bed to demonstrate the 
merits of many of their design ideas while also giving them the opportunity to adapt 
and refine the model in response to challenges in a large scale, complex, operating 
environment. From Hamilton’s perspective, this was an opportunity to work with a 
fledgling company whose collaborative ethos would complement the spirit that had 
characterized the project since its inception. 
As per the business case, the scheme would be implemented and run through a 
not-for profit organisation, to be named SobiHamilton. Though the planning process 
had defined a provisional network at this point, Topalovic in particular understood that 
successfully embedding the scheme in the fabric of the city would be dependent on the 
support and engagement of its citizens.  
 
“Based on my own experience I think the truly successful projects are the ones 
that engage with the grass roots, but also ones that are top down. I mean you 
need professional expertise so, yes, there’s a top down element to it, but you 
also need to leverage the expertise and experience on the ground, so that’s 
citizens and advocates right. (Peter Topalovic, TDM, Hamilton, 2016) 
Consequently, collaborating with SobiHamilton to design a public engagement 
programme was the first item on Topalovic’s to-do list when the project transitioned 
to the design and implementation phase. 
6.4 Remediating Strategies and Democratic Interventions 
Central to the design and implementation of the system was the public participation 
campaign which was run during the early part of 2013 and which was notable for the 
variety of tools, techniques, communications platforms and groups mobilized to ensure 
its effectiveness. A summary is provided here to illustrate the extent of the campaign. 
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Social Cyclist 
This digital engagement-based platform was developed by Social Bicycles to aid in 
launching their various bikeshare programs and was a keystone of their digital public 
engagement strategy. The platform gave users the opportunity to vote in support of the 
provisional hub locations being proposed or, conversely, to comment negatively if so 
they wished. In addition to allowing respondents make recommendations of their own, 
it also provided a forum for discussion and debate. This dialogical aspect of the 
platform supported both a quantitative and quantitative analysis of the locations and 
system design (see figures 6.1 and 6.2) 
Social Media 
Messages from several influential accounts in the region each coordinated re-tweets 
that socialized the project and broadened the audience (see figures 6.3 and 6.4). During 
the engagement period, thousands of users were reached with up-to-date information 
about the program while also being given an opportunity to participate through the 
platform. The project was also posted directly to four Facebook pages: Hamilton Bike 
Share (a page run by a local cycling advocate), Social Bicycles, Smart Commute 
Hamilton and Open Streets Hamilton. Open Streets is an initiative where streets, 
temporarily closed to motorized traffic, become “paved parks” where people of all 
ages, abilities, and social, economic, and ethnic backgrounds can come out and 
improve their health. These branded web pages carried information to networks of 
people likely to be sympathetic to goals of the project. 
Against this backdrop, several local media outlets, such as The Hamilton 
Spectator, CBC Hamilton, and Raise the Hammer - a local website founded by Ryan 
McGreal and committed to progressive urbanism - also socialized the project, built 
anticipation and disseminated newly released information through wide-reaching 
articles.    
Printed Maps 
Physical maps with attached sticker sheets prompted the public to vote for locations or 
suggest new locations for hubs. Figure 6.5 represents the map that was printed and 
placed at strategic locations around the city. 
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Figure 6.1: Commenting on Social 
Cyclist  
 
 Figure 6.2: Voting using this 
platform 
 
 
Source: City of Hamilton, 2014  Source: City of Hamilton, 2014 
 
Figure 6.3: Mobilizing support through Twitter  
 
Source: City of Hamilton, 2014 
Figure 6.4: An Example of Collaborative Network Design 
 
Source: City of Hamilton, 2014 
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It was also used as a method of direct engagement. Maps were brought to community 
centres and any public meetings or events where they were likely to find large groups 
of people.  
                                                                                  
“The use of these physical maps became a launching point for conversation in 
the communities. Several locations requested a map as a way of providing us 
with feedback and also to show support for the project.” (City of Hamilton, 
2014) 
Figure 6.5: Distribution of SobiHamilton Infrastructure 
 
 
Source: City of Hamilton, 2014 
Committees and Advocacy 
A Hamilton Bikeshare Committee loosely comprising of thirty people associated with 
cycling, transit, sustainability, health and related interests in the city had been formed 
during the tendering process to support the project and they met regularly through the 
engagement phase to discuss key issues including logistics, the engagement strategy 
and how best to manage feedback. The process gave the campaign direction and 
developed valuable insights which ultimately acted as a catalyst for engagement in 
related areas. The Sustainability Professionals Network (SPN), for example, is an 
advocacy group formed during 2013 by Topalovic and representatives from both 
McMaster and Mohawk universities, all of whom were active on the bikeshare 
committee. It is essentially a network of professionals, scholars and environmental-
civic groups that operates through workshops, presentations, campaigns and social 
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events to raise the profile of sustainable practices. A key component of what they do 
is ‘Community Based Leadership in Sustainability’ (CLS) (Sustainability 
Professionals Network, 2015) – an education initiative managed by McMaster’s Office 
of Sustainability. 
 
“So, I wanted to do a programme that would have more reach, and more 
impact, so I proposed the development of CLS which was around education and 
civic engagement. So, there were events organized where people could choose 
topics they wanted to know more about and what they got really animated about 
was ‘safe streets’ and improved pedestrian and cycling infrastructure. That was 
really important and so we worked with that.” (McMaster Office of 
Sustainability, System Member, 2016) 
What is significant from the bikeshare project’s perspective is that the CLS 
programme was running concurrently with the scheme’s citizen engagement campaign 
and with many of the same residents and community groups. The programme therefore 
had the effect of developing awareness in these communities of the importance of the 
bikeshare scheme and its potential role in delivering on agendas that concerned them. 
This reciprocity is a characteristic of the city’s DNA and was in evidence throughout 
the lifecycle of the project. 
 
“I would say it’s like interconnected clusters. SPN is a cluster and there are 
ones that we make sure to work with like cycling, the built environment, 
urbanism generally. They’re all clusters here too and you’ll see many of us 
working in more than one group, in more than one cluster. It’s the Goldie Locks 
paradigm right. The city isn’t too big, so you can know all the activists and 
issues intimately but it’s big enough to generate enough capacity to be effective, 
to lobby and advocate effectively.” (Director, McMaster Office of 
Sustainability, System Member, 2016) 
Another example of this kind of synergy involves the Hamilton Cycling 
Committee which is comprised of approximately a dozen advocates (many of whom 
participated in the bikeshare steering group) who meet monthly in city hall under the 
guidance of Topalovic to discuss all things cycling related, coordinate activities and 
exchanges ideas.  It was this forum that produced perhaps the most successful piece of 
grassroots advocacy that the city had seen in many years – the ‘Yes We Cannon’ 
campaign – which delivered the province of Ontario’s first separated, 2-way protected 
bike lane on Cannon street, downtown Hamilton. Orchestrated by a local cycling 
advocate, the campaign was careful to exploit the bikeshare project.  
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“I think that one of the really interesting things for me and my role in Yes We 
Cannon is that we actually used the fact that bikeshare was coming as an 
impetus for the installation of the Cannon Street Bike Lane. We highlighted to 
Council that you know, you guys already approved this. We know the money is 
coming, these systems work best where there are proper networks of 
infrastructure, so if you want it to be successful you need to be able to provide 
people, especially in the lower city, with a decent East – West route.” (Cycling 
Advocate & System Member, 2016) 
The tactic employed in the campaign is called ‘engagement organizing’ a 
targeted, face to face interaction with resident groups, community associations and 
citizens which focused on divesting responsibility for urban transformation to local 
people rather than professional organizations.  
 
“If you look at engagement organising you’re going right to the door to door 
level.  You get your people banging on doors and helping constituents to 
understand the position their councillor has taken on an issue and how that 
position may impact on them.  And you get them to write letters, send emails or 
pick up the phone so it’s essentially political campaigning. In fact it’s the 
method that the Obama campaign used the first time around. They call it the 
snowflake model.” (Director, Environment Hamilton, Advocacy Organisation, 
2016) 
Again, this helped to create a sense of agency and leadership within these communities 
which was subsequently leveraged by Topalovic and SobiHamilton. In the end, their 
campaign generated responses from more than 3,000 people. The red icons in Figure 
6.6 below show the new hubs which resulted directly from this process and which 
account for over 10% of the total. It is important to note also that many of the original 
hubs were agreed with the public who voted and submitted supportive comments.  
The collaboration with the public continued post-implementation. Once 
deployed, the flexibility of the architecture was exploited to allow unrestricted, organic 
traffic patterns to emerge as a way of optimizing the design. 
 
“We had what we called desire lines. It’s like you let people walk on the grass 
before you put the path in. So, we removed the controls and let people park the 
bikes wherever they wanted within the service area for 3 months without any 
financial penalty and based on how the bikes were distributed – those desire 
lines - the network was adapted again.” (Peter Topalovic, TDM, Hamilton, 
2016) 
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Figure 6.6: SobiHamilton Hub locations – red indicates sites proposed directly by 
the public 
 
Source: City of Hamilton, 2014  
Expertise developed through Topalovic’s own intercity professional networks 
also played an important role in the design process – especially those with 
neighbouring Toronto and Minneapolis whose own systems were well established at 
this time. Minneapolis, though not Canadian, is another great lake city with a similar 
climate and a similar sized implementation.  
 
“We met with them numerous times and learned all we could about operations, 
hub density, the attributes of station sites, what kinds of public reaction we 
should expect and so on. What was Toronto’s interaction with its own 
bureaucracy in terms of placing stations? I mean that was an important one 
that we’d never have anticipated but we’d been prepared for by talking with 
other schemes. I mean we had internal city staff saying, ‘well it’s not our 
problem’ and we had residents saying, ‘don’t you dare put a station there’. I 
had calls coming in to me saying ‘I just want you to know that this is a really 
stupid idea’, click!” (Peter Topalovic, TDM, Hamilton, 2016) 
The final network - the product of local planning and design expertise, networks 
of advocacy, citizen engagement and the experiential learning from other cities - 
comprised 800 bikes and 101 hubs distributed across four wards of the city centre. In 
terms of size and density this is comparable with Dublin’s current scheme (and 
significantly larger than Dublin’s initial implementation) however, in terms of equity 
and inclusion, the distribution pattern of the infrastructure reflects the demographic it 
serves. 
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“Yeah, that’s what we set out to do. I recently tallied all of our hubs and 
referenced them against the neighbourhoods they’re in and 40% are in areas 
that are technically deprived - so called neighbourhood action strategy areas.” 
(Community Manager, SobiHamilton, 2016) 
Equitable access is also the rationale behind much of the design innovation 
taking place in other areas of the scheme. In addition to tiered pricing with reduced 
fees for students and the low paid, the scheme also introduced initiatives such as 
‘Everyone Rides’ (Topalovic & Johnson, 2017) which essentially makes 250 yearly 
memberships available to the most disadvantaged groups through various social 
organisations. Many of these go to the city’s growing immigrant population. 
 
“If you look at Hamilton we’re predominantly a white city, but that’s changing. 
So, we need to develop strategies for supporting these people too. What we 
want to do is work with religious organisations like churches, temples, and 
Mosques. Environment Hamilton has done something called ‘Greening Sacred 
Spaces’ which focused on working with these communities to raise aware of 
sustainability and that’s the approach that we want to follow too.” (Peter 
Topalovic, TDM, Hamilton, 2016) 
SobiHamilton’s Community manager also runs regular cycling classes for new 
members designed to familiarize them with using the system and with navigating the 
city safely. 
6.5 Iterative Innovation and Concretization 
Technical innovation, largely in the form of new data products, digital tools and system 
integrations, has also been an emergent property of the relationships underpinning the 
project and one with both macro and micro dimensions. 
At an industry level, perhaps the most significant development has been the 
creation of the North American Bike Share Association (NABSA). The organisation 
was formed in the aftermath of Bixi’s bankruptcy when relationships had been 
damaged and the industry was left somewhat in disarray. It was the municipalities in 
the form of NACTO – The National Association of City Transportation Officials – 
who intervened and brought the key vendors together in an effort to restore trust and 
foster co-operation. It was at one of these meetings that the idea for NABSA was 
developed. 
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“I suppose people were ready to talk by then, a lot of changes had happened, 
certain people had left, new people had arrived. Up to that there was a huge 
focus on secrecy. Whether it had to do with future developments with 
technology or how people were going to respond to RFP processes, there was 
just a big focus on making everything proprietary and getting cities locked in 
to contracts. So, you bought a system, you bought hardware, software and bikes 
from the same supplier. Cities recognised that this was not going to lead to a 
fruitful future for the industry.”  (Project Manager, NABSA, 2016) 
With the legitimacy of the concept at stake, the industry recognised that the 
benefits of cooperation outweighed any short term commercial and competitive 
considerations. Leveraging the NABSA platform to build trust, the vendors have since 
begun collaborating on a broad range of issues such as funding opportunities, 
operational issues, procurement challenges, integration with public transportation and 
system interoperability. Perhaps the most significant initiative to emerge from this 
process has been the ‘General Bike Share Feed Specification’ (GBFS) (Github.com, 
2017). The standard was designed to make bikeshare data feeds freely available via a 
uniform format so that map and transportation-based apps such as Google Maps and 
Transit App could conveniently incorporate the data into their platforms. Available 
GBFS data includes station locations, bike and dock availability and information on 
pricing. The idea for the GBFS came from a similar initiative in the public transit 
domain called the ‘General Transit Feed Specification’, or GTFS (GTFS.org, 2018), 
which defines a common format for schedules and associated geographic data. Social 
Bicycles was a founding member of NABSA and the primary architect of the bikeshare 
feed standard. 
  
“Well, the structure [of the standard] was a group decision involving all the 
main industry vendors, but because SoBi had an API already, modifying it was 
relatively quick and easy and that’s what happened. So basically, the GBFS is 
SoBi’s original API tweaked to accommodate what were pretty modest 
changes. And of course, the whole idea of the standard was to get Google to 
take the data and use it on their maps. That’s the big fish.” (Operations 
Manager, SobiHamilton, 2016) 
Significantly, and due to opportune timing, the site of the standards’ first 
implementation was Hamilton, which aligned with SoBi’s interest in framing the 
scheme as an exemplar of 4th generation design. SoBi also used the standard as part of 
a recent integration with Transit app which, in addition to providing commuters with 
real-time bike and transit information, allows them to manage the entire booking and 
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payment process without having to interface with the vendors’ website. Rzepecki sees 
these kinds of third-party collaborations with specialist expertise as being an important 
part of their, and the industry’s, development. 
 
“So, it’s so hard just trying to do one thing really well, let alone trying to solve 
every issue in the eco-system. So, mapping and location-based technologies are 
important areas of development right now and I think we’re going to build some 
capabilities into our software and then partner out for richer solutions.” Ryan 
Rzepecki, CEO, Social Bicycles) 
Against this backdrop of transformation at an industry level, technical 
innovations are also emerging from within the SobiHamilton organisation. The 
systems’ operations manager is another of the principles associated with the project 
with a background in advocacy and has campaigned extensively on issues including 
cycling and related infrastructure, road safety, public transportation, architectural 
preservation and so on. After graduating with a degree in computer science from 
McMaster in the early 2000s, he decided to follow a calling and set up a bike co-op in 
the city which has committed itself primarily to reconditioning old bikes and making 
them available to the community through schools, charities and other social 
organisations. He feels that the foresight shown by Topalovic at the contract 
negotiation stage of the project has contributed significantly to the level of engagement 
they have had with the vendor ever since. 
 
“They [SoBi] have a lot more responsibility here than they would in most 
places because when they signed the RFP back then they agreed to ensure that 
the system operated for 5 years. So, they took the legal responsibility for making 
sure that the bikes get moved around and repaired, and then they moved the 
responsibilities for that contract on to us. I mean I found them pretty receptive 
anyway, but the very close integration with this particular system helps. Plus, 
I’m quite vocal about this stuff, so if there’s something that their system doesn’t 
do I tell them about it, I’m not afraid to do that.” (Operations Manager, 
SobiHamilton, 2016) 
The result of their collaboration has been a series of adaptations and system 
enhancements, many of which are likely to migrate to the vendor’s other 
implementations. One such innovation involved developing a script which operates on 
the data collected through the systems’ API to configure a custom map of the network 
that supports maintenance and operations. 
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“So, this script goes out and gets standard real-time data from the system but 
then displays the bikes at the various hubs in a much easier to use fashion. It 
shows for instance how many bikes need to be moved or redistributed at each 
hub based on pre-set targets, it shows which bikes are faulty, what the fault 
code is; maybe it’s a battery failure or loss of connection to the network or 
whatever. This information was there but SoBi hadn’t developed it, and it’s 
important because it makes the techs’ life a lot easier and in turn improves 
service quality for riders. This was something we developed here in 
SobiHamilton.” (Operations manager, SobiHamilton, 2016) 
In the longer term SobiHamilton is hoping to work with expertise in McMaster to come 
up with a problem definition for predictive rebalancing. Essentially, this requires an 
algorithm which can determine the minimum and maximum number of bikes required 
on a hub by hub basis based on a complex set of variables. 
 
“Ideally, what would happen is as time goes on and people use the bikes, we 
gather better data on how many people are taking them, how many people are 
returning them, what’s the weather like, what day of the week and time of the 
day it is, holidays events, etc. Over time there should be an algorithmic 
determination of optimal distribution levels. So, for instance the system would 
start to understand that the train comes in a 3:45 and 6 people take bikes on 
one day and 8 the next and 4 the next, so if that hub is full at 3:40 we don’t 
want to go taking bikes away because x amount of those bikes are going to be 
needed in a few minutes. That, to me, is a mathematical problem that should be 
quite solvable, but not with only our own resources.” (Operations Manager, 
SobiHamilton, 2016) 
Other innovations have focused on improving the user experience, such as 
enabling a single member book multiple bikes per transaction - not possible in Dublin 
and important for families or tourists - or incorporating a digital interface to the bike’s 
control panel to prompt riders through the booking process. These ideas were 
developed by SoBi’s backend software team but were tested and implemented in 
cooperation with SobiHamilton. Perhaps the most significant development to-date 
however, has been the use of geo-fencing as a technique to encourage the natural 
rebalancing of the system. A geo-fence exploits the characteristics of GPS to create a 
virtual boundary or perimeter around an actual geographic location. In Hamilton the 
technique is used to define a space of approximately 10-15 meters around each of the 
hubs within which a bike can be returned should docking spaces be unavailable. The 
system is designed to apply a penalty of one dollar if bikes are docked outside these 
areas; however, returning a bike to a geo-fenced zone yields a credit of 66 cents, a 
reward that can be claimed by any member.  
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“If you’re a member and walking down the street and see a bike out of hub, or 
if you happen to see it on the app you can just sign it out and bring it back to a 
hub and get that credit. So, I’m sitting on quite a bit of credit right now because 
for a while every time I saw a bike out of hub I’d bring it back. No, it’s not a 
lot of money but it offers a nudge and helps people to feel involved. It also gets 
bikes around which is the important thing.” (Ryan McGreal, Journalist, 
Activist, System Member, 2016) 
The concept, which addresses perhaps the most persistent and costly operational issue 
in the industry, was devised by SobiHamilton and is already working in SoBi’s systems 
in Boise and Santa Monica.  
System data has also been an important catalyst for activity across a range of 
related social and technical areas. Topalovic, for example, has collaborated with the 
public health department to understand how the GPS trace data might improve health. 
 
“So, when I looked at the SoBi data with Pete, the average ride is around 10 or 
12 minutes.  So, if you’re doing that twice a day that’s 20 to 24 minutes or, 
based on the Canadian activity guidelines, your physical activity for the day. 
So, if you use active transportation – cycling or walking - then you’re building 
it into part of your day, so you don't have to worry about going to the gym or 
whatever. We’re planning a research project around this once the data can give 
us a fuller picture.” (Public Health Nurse, Hamilton, 2016) 
The data is also supporting the analysis of route traces and usage statistics which, in 
addition to facilitating informed transit planning and network design optimization, is 
also being used by advocates. Ryan McGreal, having been made a research partner to 
SoBi Hamilton with access to anonymised system data, recently conducted an analysis 
of bikeshare traffic on the Cannon Street bike lane. This was prompted by complaints 
from certain politicians, who felt that the infrastructure was being significantly under 
used. This perceived failure, based on data from sensors positioned along the 3.3 km 
track (see Figure 6.7), was disappointing given the amount of advocacy mobilized to 
implement the infrastructure in the first place. Based on personal experience of the 
location however, McGreal suspected that the positioning the sensors would make 
sense only if the traffic being counted used the street as an end-to-end corridor. If bike 
riders were using Cannon for shorter trips, then the arrangement would likely miss a 
much of this activity. The findings from his study confirmed his original suspicions. 
He found that most bikeshare trips that touch on the Cannon cycle track do so for only 
a short distance as part of a route between origin and destination. Around two-thirds 
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of trips travelled only 1-5 blocks along the cycle track, with less than one percent of 
the trips studied traversing the lane’s full length. 
Figure 6.7: Bike counters installed on Cannon cycle track 
 
 Source: Ryan McGreal, Raise the Hammer (2017) 
There is also evidence to suggest that the protected cycle track may be enjoying a 
higher rate of usage than the unprotected bike lanes on either side, though this 
hypothesis requires additional study. Planners have confirmed that the city intends 
incorporating bikeshare data into their traffic analysis going forward. 
6.6 Summary 
SobiHamilton emerged from a largely working-class city in the process of political 
and cultural transformation. An important aspect of this transformation was the priority 
given by the city - in the form of the active transportation department - to citizen 
engagement, collaborative infrastructing and more progressive and transparent forms 
of governance. The design and implementation practices associated the development 
of the city’s scheme reflected these considerations and produced a technology which 
is innovative, responsive and accessible. In this sense, SobiHamilton embodies the 
citizen-centric development called for in much of the critical literature (Agyeman, 
2013; Hannig, 2016; Feenberg, 2017) and acts as a counterpoint to the instrumentalism 
and expedience which characterized the Dublin case.  
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SobiHamilton was produced by a network of professional and community 
expertise operating at a variety of scales. It was supported and financed by the province 
of Ontario and was championed by progressive elements within the city who pioneered 
new techniques and practices for enrolling a broad spectrum of interests and 
stakeholders in the decision-making process. This has resulted in ‘design’ being a 
cooperative function involving a multitude of sectoral and community interests. As a 
consequence, the technological platform it produced articulates the values and 
viewpoints of a diversity of stakeholders and positions the scheme more broadly within 
discourses of sharing and collaborative consumption which prioritize social equity 
above profit driven motivations. The emphasis on community focused innovation also 
addressed the primary barrier to equality identified in the literature (Hannig, 2015) by 
ensuring that knowledge generated by expert regimes would not prevail over of the 
needs and wishes of broader society. This is complimented by the financial, procedural 
and informational measures coded into the systems’ design, and by the business 
processes developed to support them. The use of technology as a mechanism for 
participation and feedback throughout the life cycle of the project has also been 
significant in this regard. The role of the not-for-profit organisation proved pivotal 
here, not only as a source of innovation and creativity but also as a tactical way of 
reconfiguring the practice of governance in the city. It became the instrument through 
which new and experimental forms of representation were explored and new ways of 
consensus building enacted. Staffing the organisation with advocates of progressive 
urbanism more generally also lent the project a degree of legitimacy and integrity 
which may have been absent had the scheme been controlled by purely corporate 
interests. SobiHamilton was also seen to act as a catalyst for broader social 
transformation through the alignment of the project with a multiplicity of related 
causes and campaigns thereby strengthening political agency within the city and 
consolidating its capacity to influence change.  
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Chapter 7 - Analysis 
Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a theoretically informed analysis of the two 
case studies. The chapter mobilizes the tools provided by instrumentalization theory 
to develop and enrich the largely descriptive narratives from the preceding chapters 
and position the cases within a broader conceptual framework. As such, it enhances 
the capacity of the analysis to develop useful insights and identify casual relationships. 
As described in Chapters 2 and 4, instrumentalization theory is used 
hermeneutically to situate the creation of the two schemes within the broad cultural 
assumptions, logics and decision-making practices producing them. Given the 
particular findings from each study, the analysis is especially concerned with critiquing 
the modes of corporate and bureaucratic governance through which bias has operated 
to conserve hierarchical power in Dublin, and also with understanding the processes 
of instrumentalization through which Hamilton has enacted enlightened and liberating 
notions of citizenship. 
The chapter begins with a separate reading of each case which is structured 
around the core ideas of subjectivication and objectification. This format supports an 
investigation of the interplay between human identities, technologies and processes of 
instrumentalization. Table 7.1 below, reproduced from chapter 4, illustrates the 
relationships between these ideas. 
 
Table 7.1: Instrumentalization and associated concepts 
 
 Functionalization Realization 
 
Objectivication 
(Technology) 
 
 
Decontextualization 
 
Reduction 
Systematization 
 
Mediation 
Subjectivication 
(Human) 
Autonomization 
 
Positioning 
Vocation/identity 
 
Initiative 
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Following this, the chapter also provides a second level analysis which serves 
to develop, compare and contrast key aspects of the cases critical to their respective 
designs. In keeping with the hermeneutic approach, this discussion reflects upon the 
relationality and interdependencies between local or situated decision-making on the 
one hand and the broader socio-political and technical milieu on the other. In the 
process it develops themes and insights which may guide the design of citizen-centric 
technologies more generally. 
In addition, and as noted in Chapter 4, the conceptual framework guiding this 
analysis is an elaboration of that proposed by Feng and Feenberg (2008). This 
adaptation, which includes a feedback loop between concretized design and ongoing 
processes of instrumentalization, addresses limitations in its original formulation by 
incorporating the conceptual means to map technology’s response over time to the 
influence of socio-political change, experiential learning and technical innovation. As 
originally formulated by Feng and Feenberg, the design space is framed as conditioned 
by, and reflect of, technical codes, which in turn produce stabilized or concretized 
solutions. This illustration, however, suggests that such solutions may be end-points 
in the design process and temporally static. Given the evolutionary thrust of 
Feenberg’s work, this failure to adequately incorporate technology’s ongoing and 
emergent nature can only be interpreted as an oversight. The revised schema is 
intended to more accurately reflect both the essence of instrumentalization theory and 
the empirical findings developed through both studies. The model also emphasizes 
that, while the primary locus of secondary instrumentalization is located in the 
alliances, strategies and decision-making practices developed through the 
implementation phase, valuative mediations may also permeate choices made during 
the conceptual design. Figures 7.1 and 7.2 below illustrate this adaptation. 
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Figure 7.1: Original Conceptual Framework  Figure 7.2: Modified Conceptual Framework 
 
 
 
Source: Feng and Feenberg (2008)   
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7.1 Dublinbikes: Subjectivication 
Autonimization – Strategic Positioning  
Throughout the conception, design and implementation of the Dublinbikes scheme, 
there is an operation of a technical code which acts to support the institutional forms 
and ideologies of the projects’ primary stakeholders and which embodies Feenberg’s 
notion of social rationalization; a concept derived from Weber. 
 
“I introduce the term social rationality to refer to phenomena Weber treated 
under the rubric “rationalization”. What I retain from Weber is the emphasis 
on forms of thought and action that bear some resemblance to scientific 
principles and practices and the role of the modern organisations in 
generalizing those forms in society at large.” (Feenberg, 2010: 158) 
Key to this notion of rationalization is operational autonomy which rests on the 
capacity of bureaucracies to atomize the public through processes of reduction, 
exclusion and decontextualization.  
 
“The operational autonomy of management and administration positions them 
in a technical relation to the world, safe from the consequences of their own 
actions.” (Feenberg, 2010: 70) 
In practice this autonomy was realized primarily through the strategic control 
of the planning environment. Ethically informed governance requires - or should 
require - that collaborative, consensus-building practices be constitutive elements of 
the systems and practices of planning (Healey, 2006). In the Irish context, such systems 
and practices - incorporating legislative and regulatory frameworks, review boards and 
democratically constituted policy committees – had been designed to both constrain 
the role of powerful interests and give political actors a meaningful opportunity to 
contribute to spatial, environmental and infrastructural development. In their idealized 
forms, they aspire to Habermas’s communicative approach which is “oriented to 
achieving, sustaining and reviewing consensus - and indeed a consensus that rests on 
the intersubjective recognition of criticisable validity claims” (Habermas, 1984: 17).  
This position embraces the notion that true collective reasoning requires a pluralist 
epistemology which recognises the integrity of a diverse range of knowledge, values 
and experience.  
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However, these processes of governance are unlikely to promote inclusionary 
practices unless they occur within a culture which is sympathetic to their ideals. In 
practice, they proved unable to withstand the effects of hierarchical power which was 
used strategically in order to preserve the identities, cultures and ways of life of elite 
interests.  
In this respect, the case contextualizes the narrative of powerful corporate 
actors parasitically feeding on the political and economic vulnerabilities of local 
governments. Dublinbikes reveals relationships which are far more premeditated, 
calculating and symbiotic. While the scheme is a manifestly cynical exercise by 
JCDecaux in offsetting the environmental and cultural consequences of its primary 
business interests, the manner of its configuration and implementation has also had the 
effect of protecting DCC’s historical and functional identity. In this respect, it 
embodies a regime characterized by both neoliberal and technocratic ideologies which 
necessarily negates the public’s right to participate in decision making processes 
materially impacting the quality of their lives.  
Despite the backdrop of an increasingly articulated smart city narrative which 
officially promoted openness and transparency, the findings from this case suggest that 
engagement throughout the life cycle of the project was of the most impoverished kind. 
This can be attributed to both distal and proximal forces. Under the impress of 
neoliberalism – an orthodoxy seeded by central government policy initiatives - and 
combined with an historic, managerialist style of local governance - inclusivity and 
participation were either non-existent or merely concepts used rhetorically to 
legitimize an illegitimate project. This manoeuvring was also conspicuous when the 
research attempted to enrol the co-operation of key organisational actors. 
Neither the DCC manager with executive responsibility for the planning and 
implementation of the Dublinbikes project, nor representatives from JCDecaux would 
agree to be interviewed for the research. In the interest of rigor and probity, the current 
CEO of Dublin City Council was also invited to participate in the interview process. 
While not part of the governance structures affecting the initial design and 
configuration of the scheme in the late 2000s, his reflections and insights may 
nevertheless have been valuable in exploring and contextualizing its history and that 
of the organisation. He is also currently responsible for collaborating with other 
agencies and stakeholders in developing smart city strategies and policy initiates which 
may impact on the schemes’ future technical and social trajectories. Furthermore, the 
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request emphasised that the research was part of an overall effort by the Programmable 
City project to provide empirical and theoretical insights which could inform debates 
across a number of areas relevant to his domain, i.e. city management, the provision 
smart urban infrastructure and social and technical innovation. The CEO refused to 
support the research. This refusal has an additional significance given that he had 
engaged willingly with other Programmable City researchers whose work had 
incorporated various aspects of urban management and administration.  
This strategic ‘positioning’ or autonomizing has the effect of hermetically 
sealing the organisation from critique in a manner evocative of Weber’s notions of 
bureaucratization and oligarchy, i.e. the tendency in hierarchically structured 
organisations to concentrate power in the hands of the few with the effect that 
organisational forms and cultures can be (re)created with relative ease. For critical 
theory of technology, this conservation of hierarchy is also evident in the production 
of technology itself. 
 
“Operational autonomy enables them (bureaucracies) to reproduce the 
conditions of their own supremacy at each change in the technologies they 
command. Technocracy is an extension of such a system to society as a whole 
in response to the spread of technology and management to every sector of 
social life.” (Feenberg, 2010: 71) 
This hegemonic process succeeds largely due to the legitimization that bureaucracies 
and technocracies achieve through their claims to neutrality and value free efficiency, 
despite the fact that actualized, highly rationalized systems are as prone to error and 
bias as the minds which conceive them.   
 
“The usual commonsense notion of bias attributes unjust discrimination to 
prejudice and emotion. But efficient operations are often unfair even where 
bias in this ordinary sense is avoided. I have introduced the concept of ‘formal 
bias’ to describe prejudicial social arrangements of this type. Formal bias 
prevails wherever the structure or context of rationalized systems or 
institutions favors a particular social group.” (Feenberg, 2010) 
Essentially, Feenberg is saying that the factors shaping technology under the 
influence of social rationalization are not explicitly or intentionally prejudicial per se; 
rather the technical rationales at work in modern bureaucracies have embedded in them 
historically and culturally biased knowledge which tends to be oblivious to broader 
social values and which operate to reproduce patterns of inequality and injustice which 
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are sympathetic to the interests of privileged groups. This formal bias is comprised 
largely of ‘constitutive’ and ‘implementation’ variants which correlate broadly with 
primary and secondary instrumentalizations, i.e. constitutive bias is evidenced in the 
values inscribed in a theoretical system and tends to be independent of context, while 
implementation bias is realised subsequently through contextualizations in the real 
world. It may be that implementation bias is closer to what Feenberg envisioned when 
developing these ideas. In 1991 he wrote “The essence of formal bias is the prejudicial 
choice of the time, place and manner of the introduction of a relatively neutral system” 
(Feenberg, 1991: 180). Constitutive and implementation bias then represent additional 
analytic constructs which deconstruct the nature of technical systems allowing a 
critical hermeneutic reading of the ways autonomy is enacted through technical action. 
In the case of Dublinbikes, design praxis leading to its concretization would be 
characterized by bias in both its forms.  At a conceptual level, and in the manner of its 
deployment, the scheme can be seen to embody objectification processes which 
operationalize the interests and rationales of the projects’ powerful stakeholders. 
7.2 Dublinbikes: Objectivication 
Decontextualization –Reduction 
At a primary level the system was designed by JCDecaux as a functional, ‘efficient’ 
technology, but one devoid of mechanisms which might support enhanced reciprocity, 
usability and environmental sustainability. Its ongoing failure to translate discursive 
demands into their system equivalent reflects a constitutive bias indifferent to notions 
of society as complex and adaptive with emergent needs and values. There is little, if 
any, evidence that aesthetic or normative considerations were influential either during 
the initial design process or throughout an intervening period characterized by 
dynamism and innovation within the industry. On the contrary, the instrumentality of 
the configuration reflects a marked absence of dialogue or contestation, and frames 
citizens as decontextualized consumers.  
Once this design passed through the political and cultural milieu of Dublin we 
see a secondary instrumentalization shape this system in conformity with the 
assumptions and interests of the city’s executive elite. While it may be argued that at 
a macro level, the pervasiveness of Public Private Partnerships and the trend towards 
entrepreneurial governance explain the initial decision to migrate the provision and 
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management of the system to a private entity, the particular enactment of these 
processes in Dublin remains a function of the history, culture and practices of local 
governance. It was the systemic failure by DCC to effectively regulate advertising 
infrastructure in the city which proved the genesis for the bike scheme in the first place. 
Despite the rhetoric to the contrary, the system was merely an incidental and 
opportunistic means of resolving an unrelated issue; a mechanism by which the effects 
of advertising on the aesthetics, identity and sustainability of the city could be 
mitigated, and local governments’ own structural and ideological shortcomings could 
be masked. Hence the reason DCC could, without compunction, cede the management 
and development of the scheme to an organisation with a manifest disregard for legal, 
professional and ethical norms. Expedience also explains the rationale behind 
partnering with the Coca Cola Corporation to part finance the systems’ ongoing 
operation. This apathy, combined with negligent (or complicit) contract management, 
has led to a technological path dependence which has limited the avenues through 
which the system may now grow. This aspect of the system emphasises the degree to 
which the ‘concretized’ technology is mediated and shaped by ongoing, post-
implementation practices and ideologies. 
Despite the constraints and dependencies inscribed at a conceptual level by 
JCDecaux, which in themselves reflect the interplay between primary choices and a 
system of values, the concretized design still bears the impress of local history and 
politics. The spatial distribution of infrastructure, the prescriptive nature of 
subscription processes and the manner of the system’s operation, reflect historic 
patterns of prejudice, inequality and paternalism. Furthermore, the scheme’s lack of 
meaningful digital and informational integration with other systems and modes is only 
partly explained by the constraints of the conceptual design. It is also a metaphor for 
DCC’s own institutional isolation and inertia. 
  
“It has always been the way. Dublin Bus doesn't talk to CIE [Public Transport 
Authority], doesn't talk to Irish Rail, doesn’t talk to Luas [Light Rail System].  
Sibling rivalry! That is standard operating procedure for all Dublin transport 
issues, incredible, ridiculous institutional rivalry. It is almost impossible to get 
coordination.  Look how long it took us to get into integrated ticketing; we were 
pulling our hair out for ten years.” (Eamon Ryan, Green Party Politician and 
Former Government Minister, 2016) 
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The result is a segregated, legacy technology, disconnected from its technical, 
social and cultural environments. This insularity may have particular consequences if 
and when bikeshare spreads to other local authority areas within the greater Dublin 
region. It may be for example, that riders are forced to transition from one provider to 
another in order to complete trips which straddle jurisdictional boundaries. 
DCC of course have countered that the scheme is a sustainable and efficient 
mode of urban transportation which, assessed on a trips-per-bike-per-day basis, has 
proven highly successful (DCC, 2011). However, this rationale conveniently ignores 
the fact that the service, which is all but free for those who can access it, was 
implemented in a dynamic, densely populated environment which is served by a much-
maligned public transportation network (Pope, 2010; Bohan, 2013; Ryan, 2017). 
Furthermore, to infer causal relationships between contested notions of 
performance and quality on the one hand, and ‘success’ on the other, is a non sequiturs 
which confuses explanandum with explanans. In a progressive democracy one might 
reasonably expect that notions of success would encompass a technology which 
embraces a broader range of social values (Flanagan et al., 2005). As Feenberg (2011) 
has noted, efficiency is not an absolute concept since it cannot be quantified in the 
abstract but is relative to particular and contingent demands and contexts. Once 
technologies have stabilized we no longer recognize its bias at all and apprehend it as 
independent of the partiality from which it emerged. 
In a general sense then, the manner of the scheme’s implementation and 
management has, thus far, precluded any recontextualizing strategies which might 
have reoriented the technology normatively and resolved the tensions between design 
and the requirements of society. In effect, the opportunity to infuse function with 
meaning has been missed.  
Democratic rationalizations are about mediating this dialectic and producing 
new technical codes which can prioritize traditionally excluded values in new technical 
configurations. This scheme has thus far been characterized by a marked absence of 
such strategies or ambition. The boundaries that define the structural and cultural 
identity of governance in the city have remained intact and have acted to resist any 
intervention – political or technical - to change the status quo. The configuration of the 
technology is an integral part of this process of self-protection and renewal. 
Ontologically therefore, the scheme’s dominant meaning or purpose is that of an 
instrument to preserve and promote neoliberal-bureaucratic norms and practices which 
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in turn contribute to the rationalization process that creates Dublin’s political and 
cultural life. 
Furthermore, it may be argued that Dublinbikes blurs the distinction between 
formal and substantive bias. Given the duplicity and cynicism shown by senior local 
authority managers throughout the life time of this project, it is difficult to imagine 
that the particular constellation of technical, functional and operational specifications 
that define the scheme were entirely the result of a mere vulnerability to self-interest 
caused by a detachment from their consequences and outcomes, i.e. formal bias.  
Something more deliberate and conscious may well have been at work here in the 
character of the distributed system. Feenberg suggests that substantively biased 
systems – which encompass intentional, wilful prejudice - tend not to survive because 
their irrationality makes them transparently inefficient or malign (Feenberg 2010). 
However, the level of executive control wielded by governance in the city has rendered 
the system impervious to any such processes of evaluation or contestation. The failure 
of DCC to participate in the research - or otherwise address these matters - has left the 
issue of bias open to interpretation.  
7.3 SobiHamilton: Subjectivication 
Vocation - Imitative 
Subjectivication in the form of Feenberg’s secondary moments - vocation and 
initiative – were shown to be important recurring themes in the Hamilton Project. 
While these qualities characterized many of the stakeholders, they were especially 
applicable to the three principles - Topalovic, Social Bicycles and SobiHamilton. 
Together they employed leadership, tactical awareness, collegiality, advocacy and 
experimentation to make an improbable project a reality. Their efforts leveraged an 
important moment in the city’s trajectory when the political, cultural and economic 
contexts aligned, and meaningful change was possible. Despite the opportune timing 
however, the project still required a catalyst. 
 
“Somebody had to take the leadership role, somebody had to organize and to 
capture all of that civic engagement and put it together. Somebody had to tie 
all that together and present it as a package and he [Topalovic] took a big 
political risk as a staffer. This is not a city that rewards innovation and 
progressive thinking. No good deed goes unpunished in this town right!” (Ryan 
McGreal, Raise the Hammer, 2016) 
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Initiative, in the form of micro-political manoeuvring, was an important mechanism 
for guiding the city council to behave in ways that were alien to it. 
 
“I would say that Peter hacked the political context to make the bike share 
happen in the sense that he understood what it would take to get those 
councillors to support it politically, and he made that happen! I would hesitate 
to use the word manipulated, but he understood what he would have to 
demonstrate and deliver in order to get those votes [of city councillors] and 
those votes went against their knee jerk reaction which would be to say no! It’s 
politics the way bureaucratic staff have to practice it. The city doesn’t have a 
culture of risk taking or encouraging greatness but is does this in spite of itself 
through Pete.” (Ryan McGreal, Raise the Hammer, 2016) 
There is already evidence that the democratic initiatives he pioneered in 
realizing the bike project have shifted the culture of institutional governance and 
decision making. Light Rail Transit (LRT), for example is another major transportation 
initiative from Metrolinx currently being planned for the city. This time, collaboration 
with a diversity of communities and constituents was placed high on the project’s 
agenda at the outset.  In March of 2015, as the bike project was launching, the city’s 
Mayor brought a motion to Council to establish a “Citizens' Jury” that would review 
the city's light rail transit plan. This Citizens' Jury is a forum of residents randomly 
selected from every ward in the city and brought together to review the literature, 
consult with experts, hold public consultations and then come to a consensus on how 
to move forward, considering the best interest of the city as a whole. Their final report, 
which reflected a multiplicity of perspectives and experiences, was submitted to City 
Hall in March of 2017 and councillors have already committed to adopting many of 
its recommendations. Engagement, until recently regarded as a concept appropriate to 
more cosmopolitan, liberal cities, is now becoming a taken-for granted part of the 
municipal decision-making process. 
Topalovic also showed considerable foresight and guile in creating a not-for-
profit to manage and operate the scheme. It is largely beyond the reach of political 
interference and carries genetic material from both the vendor and from progressive 
elements within the city. In practice, it represents a design space which circumvents 
many of the barriers that might otherwise constrain it. Feenberg (2008) for example 
notes that while designers appear like powerful actors in reality they do not operate in 
a vacuum. They must accommodate the requirements of a multitude of power relations, 
interests and ways of knowing. The creation of a not-for-profit, in effect, resulted in a 
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centre of innovation through which Topalovic and others, were free to use dialogue, 
and creative appropriations at various levels of sophistication, to refine many areas of 
the system. The choice of not-for-profit model was also part of carefully conceived 
strategy to mobilize support. 
 
“The real difference between running a system with a not-for-profit like in 
Minneapolis and here in Hamilton, and say a corporate entity, is that there’s a 
qualitative difference in how the community perceives and interacts with the 
bikeshare. And I think the fact that it’s a non-profit has been the catalyst for 
building broader support for cycling generally. So even though it’s framed very 
much as a transit project, in reality many of the social networks that supported 
it - and were strengthened by it - were around cycling. That was key actually. 
In fact bikeshare naturally connected so many networks; cycling, transit and 
safe streets but sustainability too.” (Pete Topalovic, TDM, Hamilton, 2016) 
7.4 SobiHamilton: Objectivication 
Systematization - Mediation 
From a technological perspective, the artefact was conceived, designed and 
implemented with systematizations and valuative mediations as its overriding 
characteristics. The objectification process reflects the myriad of people and 
organisations, rationales and philosophies that coalesced around its development to 
produce a platform with functional and socio-cultural value. The various layers of 
development and adaptation that the initial design concept experienced as it passed 
through Hamilton’s political and cultural landscape (secondary instrumentalization) 
conspicuously reflect the interests and preoccupations of a city in transformation. The 
concretized design incorporates multiple agendas, objectives and values, and expresses 
them as their technical equivalent. The socially sanctioned patterns of network 
distribution, the goals and objectives which system data serve, the user - centric 
development of social and digital tools, even the alignment occurring at an industry 
level to produce common standards and specifications all represent the translation of 
discursive demands into system specifications. This eclecticism has made the process 
of integrating the scheme with its environment all the more effective, and introduces a 
third register to Feenberg’s work, that of cognition or phenomenology. This relates to 
the subjects’ immediate and pre-discursive reactions to the normative, aesthetic and 
imaginative potential of technology. 
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“Openness should be seen as an active participation through projecting the 
possibilities of things in the ethical and aesthetic imagination.” (Feenberg, 
2013) 
The design reflects this pluralism. Ontologically, SobiHamilton is as much a 
platform for citizen engagement, participatory design, and devolved governance as it 
is a piece of transit or cycling infrastructure; epistemologically, it is the product of 
both lay understanding and experience, and professional and institutional networks of 
expertise. The successful assimilation of a variety of technical capabilities and 
affordances, which have their genesis in such a diverse set of demands, empirically 
challenges the substantivist argument that technology discloses or reveals a culturally 
impoverished world, driven by functionalism and devoid of meaning. On the contrary, 
the secondary instrumentalizations seen here have created a technology that embodies 
a rich system of meanings and relations that reflect many ways of being and knowing.  
The scheme also challenges the thesis that optimum design or efficiency is 
compromised by externalities like sustainability or democracy. Just as the distinction 
between technical efficiencies and external values is contingent on past social and 
political negotiations and conflicts, it may be that the technical code which evolved in 
Hamilton will form part of the canon which guides future development in other cities 
and across other projects. 
The success of SoBi’s technology suggests that this may already be happening. 
However, achieving the same level of contextualization (or systematization) achieved 
in Hamilton will require more than simply adopting a technology or architecture. The 
uniqueness of place, with all of its contingency and relationality, means a successful 
technology must emerge organically, at least in part, from the experiences and needs 
of those who appropriate it. 
 
“There’s no one optimal technical solution, there can’t be. There are far too 
many factors that are not necessarily compatible across geographies. There 
are local laws and regulations. Even funding might be dependent on things like 
pollution and air quality mitigation which are factors that are not even across 
different cities and different systems. Then there are the demographics of your 
population and who you’re targeting, the topology of the city, whether or not 
the weather supports the use of solar technologies, what kind of data are you 
interested in generating, what kind of cycling infrastructure is available to the 
scheme, and on and on and on.”  (Project Manager, NABSA, 2016) 
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This captures the challenges faced by cities as they work to contextualize these 
technologies to meet the cultural and social needs of their citizens and it may explain 
why some cities, in the face of such complexity, either choose to implement off the 
shelf solutions - simply cut and paste from other cities - or allow the technical code to 
be controlled by private or bureaucratic interests which are motivated by profit, self-
serving notions of efficiency or administrative convenience. These arrangements tend 
to produce technologies which have been isolated from social constraints and typically 
serve privileged interests. In other words, they exemplify primary instrumentalization 
and have a formal bias which bears the impress of autonomy and strategic positioning. 
From the perspective of Feenberg’s critical theory, Hamilton is a reminder that 
development and the ideals it embodies are historically contingent – another refutation 
of essentialism - and as discursive power shifts within society then so too does the 
character and content of the technology it produces.  
7.5 Cross Case Analysis 
The form and function of institutional agency across both cities is perhaps the most 
pointed contrast between the two research sites. Dublinbikes was developed by a local 
authority with no prior history in, or expertise of, implementing transportation 
infrastructure (the provision of transportation infrastructure in Ireland is a function of 
the national government). As such, the project operated outside the scope of the 
National Transport Authority and so was neither aligned with, nor subject to, strategic 
policy objectives for either the state or the broader geographic area. This would have 
made any attempt to develop collaborative arrangements with individual transit 
operators (bus, rail, tram, etc.) problematic, especially in light of the competitiveness 
and friction that characterized the culture of transportation management in the capital. 
Therefore, the exclusionary practices employed by DCC contributed both to the degree 
of control exercised by the organisation in its handling of the project and to the 
scheme’s subsequent partiality and bias. It also left the fortunes of Dublinbikes to an 
institution noted previously by Coletta et al. (2017) as having a series of systemic 
issues (i.e. a piecemeal approach to strategy, an absence of joined up thinking, weak 
governance, a lack of formal engagement processes, limited skills capacity, and a staid 
cultural mindset with respect to procurement, experimentation and operations). The 
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absence of any remediating influences at state level has led, at least in part, to the 
production of a system which reflects and reproduces this dysfunction.  
By comparison, SobiHamilton was supported and financed by the provincial 
government’s transportation department and the project was required to co-ordinate 
with it its capital programme for regional transit development. Essentially, Metrolinx, 
acting in a supra-local capacity, used its position in the decision-making hierarchy to 
largely by-pass local governance and a fractious political environment which might 
otherwise have operated to resist the implementation. Once this potential impasse had 
been averted, Topalovic, a transportation professional with a wealth of experience 
operating within the bureaucratic and technical spheres, was well positioned to 
leverage his relationships with Metrolinx and other inter-city officials to integrate the 
scheme into Hamilton’s transportation infrastructure. This process was supported by a 
climate of sharing fostered also by the Ontario government.   
 
“That was expected from Hamilton, it was expected of all the provincial cities 
actually.  So, in practice that’s carshare, bikeshare, shared spaces and shared 
ideas right and technology allows to do all that effectively. It was expected for 
example that Toronto would help us with this project and they did. We’re all in 
the sharing economy and we see value in that. That comes from the province. 
In a lot of ways, they call the shots; they set the tone.” (Pete Topalovic, TDM, 
Hamilton, 2016) 
As a force shaping the nature of secondary instrumentalization, the impact of 
the province cannot be overstated. It contributed significantly to the structural, 
economic and cultural climate within which progressive executive decision-making 
took place and one could reasonably argue that without its active participation - and 
legitimization - the project may never have materialized.  
We also see the effects of other sources of institutional and organisational 
agency permeating Hamilton’s decision-making environment. The North American 
Bike Share Association, itself a construct of the National Association of City 
Transportation Officials, emerged in response to the need for reciprocity and 
collaboration across the industry. It also actively encourages creative problem solving 
(innovative dialogue, engagement and experimentation for example) as a way of 
promoting smart bikeshare and negotiating the technical and socio-political barriers 
constraining the industry. In effect, this congruence between governmental and 
industry stakeholders created an epistemic community which aligned to promote 
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particular values and rationales. Essentially, it represented a coalition of stakeholders 
who operated to advocate particular approaches to urban management and governance. 
In this instance, Metrolinx, NACTO and NABSA acted in loosely coupled yet 
complimentary ways to define a set of goals and normative assumptions which 
structured thinking and promoted certain practices and logics. The concept of 
epistemic community also resonates with Bijker’s notion of the technological frame 
(1997). This refers to the shared cognitive frame of reference that characterizes how 
individual social groups or stakeholders perceive the technology production process. 
A frame may include the problem definitions, goals, rules of thumb, assumptions or 
strategies adopted by each group in response to the creation of a particular technology. 
In effect, a frame marks the boundaries between relevant social groups (Bijker, 2007). 
A high degree of coherence between these frames leads to an epistemic community of 
the type which emerged in Hamilton as a multitude of organisational and societal 
interests cohered around the concept that ‘success’ should incorporate equity, access 
and democratic participation as part of its rationale. By contrast, the isolationist 
mentality of Dublin’s executive body precluded the development of any such coalition. 
Convergence here was largely between DCC and the operator JCDecaux, whose 
respective frames coalesced around the caveat that the scheme should first and 
foremost protect their interests.  
At a municipal level, Topalovic’s championing of SobiHamilton positioned 
him at the nexus of both macro and micro level forces shaping the socio-technical 
environment. In effect, he acted to synthesise and direct various sources of agency in 
a purposeful way. In the process, he created the conditions for a normative 
reconfiguration of governance practices.  
 
“Engagement is certainly becoming more the norm here. So, yes, I would say I 
was an early adopter of new techniques, but the city is exploring new 
approaches now too. I mean we always did a lot of public information centres, 
but this project has helped us realize that public information centres don’t work 
especially well. People don’t come unless the issues are very contentious, plus 
the timing doesn’t suit everyone and so on.  So as a city we’ve had to adapt and 
I think we’re doing that.” (Pete Topalovic, TDM, Hamilton, 2016) 
This kind of remediating agency resonates with Feenberg’s notions of organisational 
subordinates operating to subvert conservative regimes, making them amenable to 
cultural and structural reconfiguration. Perng (2017), commenting in a similar vein, 
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notes that this form of leadership can operate to destabilized government as a centre 
of control, knowledge and expertise and also disassemble and relocate ‘the 
government’ as a locus of innovation into the context of everyday life. 
Under the influence of Topalovic’s initiative, we see the production of 
knowledge, expertise and technology become reconfigured to operate through 
universities, civic organisations, bureaucrats, technologists, environmental groups, 
community advocates and citizens. Through a process of collaboration, we see the 
emergence of an open, inclusive and participatory form of governance which 
articulates the values, viewpoints and practices of a diversity of stakeholders. This also 
embodies the notion of ‘agonistic’ relationships noted previously (Bjögvinsson et al., 
2012; Perng, 2017), i.e. the concept that diverse and sometimes conflictual interests 
can, through experimentation, negotiation and consensus building, create progressive 
networks of technical and human infrastructure. 
 
“Competing alliances can build on incompatible views and practices where 
social, technological and institutional arrangements in support of these views 
and practices assemble differently motivated initiatives, individuals and 
governmental units and agencies to participate.” (Perng, 2017: 6) 
The articulations of urban governance in Hamilton also resonate closely with 
those advocated by urban planner, Patsy Healey, who proposes that constructive and 
just government should incorporate forms of what she describes as inclusionary 
intention and argumentation and participatory discursive democracy’ (Healey, 2006). 
These modes essentially synthesize the formal aspects of government, which provide 
structure, rules and resource allocation (hard infrastructure), with consensus and 
relationship-building, and mutual learning (soft infrastructuring).  As evidenced in 
Hamilton, these forms and practices are likely to cultivate social, intellectual and 
political capital to promote co-ordination and the flow of knowledge and competence 
among the various social relations coexisting within places. (Healey, 2006; 239). She 
goes on to note that the practice of planning should be cognisant of the concerns of all 
members of a political community and, as such, all members should have the 
opportunity to express their views, and to challenge decisions made on their behalf, 
through rights and opportunities coded in the process. The democratic forms emergent 
in Hamilton, based as they are on dialogue, negotiation, and accountability, offer such 
safeguards.  
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While the success of SobiHamilton is clearly a function of the governmental 
practices supporting it, it is also true that the nature of the infrastructure and its 
particular design were instrumental in augmenting this process. Healey notes, for 
example, that participatory governance, due to structural, economic or other contexts, 
may struggle to deliver positive outcomes for disenfranchised communities, however 
the inherent generativity of SoBi’s architecture has supported the capacity of both hard 
and soft infrastructures to reconfigure patterns of resource distribution. It achieved this 
by encouraging a culture of experimentation and disruption. Discussing generativity, 
Zittrain (2008) observed that: 
 
“A less generative device may work more smoothly because there is only one 
cook over the stew, and it can be optimized to a particular perceived purpose. 
But it cannot be easily adapted for new uses. A more generative device makes 
innovation easier and produces a broader range of applications because the 
audience of people who can adapt it to new uses is much greater. (Zittrain, 
2008: 30). 
Significantly, this openness to possibility was achieved organically and in the 
absence of an overarching or highly articulated smart city narrative. ‘Smart’, in the 
context of this project emerged as signifying a set of understandings and practices 
concerned with pragmatically addressing real urban problems and encouraging 
changes to mobility practices which are sustainable – socially, environmentally and 
economically. In this sense, it is deeply implicated with a broader articulation of a city 
in the process of political and cultural reconstruction and one committed to using 
technological infrastructure as a vehicle for achieving real democratic reforms. This 
resonates closely with the ‘real’ smart city as envisioned by Hollands (2008) which 
positions ICTs as enhancing democratic public debate about the kind of urban spaces 
citizens wish to live in. Hamilton is also paradigmatic of a broader culture of sharing 
which, as noted by Agyeman and McLaren (2009), stands in opposition to 
entrepreneurially motivated development. They propose that the sharing culture 
challenges the discourse of the instrumental smart city, and, by extension, its 
preoccupation with inward investment through the development of a ‘high-tech core’. 
It positions the culture of sharing and collaborative consumption being developed in 
Hamilton as a vison of how the smart city may disconnect from a purely competitive, 
profit-motivated agenda. 
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By contrast, Dublin demonstrates a fundamentally different governmental 
terrain; one which espouses decidedly anti-political and elitist ideals. While neoliberal 
forms of governance may consciously foster cooperative practices by cultivating 
partnerships and alliance, such alliances typically function to support economic 
innovation. As noted (somewhat prophetically), by Healey (2006), such alliances may 
become merely mechanisms for the reconfiguration of the institutions of government 
for the benefit of corporatists elites. This broadly resonates with the rationales and 
ideologies informing Dublinbikes which can be positioned within a view of the city 
proposed by Florida (2005). He suggested that urban policy should be focused on 
tending to the lifestyle and consumption choices of the middle classes as a way of 
transforming the city into a creative and, by extension, economically productive hub. 
However, as Peck (2005) notes, the realization of these policies in the real world 
typically result in forms of segregation and gentrification which are ultimately 
incompatible with social cohesion and broader notions of community building.  
From the perspective of democratic representation, Dublin did produce a 
coalition of ‘implicated publics’ but one which developed reactively and in resistance 
to explicit forms of suppression and exclusion. Whereas civic activism in Hamilton 
was energized at the outset by a variety of municipal actors operating in tandem with 
Topalovic, Dublin’s coalition - comprising environmental and community 
campaigners - developed in response to practices explicitly formulated to exclude 
democratic representation. Given the extent of DCC’s control, however, this coalition 
failed to develop sufficient momentum to pressurize change. In a manner which 
resonates with previous research conducted by Fox-Rogers et al. (2011) and Grist 
(2008; 2012) we see a systematic interpretation of planning and development 
regulations aimed at protecting both private sector and bureaucratic interests. Many of 
the major decisions associated with the project were engineered to remove the legal 
requirement for public engagement, while others were positioned to significantly limit 
their exposure to subsequent processes of evaluation and arbitration. In addition, a 
prohibitively expensive appeals process essentially acted in concert with a policy of 
deliberate obfuscation to frustrate democracy and marginalize voices of dissent.  
Where decisions were subjected to a formal appeals process, we see the appeals 
board act, contrary to the advice of its own investigators, and in contravention of 
Planning and Development regulations, to facilitate DCC in expediting the project. 
Here, the effects of national politics, the reliance on public private partnerships and 
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the shift towards corporate modes of governance, materially influenced the behaviour 
of a statutory body with responsibility for regulating the planning activities of local 
authorities across the state. This serves as a verification of observations made by 
Murphy et al. (2014). Reflecting on An Bord Pleanála’s complicity in ongoing process 
of neoliberalization, they note that:  
 
“The Board [appeals board] must now have regard in discharging its functions 
to include the ‘national interest’, it may be deduced that economic interest 
rather than the ‘common good’ was intended by the legislation to provide 
broader scope and justification for granting permission for an application that 
materially contravenes the development plan. Taken together, it can be seen 
that the role of the Board has shifted from decision maker to a facilitator of 
development and has increased the already privileged position of private 
development interests relative to the general public. (Murphy et al., 2014: 58) 
The result was a form of mutuality or reciprocity which operated to maintain the 
political and cultural status quo at both a municipal and national level. In effect, this 
also comprises an epistemic regime but one which understands success in terms of 
self-protection and neoliberal development. Aligning Dublinbikes within a smart city 
discourse of openness and innovation has been a transparent attempt to mitigate this 
and reposition the scheme as delivering benefits which, in reality, are largely absent. 
Here the smart city construct has essentially acted as a form of what Meyer and Rowan 
(1977) described as organisational decoupling - creating and maintaining gaps 
between symbolically adopted formal policies and actual organizational practices. In 
effect, it involves organisations maintaining policies which ensure legitimacy in the 
eyes of stakeholders while simultaneously maintaining the status quo for practical, 
cultural, or ideological reasons (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).  For Dublin, the smart 
concept has operated largely as a branding exercise devised strategically to position 
the city as a centre of economic, technical and social innovation.  
However, as a technology which embodies spatial and economic bias, 
Dublinbikes represents a metaphorical and literal expression of the structural and 
cultural problems characterizing urban governance more generally. This disparity 
between rhetoric and reality is likely to continue. As noted by Coletta et al., (2017), 
Smart Dublin - the organisation established to coordinate and manage Dublin’s smart 
city programme - has no control over many of the initiatives being implemented across 
the city. Its function is one of articulation (creating a smart city narrative), initiation 
(introducing new potential projects and partnerships to the city) and promotion 
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(marketing Dublin as open for smart city businesses) (Coletta et al., 2017). It is 
therefore unlikely to have sufficient executive authority to address many of the 
political and cultural problems which produced Dublinbikes. Since its inception in 
2015 it has: 
 
“… little addressed the existing accidental and uncoordinated nature of Dublin 
as a smart city and in many ways actively contributes to that accidental nature 
through proliferating smart city projects that are largely uncoordinated and 
non-interoperable beyond a shared, overarching narrative." (Coletta et al., 
2017) 
Dublin’s smart city therefore has proven little more than an entrepreneurial governance 
strategy concerned with economic development and with a marked absence of any 
practical initiatives likely to promote social and political inclusion. In this regard, it 
merely perpetuates the culture of institutional autonomy it was supposedly created to 
address and creates forms of citizenship unlikely to challenge the underlying political 
and ideological rationales shaping urban development. Accordingly, Dublinbikes is 
implicated in a much broader process of identity making informed by the imperatives 
of the market and bureaucracy rather than by rights, entitlements and fairness.  
7.6 Conclusion 
The collective findings from this research, understood through adapting Feenberg’s 
framework, demonstrate that technology is not value neutral but is inherently political 
and embodies the abstractions, values and cultural assumptions shaping the technical 
code within which production takes place. The inclusion of a feedback loop in 
Feenberg’s conceptual framing between concretized design and ongoing process of 
instrumentalization also provides the conceptual apparatus to understand, map and 
problematize the dichotomy between the static nature of Dublinbikes and the emergent 
and responsive properties of Hamilton’s scheme. The findings also demonstrate the 
potential of remediating strategies to resist the imposition of technocratic, 
instrumentalist modes of thinking by empowering marginalized groups, alleviating 
inequality and fostering social cohesion. However, the capacity of such interventions 
to create new and citizen-centric socio-technical arrangements was shown to be 
conditional on a multiplicity of situated and context dependent forces operating at 
various spatial scales. It was the alignment of these forces in Hamilton that allowed 
deep democratization to emerge which acted to systematically address many of the 
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structural, procedural and operational barriers to equality identified in the smart 
bikeshare literature.  
Within this environment smart bikeshare emerged not purely as a form of 
oppositional counter cultural challenging the orthodoxy of private mobility but also as 
a positive framework of human and technical capital through which new and 
emancipatory modes of governance have been explored and enacted. These emergent 
practices have already led to more inclusive forms of policy making and 
implementation practices across the city. In addition, the alignment of bikeshare with 
a network of transit and related infrastructure supported the creation of knowledge 
regimes sympathetic to pluralism and urban justice and leveraged the scheme’s 
potential as a nexus of tactical urbanism. In effect, SobiHamilton has been the source 
of new discursive frames which institutional and civic actors have assimilated into 
their respective organisations and communities leading to the creation of new political 
identities and new forms of technical agency.  This is in marked contrast to Dublin 
where historic ways of knowing and working have been masked behind a veil of 
obfuscation and where institutional and state actors proved unwilling to make the 
ideological and practical leap needed to support meaningful learning.  
More generally these cases are a reminder that despite the pervasiveness of a 
mode of technology production characterized by capitalist-bureaucratic norms, there 
remains the potential for another type of modernity; one which embodies 
fundamentally different articulations of subjectivication and objectification. Feenberg 
(2010) proposes that this would be achieved through the democratization of technically 
mediated institutions where power would migrate away from centralized control and 
towards historically subordinated actors.  
 
“As more actors gained access to the design process, a wider range of valuative 
considerations would inform technical choices. These formal changes would 
result in new technical designs and new ways of achieving the efficiencies that 
characterize modern technological activity.”  (Feenberg, 2010: 77) 
This framing resonates closely with the technical praxis seen in Hamilton; a 
praxis that has produced a technology which reflects Simondon’s notion of progressive 
concretization and Feenberg’s equivalent concept of layered innovation, i.e. the 
iterative process of condensation by which intrinsic (technical) and extrinsic (social) 
variables, emerging from different regions of society, come to define the instrumental 
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and normative character of realized devices. It is also the process by which function 
and meaning – the double aspects of technology – are merged and preserved.  
In this sense the research re-affirms the value of studying socio-technical 
systems as a way of mapping and problematizing broader processes of urbanization. 
Socio-technical systems are an assemblage of cultural, political, economic, historic, 
aesthetic and technical elements and, as such, their production becomes an enactment 
or instantiation of broader processes of urbanisation.  As illustrated in this research, 
critical refection on the nature of technology production makes visible the 
relationships, processes, contingencies and interdependencies shaping cities and so 
provides the conceptual means to understand and address urban problems systemically 
rather than symptomatically. 
In conclusion, the cases are a reaffirmation that so long as our engagement with 
technology is conditioned by, or subordinated to, a mere ‘enframing’, then an 
improvised, decontextualized experience prevails. However, when the technical code 
supports a free engagement with technology through appropriation, experimentation 
and dialogue, then the tools (and identities) created have the potential to be radically 
different in character. Meaning, in all of its complexity, can be expressed (or 
substituted) through innovations and functional design attributes and, in the process, 
the nuance and subtlety of the human experience can be captured through technical 
potentials. As seen in Hamilton, this will require new forms of technical citizenship to 
identify and pursue new opportunities and new directions of progress. Whether or not 
this will happen is open to question. As Feenberg (2011: 13) has noted: “all theory 
can hope to do today is to identify open possibilities, not confidently predict the 
future.” 
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Chapter 8 - Conclusions 
Introduction 
This thesis has explored how design and implementation practices unfolding in 
different geographic locations and conditioned by situated contexts operate to pattern 
the delivery and operation technology. The study was particularly concerned with the 
ways in which the technopolitics charactering particular sites of production led to 
fundamentally different articulations of the same technical proposition; articulations 
which preserve and perpetuate contrasting notions of citizenship, equality and 
democratization. The research was investigated through an exploration of smart 
bikeshare systems and their heterogeneous assemblages of technologies, actors, 
institutions, practices and processes which act within, and respond to, a diversity of 
historical, political and economic variables. As such it offered an opportunity to 
unpack and problematize the praxis by which these technologies were actualized in the 
real world and in the process address the projects’ primary question: that is, how may 
the design and implementation of smart bikeshare systems preserve notions of 
equality, democratization and smart citizenry?  
The approach to answering this question has been twofold. Firstly, it required 
a comprehensive review of the smart bikeshare literature to develop an appreciation of 
the structural and ideological barriers acting to undermine equity within the sector. 
This revealed the industry to be broadly aligned with the same processes of neoliberal 
and technocratic development characterizing the smart city and manifest primarily in 
the socio-spatial disparity characterizing the distribution of infrastructure. It is also 
evidenced in the bias inscribed at the level of design, acting to operationalize the 
exclusion of low-income citizens.  Furthermore, the review highlighted cultural 
barriers to equity such as poor information exchange between cities and citizens which 
leads both to mistrust in city governance and an under-appreciation of the merits of 
cycling as a sustainable mode of transport. The review also noted that, for the most 
part, smart bikeshare has missed the opportunity to play a constructive role in 
cultivating an ethos of sharing and collaborative consumption and mitigating various 
forms of cultural and socio-economic disadvantage.  Secondly, the project empirically 
examined the modes of production characterizing two archetypal systems, both to 
understand the rationalizations creating (and legitimizing) these barriers in a real-
world setting and, as a counterpoint, to explore the types of remediating strategies 
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capable of (re)positioning citizens and communities as integral to the planning and 
design process. The study was supported by a theoretical framework developed from 
critical STS studies with the conceptual and analytic tools to analysis both the technical 
and ethical aspects of the system production. 
The findings from the cases provide an important corroboration of much of the 
critical and participatory design literature which articulates agency as having the 
potential to resist a doctrine of decontextualization and bias and which embraces its 
capacity to foster reflexive, democratic rationalization. Within the context of this 
research this was demonstrated by SobiHamilton’s capacity to operate not only in the 
technical realm as an example of innovative mobility infrastructure, but also to 
function through other, more normative, modalities. The system is informed by 
progressive notions of community, citizenship and sharing which position it as integral 
to, and reflective of, a new liberatory and inclusive politics emerging within the city. 
This chapter leverages the findings from the study to develop a set of principles 
which, despite the variability and contingency of place, may be applied to encourage 
more equitable system design across multiple settings. The chapter also explores a 
series of policy recommendations, which together, are likely to provide the structural 
contexts to support such efforts. Implications of the study for theory are also examined 
and critically reflected upon. The chapter concludes with a series of recommendations 
for further research which are intended to compliment and extend the findings from 
this project and address some of the limitations inherent in the research design. 
8.1 Design Implications 
As previously noted, cities have typically taken developmental paths and forms which 
vary as a function of governance, legacy infrastructure, policy priorities, 
administrative geographies and dependencies with other places (Coletta et al., 2017). 
Furthermore, the particularities of the smart bikeshare sector introduce additional 
variability which contributes to the complexity of the design process, i.e. local laws 
and environmental regulations, funding opportunities, population demographics, 
prevailing weather conditions, urban topographies, data requirements, availability of 
cycling infrastructure, and so on. Hence, there is no one design solution that will work 
optimally in every environment. However, despite the relationality and dependencies 
of place, the findings from the research make possible a number of recommendations 
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for equitable system design, especially when placed within the context of existing 
literature and prior scholarship.  
While 3rd generation schemes may have represented considerable progress in 
the mid-to-late 2000s with respect to previous iterations of smart bikeshare technology, 
this design has been superseded by approaches which can be loosely described as next 
or 4th generation, models. These are characterized by both technical and social 
innovations, i.e. dockless architectures, GPS technology, enhanced integration with 
other modes, and the incorporation of collaborative digital platforms and web 
technologies to encourage reciprocity and facilitate improved communication with 
riders. The model developed in Hamilton, however, represents an important fusion of 
3rd and 4th generation approaches by synthesizing, and developing on, key aspects of 
both.  
The retention of a ‘network’– essentially comprising bike rack hubs – is an 
important innovation that offers service users a degree of predictability while also 
providing municipal authorities with a means of managing the distribution of 
infrastructure. As a design principle, this should act to reduce the anxieties of cities 
either new to bikeshare or wishing to transition from legacy systems. A number of 
cities have recently expressed concern for example that a wholly dockless approach 
would result in bikes accumulating in an ad-hoc, unregulated way, creating urban 
chaos in the process (New York Post, Aug 11th, 2017). SoBi’s solution resolves this 
dilemma by offering local authorities both flexibility and control.   
Furthermore, the cost differential between bike racks and the hardwired, digital 
stations required by 3rd generation schemes significantly lowers barriers to more 
equitable service provision. In practice, the flexibility of SoBi’s architecture has been 
the catalyst for approaches to infrastructure distribution which would otherwise have 
been untenable: 
 
“This [Sobi’s approach] represents a sweet spot. I mean you have a lot of 
flexibility about where you install these hubs, there’s no heavy-duty wiring to 
worry about, there’s no physical work required on the street to install them so 
when you run a community input programme you can actually deliver a lot of 
those suggestions. I mean, there can be a lot of constraints with other kinds of 
infrastructure, but with this hybrid model the distribution patterns can 
reasonably reflect the input.” (Bikeshare designer, Motivate, 2016) 
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In addition, technical innovations, such as GPS, geo-fencing and a variety of 
GIS and social media tools, when configured sensitively, have acted to create synergy 
between the scheme’s physical and informational components while simultaneously 
enhancing equity, participation and performance. The design approach has also 
addressed the systemic nature of technology by positioning the scheme within a 
supportive framework of dynamic pricing structures, training, citizen-centric 
operations, and collaborative decision-making which have reduced friction and 
encouraged meaningful integration with the city’s cultural and technical spheres. How 
such processes unfold in contextually disparate environments may of course vary, 
however, the normative and technical tools used in Hamilton should offer design 
stakeholders a way of understanding how technologies and people may combine in 
mutually beneficial ways.   
In this sense, the research is an important corroboration of the emerging 
consensus within the bikeshare literature which, while acknowledging the role of 
emergent technologies in addressing issues of equity, emphasizes the need for 
consensus building as integral to the development of sustainable and socially 
responsive programmes. While SoBi’s design architecture may offer practitioners a 
useful archetype or staring point from which to conceive solutions, the co-operative 
principles seen in Hamilton may also be mobilized to adapt other configurations. Paul 
DeMaio, bikeshare consultant and Manager of Washington DC’s Capital bikeshare 
scheme, reflecting on the evolution of the city’s scheme, observed that: 
 
“So, in 2008 we had a system here [Washington] which had fixed stations 
which required a 6 months period or more for the local electricity company to 
make operational and so service took a long time to get up and running. We’re 
now using solar stations which take an hour and a half to put in, or to take it 
out for that matter. That has allowed us to be far more responsive. It has also 
meant that issues of accessibility can be worked through with local 
communities far more effectively.” (Paul DeMaio, practitioner, 2016) 
DeMaio, under the guidance of the city’s Chief of Commuter Services, has also 
developed engagement processes which echo those seen in Hamilton i.e. the use of 
survey tools, social media platforms, interactive maps and so on. 
 Even when technical innovation is not an integral part of the process, 
programme development can still act as a form of social cohesion by motivating 
communities to take a proactive role in shaping their environments. Sarah Shipley, 
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programme manager of Kansas City’s bikeshare, which uses a standard 3rd generation 
networked design, explains: 
 
“I guess what’s different in our case, is the way we went about implementing 
it. We saw it very much as a form of advocacy and used the spirit of co-
operation you find here in the mid-west and treat it essentially as a ‘barn 
raising’ exercise. More than 100 volunteers gave their time to put the bikes 
together and get the system up and running. Many still come back and help out 
when they can.” (Sarah Shipley, practitioner, 2016) 
What Hamilton and these additional examples from Washington and Kansas 
emphasize, is the socio-technical nature of system production and the potential of 
collaborative and integrative practices to materially influence technical activity. In 
terms of implications arising from this thesis, they demonstrate the capacity of such 
processes to produce modes of design and development which embrace reasoning as a 
wider activity than seen in much of the industry to-date. In Dublin for example, despite 
opportunities to reconceptualise its system with the help of community and academic 
partners, the scheme remains an indictment of the instrumental model of production, 
with design practices operating within the strict imperatives of autocracy and control. 
As such, it represents as important empirical example of how self-interest and 
indifference to social contexts are ultimately antithetical to pluralist forms of 
knowledge and design praxis.  
In sum, while certain technologies and architectures have inherent in them an 
additional capacity to encourage a climate of reciprocity and experimentation, the 
outcomes for citizens are far more likely to be dependent on the willingness of 
decision-makers to engage meaningfully with a diversity of interests and realize such 
interests using the technical means at their disposal. As such, the resocialization of 
technology through processes of secondary instrumentalization is not conditional on a 
set of historic technical conditions. Rather, it requires a critical sensitivity to 
circumstances and opportunities which may make systems more just, legitimate and 
practical. 
As the research has demonstrated, however, the world of design does not 
operate in a vacuum. Decision-making at the proximate level is intimately linked to 
the broader regulatory and economic environments and so realizing smart bikeshare’s 
political and instrumental value to cities can be supported through a number of policy 
initiatives which are discussed below.  
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8.2 Policy Implications 
The findings from the case studies, and from the work of previous scholars, make it 
axiomatic that developing public smart bikeshare within a framework of integrated 
planning and strategic development is essential to ensure it contributes meaningfully 
to the transportation eco-system and by extension to the amelioration of social and 
economic disadvantage. Configuring schemes to be tightly coupled with public transit 
for example leads to a high degree of interoperability with other modes, increases 
mobility, and maximizes its potential to support public health, manage congestion, 
support environmental objectives and reduce socio-cultural disadvantage. Realizing 
this potential will require decision makers operating at local, provincial and national 
scales to embrace smart bikeshare as a legitimate public transit mode and ensure its 
support though access to key resources such as public land and sustainable funding.  
 
“We subvent our railways and we subvent our bus services. Why shouldn’t we 
subvent our bikeshare schemes? Relying on advertising models is basically 
saying that it isn’t really public transportation at all. Of course, one of the 
failures of the economic system we have is that the external costs aren’t 
absorbed by the user. If we put the full carbon, social and environmental cost 
onto the different transport modes I suspect bikeshare would be far better 
funded.” (Planning Professional, Dublin, 2016) 
This also resonates with policy recommendations from the European Cyclists’ 
Federation policy framework for smart public-use bikesharing which emphasises the 
importance of a sustainable, equitable use of public resources, “be those direct or 
indirect, taking into consideration all costs of such systems, and not socialising private 
costs while maximising private profits.” (European, Cyclist’ Federation, 2017: 2) 
This process of integration is likely to be more effective when overseen by state 
transportation authorities, operating in conjunction with dedicated local expertise. 
Metrolinx, for example, has responsibility for strategic planning, the development of 
integration across public modes and the promotion of active transportation (walking 
and cycling). State authorities are also likely to have responsibility for technical 
integration such as ensuring the alignment of information systems for public transport 
customers and managing integrated ticketing for example. While SobiHamilton is 
aligned equitably with its physical transit infrastructure, increased technification is 
likely to bring additional challenges associated with digital interoperability. As such, 
Hamilton should engage proactively with this issue at the outset in order to avoid the 
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potential difficulties associated with retrospective planning. Given the flows of 
transport delivery to-date and the priority that provincial authorities have given the 
transit landscape more generally, one would reasonably assume that this process could 
be managed effectively and in a climate of co-operation. 
State agencies also typically have responsibility for procuring and licencing 
transport services provided to cities by private operators. As such, and in the event that 
bikeshare services are not provided in-house, they are likely to have the experience 
and expertise to ensure the interests of the general public are preserved through robust 
procurement and contract management. Had the National Transport Authority in 
Ireland, for example, been the commissioning authority for Dublinbikes then one 
might reasonably expect that many of the operational, technical and strategic issues 
associated with the scheme would have been averted, i.e. unstable funding, 
unregulated service quality, technical lock-in and path dependency, an absence of 
system development, physical and digital isolation and a lack of control/ownership of 
key infrastructure. Furthermore, given that such authorities operate exclusively in a 
transportation capacity, they are less likely to be compromised by municipal politics 
and local institutional inertia which could act to undermine their capacity to pursue 
solutions independently and in the public interest.  
Where state authorities wish to divest responsibility for managing schemes to 
a third party, then the use of not-for-profit organisations may represent a productive 
way of simultaneously controlling the participation of private capital while also 
supporting citizen focused innovation. As noted by Besley et al. (1999), private sector 
activity in the public good is value-driven while non-profit organizations are typically 
motivated by altruism and a desire to help the beneficiaries of public goods. In 
addition, Solana (2014), proposes that public, private, not-for-profit partnerships 
(PPNPs) tend to produce arrangements characterized by improved trust, a willingness 
to take risks, enhanced reciprocity and more sustainable outcomes. The experience 
from Hamilton serves to emphasize this point. 
While many cities have opted to implement single operator systems, there may 
be value in considering the proposition of creating hybrid public/private or multi-
player eco-systems. The European Cyclists’ Federation (2017) for example has 
proposed that licencing private systems to operate in tandem with state owned, public 
infrastructure could address historic problems of uneven service distribution and 
develop bikeshare as an equitable mode available to under-represented demographics.  
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“Eco-systems need to be created to allow, if not actually incentivize multi-
competitor environments to drive innovation and service to the community. A 
carefully designed service area strategy for all forms of public-use bike share 
is a critical component of a wider urban mobility strategy for any city / 
metropolitan area, tailoring it to local needs and desired outcomes.” 
(European, Cyclists’ Federation, 2017: 3) 
Such arrangements should be properly regulated to ensure positive outcomes for 
citizens and implemented to address issues of system interoperability (through 
common registration and payment processes, information exchange and integrated 
ticketing for example) thereby supporting ease of use across systems and 
administrative jurisdictions. Dublin for example has recently licenced two operators – 
‘Urbo’ and ‘Bleeperbike’ - two dockless bikeshare companies, to run alongside the 
existing Dublinbikes scheme (Ginty, 2018). In the coming months, it is expected that 
these schemes will expand into Dublin’s other local authority jurisdictions. The 
interactions and dependencies that develop between these companies and municipal 
actors will indicate the implications of such arrangements for transportation 
disadvantage, social cohesion, urban justice, the culture of sharing and so on. These 
new arrangements may also have implications for design itself. As an initial constraint, 
the licencing arrangement in Dublin requires users of these schemes to dock bikes at 
traditional bike racks, which essentially means that SoBi’s hybrid approach to 
architecture is the one being implemented. The two vendors have also already 
collaborated on a common registration process, which means that signing up to either 
system will allow new members to use the services of both companies (Duffy, 2018). 
Developing co-operative and reciprocal relationships with these operators might 
effectively extend the reach of Dublinbike’s with improved outcomes for access and 
service quality.  
‘Smarter’ bikeshare will also be dependent on the production and sharing of 
fined-grained, spatio-temporal data, which can support ease of use, operations 
management (geo-fencing, system rebalancing, station siting, theft-
prevention/unauthorized use and so on) predictive modelling and optimization, modal 
integration, strategic mobility planning and collaborative forms of innovation. 
DublinBike’s RFID based data, which was proprietary until 2013, has limited capacity 
to meaningfully enhance these processes. Data is also important in positioning smart 
bikeshare as a form of mobility-as-a-service and as part of the broader IoT eco-system. 
The creation of the General Bikeshare Feed Specification (GBFS) in North America 
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has been important in this regard by providing publicly available, standardized data 
sets that can be incorporated into mapping, navigation and transit platforms. Through 
SoBi, the standard has already been used to support integration with 3rd party 
transportation apps which, in addition to providing riders with real-time, multi-modal 
information, allows them to manage registration, booking and payment processes 
without the requirement to interface with the vendors’ website. As discussed in 
Chapter 6, the standard emerged from a coordinated effort by vendors in North 
America which, in addition to open data production, has also worked to negotiate 
barriers to bikeshare penetration through information exchange and collaborative 
problem-solving processes.  A similar initiate in Europe, developed in under the 
auspices of the European Commission from Mobility and Transport for example, 
would be an important mechanism through which the industry, municipalities, citizens 
and stakeholders might work in concert to achieve mutual goals. 
As discussed in Chapter 5, smart bikeshare may also function as an 
environmental sensing platform in a manner operationalized in MIT’s Copenhagen 
Wheel project. North American cities Portland and Chicago, and Fukushima in Japan, 
have already begun experimenting with these technologies to produce data which 
supplements information generated from municipal sensing networks (Curtis, 2015; 
Beser, 2016; Bousquet, 2017). When combined with the appropriate GIS tools, riders 
can support this process by creating important secondary data and in the process 
broaden the scope of bikeshare to include the dimensions of collective production and 
eco-collaboration.  
In Hamilton, it was observed that the availability of data (routes traces and 
usage patterns) could be a catalyst for social and environmental activism by enabling 
communities to problematize municipal decision-making and advocate more 
effectively for access to bikeshare and related cycling infrastructure. This reaffirms 
bikeshare’s potential as a political platform through which democratization may 
operate. 
Exploring smart bikeshare as an environmental platform might also be a useful 
way of mapping the skills, practices and structures required within state institutions to 
assimilate a variety of data (GPS, audio-visual, temperature, noise and so on) into 
business-as-usual activities.  
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“So, you might think using bikeshare data hinges primarily on the willingness 
of private operators to make their data available to cities. There is that aspect 
to it of course, but without a framework in place to use it productively then it’s 
just going to wind up abandoned somewhere. You need people with expertise, 
but you also need a culture that supports combining data from across different 
parts of the city to tell bigger stories.” (Outram, 2016) 
In the right context therefore, smart bikeshare may act as a catalyst for orienting 
siloed municipalities towards ‘process’ rather than ‘functional’ excellence, i.e. 
encouraging a more flexible approach to management which mobilizes resources from 
across traditionally distinct functional areas. Using data this way might have utility for 
a city such as Dublin for example, where the administrative terrain is disconnected and 
uncooperative. 
In sum, and considering its potential instrumental and political value, bikeshare 
data should be open and accessible, and sufficiently granular to maximize its utility 
across these domains. In addition, and to address ethical concerns, the use of private 
data should be in accordance with data security and privacy legislation. In the case of 
Europe for example, this would include the hosting of such data within European 
geographic and regulatory space, where protective legislation can be meaningfully 
applied. Given the risks as described in Chapter 3, data should also never be shared 
with, or sold to, third parties without the appropriate consent. 
8.3 Implications for Theory 
This project has been an important confirmation of the role of ideology and politics in 
the production of technology. Using an analytic framework which explicitly 
incorporates these dimensions has allowed the research to map and critique the 
rationalizations and ethical considerations operating to materially shape both the 
instrumental and valuative aspects of system design. A number of interpretative or 
post-structural approaches were considered at the outset, but as described in Chapter 
two, these adopted ontological positions which lacked a critical core and limited their 
capacity to produce useful insights. SCOT, for example, excludes consideration of pre-
existing power relations from the design process assuming as it does that all ‘relevant 
groups’ are present during the process of innovation. As such, only those groups 
actively influencing design can be represented using this model. Therefore, groups 
marginalized or excluded by power asymmetries essentially become invisible. The 
theory also focuses largely on the proximate influences shaping production and as such 
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is incapable of adequately accounting for the effects of the wider socio-cultural and 
political milieu. Other sociomaterial approaches are equally problematic. They 
propose an ontological position where human and non-human actors (technical 
artefacts for instance) are essentially indistinguishable, with the characteristics or 
essence of each being an emergent property of the networks within which they 
participate. Poststructural approaches such as these may have some epistemological 
value in highlighting the ways in which knowledge and discourse are constructed 
through the negotiations of key actors and at an ontological level they also recognise 
that technology ‘matters’, i.e. through its engagement with humans it can effect 
material and symbolic changes in the world. However, the primary problem of politics 
and power remains. Theoretical positions such as actor-network or assemblage theory, 
for example, lack a meta-narrative or ontological framework which prioritizes the role 
of inequality, injustice and struggle in shaping urban processes. Referring to 
assemblage theory, Brenner et al (2011) note that it attempts to reframe such processes 
with no reference to key concepts and concerns to critical urbanism such as: 
 
“…capital accumulation, class, property relations, exploitation, state power, 
territorial alliances, growth coalitions, structured coherence, uneven spatial 
development, spatial divisions of labor and crisis formation, among others. Yet 
the social relations, institutions, structural constraints, spatiotemporal 
dynamics, conflicts, contradictions and crisis tendencies of capitalism do not 
vanish simply because we stop referring to them explicitly.” (Brenner et al., 
2011) 
The result is what Sayer (1992) describes as a ‘naïve objectivism’ which 
presupposes that the rich descriptions of the relationships and interdependencies 
between human and non-human actors that it produces are self-explanatory rather than 
requiring mediation by “theoretical assumptions and interpretive schemata”. 
Critical theory of technology addresses these shortcomings by understanding 
technology production as a dialectical process within which design (and the 
rationalizations producing it) operates to support the way of life of one or another 
influential social group. As such, while it is cognisant of specific social groups and the 
strategies they employ, it also focuses on the broader cultural resources and taken-for-
granted assumptions brought into play in the design processes. These in turn are 
conditioned by political and bureaucratic ideologies, such as modes of governance, 
capital accumulation and the preservation of hierarchy and authority. 
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Instrumentalization theory supports an exploration of how these ideologies operate in 
practice through constitutive and implementation bias to produce technologies which 
conform not only to the plans and interests of particular actors but to produce and 
reproduce historically constituted power relations and socio-cultural forms. 
Furthermore, it also provides the normative and analytic tools to explore how 
oppressive or anti-democratic orthodoxies might be subverted and more socialist 
technologies created for the common good. In effect, it problematizes ‘regimes of 
truth’ informed by technocratic and instrumental reasoning and advocates instead a 
reflexivity which produces new identities and socio-technical practices.  
Within the context of this research, instrumentalization theory allowed the 
production of smart bikeshare to be understood explicitly as a process of political 
contestation with the meaning of systems dependent on the social, economic and 
cultural contexts from which they emerged. It also allowed the research to map two 
fundamentally different smart city ontologies. In Dublin the smart city construct – 
promoted as a platform for enhanced participation, collaboration and consensus 
building – emerged as essentially illusory. In reality, it serves powerful private 
interests and is, for the most part, a collage of disconnected projects given apparent 
coherence through discourse and image management. Hamilton, where the ‘smart’ 
construct is as yet embryonic, is beginning to formulate a strategic direction and an 
associated set of policy initiatives – primarily around transportation – within which 
pragmatic, solution-oriented decision making can occur. Based on the evidence thus 
far, should an overarching smart city narrative emerge here, it is likely to be one 
grounded in progressive notions of citizenship and rights to the city. In effect, 
Hamilton is defining a different technical code and one with social value at its core. In 
this sense the bikeshare schemes can be seen to be reflective of, and conditioned by, 
fundamentally different articulations of the smart city.  
In addition, the adapted conceptual model of the design process provides the 
additional means to understand technology’s post-implementation responsiveness to 
changing technical, social and environmental imperatives. As noted in chapter 7, this 
adaptation emphasizes that concretized solutions, rather than be an end in themselves, 
may incorporate new technologies, ideas and discursive frames when guided by 
reflexive rationalizations and integrative practices. Conversely, it serves to highlight 
the visibility of those systems which remain resistant to such influences. Since the 
implementation of DublinBikes for example, the city has continued to experience 
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technological change, with citizens continually adopting new technical devices and 
solutions, therefore, the static nature of the system, and the underlying reasons for it, 
have become more apparent and problematic. By contrast, SobiHamilton’s willingness 
to continually adapt to technical and social variables has been one of its defining 
characteristics. Updating the formulation as proposed by Feng and Feenberg (2008) 
aligns the model more closely with instrumentalization theory and emphasises both 
the processual nature of design and the capacity of technical actors to materially 
reconfigure solutions, post-implementation. As such, it represents a more coherent 
theoretical and methodological lens through which critical analysis may be applied to 
other technical systems.  
In this regard, critical theory of technology may be mobilized empirically to 
describe and critique design across multiple domains. Given the emancipatory agenda 
it shares with all critical theory, it may be most productive in sites where issues of 
contestation and democracy are to the fore. Not all technologies appropriate and shape 
people’s lives in quite the same way. While the design and distribution of ‘smart 
lighting’ infrastructure, for example, may be no less the product of ideologically biased 
decision making, it is unlikely to inspire the kinds of concern, criticism and political 
activism seen in response to environmental or surveillance technologies. Nevertheless, 
this need not necessarily constrain its use. Feenberg’s work has been used as an 
analytic lens to investigate the political implications of a diversity of technology design 
processes. These include gaming software (Grimes & Feenberg, 2012), online 
education platforms (Hamilton & Feenberg, 2009), surveillance technologies (Friesen 
et al, 2005), social media forums (Bakardjieva, 2009) and GIS systems (Hacklay, 
2013), amongst others.  
Important implications for theory then are that critical approaches to the 
understanding of technology are essential in accounting for the structural factors 
constraining democracy’s ability to generate new ideas, knowledge and modes of 
practice, while also preserving the possibility of a world where change may be possible 
and desirable. There should also be close critical inspection of theoretical positions 
which avoid explicitly engaging with technology as political and in the process ignore 
the opportunity to investigate the role of macro-level historical and cultural forces 
working to shape outcomes. Such theoretical positions may act to depoliticize 
technology production, or inadvertently contribute to its reification as neutral. 
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8.4 Opportunities for Further Research 
In keeping with the overall aims of the thesis, this section focuses on research 
opportunities which may develop smart bikeshare as an equitable and inclusive form 
of mobility. As such, it is concerned with complimenting and augmenting the findings 
from this project and in the process address a number of constraints and limitations 
encountered through the initial investigative process.  
Longitudinal Study of Hamilton 
A key difference between the cases in this study has been their relative maturity. 
Having been implemented in 2009, Dublinbikes represents a system which has 
developed and stabilized over an extended period of time. As such, the research 
findings from Dublin - and the analysis and critiques that followed - have an additional 
scope and reliability. By comparison, Hamilton is a relatively new system and, as a 
consequence, the narrative it supported is partial and incomplete. It remains to be seen, 
for example, how the scheme responds practically and ideologically to new economic, 
political and operational challenges, e.g. pressure from private capital, political or 
cultural resistance to system expansion, increased complexity in the city’s transit 
environment (which, as noted previously, may strain processes of integration for 
example), or the threat of competition from other operators. Can Hamilton retain its 
core values of participation, equity and innovation or will pressures from the external 
environment produce adaptations that essentially empty the scheme of its valuative 
content? In addition, what impact, if any, will broader smart city developments have 
on this process? A longitudinal study would address these questions and, in the 
process, might identify strategies for enhancing democracy’s resilience over the longer 
term.  
The potential of legacy technologies 
This research opted for empirical depth as a way of exploring the contingencies and 
interdependencies between design and place. While this approach produced theoretical 
insights which can be reasonably and logically applied to other sites of production, the 
findings could nevertheless be extended through research which focuses specifically 
on how the same conceptual design - incorporating the same potentialities - is realized 
in different locations. This might identify strategies likely to condition or recalibrate 
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legacy systems in order to make them more dynamic, functional and egalitarian. As 
noted in Chapter 5, for example, there is evidence of significant geographic variability 
in the nature of JCDecaux’s architecture across Europe, with its system in Brussels 
operating in significantly more creative ways than its Dublin equivalent. As a starting 
point, a taxonomy of 3rd generation schemes aimed at categorizing deployment 
strategies and functionality would be useful in this regard and aid in directing more 
detailed analysis. Understanding how other cities have animated networked-based 
approaches though adaptations involving GPS and GIS systems, social media 
platforms, hybrid bikes or solar technologies may allow us to relate such innovation 
back to the social, political and environmental contexts within which it occurs.  
Washington, for example, has demonstrated that the retention of networked 
infrastructure does not preclude experimentation with solar powered stations for cities 
with the appropriate climatic conditions.  The concept may even be a technically viable 
option in Dublin. In May of 2018, DCC announced that, as part of its Smarter Dublin 
programme, it intended to provide the city with 800 solar powered ‘compactor’ refuse 
bins. By its own estimates, it foresees this initiative reducing the amount on on-street 
bins by 20% (Power, 2018). If the idea is feasible in this context it may also be possible 
to retro-fit Dublin’s network (even in part) with modular units capable of being moved 
with relative ease and minimal cost. This would introduce an element of demand 
responsiveness currently absent in the system. 
The historic contractual arrangements in Dublin, operating in tandem with 
institutional inertia, make this type of experimentation improbable, particularly in the 
short term. Should innovation occur in Dublinbikes, it is far more likely to be 
predicated on exploiting the capabilities of ‘Urbo’ and ‘Bleeperbike’ through strategic 
alliances and technical arrangements that address the partiality of its current 
configuration. As such, it represents an interesting opportunity to conduct longitudinal 
research which maps the unfolding dynamic between key stakeholders and its effects 
on issues of access and disadvantage. Will DCC be willing (or able) to exert sufficient 
influence to encourage the kinds of reciprocity already occurring between the schemes 
and Dublinbikes, or will intractability and indifference continue to characterize 
Dublin’s institutional culture? What legal, regulatory and technical barriers might need 
to be negotiated as part of such a process and what role, if any, might implicated 
publics and engagement play? More generally, such research could contribute to our 
understanding of the potential of new, private entrants to the market to compliment 
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and extend legacy infrastructure for improved social outcomes. This research could be 
augmented by examining how other cities are currently negotiating this terrain.  It may 
be, for example, that co-operative models are being developed internationally which 
have the potential to inform strategic planning and development in Dublin.   
8.5 Concluding Remarks 
Smart bikeshare is an emergent form of urban mobility with an inherent, but largely 
unrealized, potential to positively reconfigure the functional, cultural and socio-
political rhythms of urban life. What this thesis has highlighted is the role of ideology 
in shaping the delivery and operation of systems and the capacity of design to translate 
and promote both neoliberal and democratic forms of governance. Realising the latter 
will depend on the imaginative capacity of key actors, operating at multiple spatial 
scales, to reconceptualise and restructure the ground rules and assumptions operating 
to create systems. Where collective reasoning, consensus building, and dynamic 
planning can be made to prevail, then schemes can be infused with meanings and 
values which transcend mere functionality or institutional self-interest. This is the 
challenge facing cities as they attempt to produce technology which meets social 
needs. Ontologically then, the thesis reaffirms Feenberg’s notion that technology is 
best seen not as a thing but as a ‘site of contestation’ where the dialectic between 
operational autonomy and democratic rationalization plays out. The outcomes, at an 
ontic or case by case level, will either conserve social hierarchies and political regimes 
on the one hand or champion those values subjugated and marginalized by 
asymmetries in power on the other. It will be interesting to see how the smart bikeshare 
industry develops. Its trajectory should tell us if schemes such as Hamilton are mere 
peculiarities or if they are symptomatic of a more fundamental trend towards a socialist 
technology. 
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Appendix 2: System Interoperability and Expansion 
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Appendix 3: System Components of Both Schemes 
Dublinbikes 
Figure A1: System Interface                               Figure A2: System Docking 
              
Source: Dublinbikes, 2017                                  Source: Dublinbikes, 2017 
Figure A3: Bike and Dock Availability 
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SobiHamilton 
Figure A4: Core Components of the SoBi Scheme 
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Figure A5: SoBi System Overview 
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Figure A6: Dynamically Creating Cycling Zones 
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Figure A7: Locating a Bike Using the SoBi Interface 
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Figure A8:  Naming and Annotating Trips 
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